A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY CAPACITY BUILDING:
THE WORK OF THE ECB PROJECT

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This dissertation is submitted in part fulfillment for the Masters of Art in Development and Emergency Practice, Oxford Brookes University.
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, expect where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.

Signed: [Signature] Date: 30 January 2012

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

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Statement of Ethics Review Approval

This dissertation involved human participants. A Form E1B1 for each group of participants, showing ethics review approval has been attached to this dissertation as an appendix.

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ABSTRACT

Exploring the interaction between capacity building theory and practice is the central theme in this research. Allan Kaplan’s Framework for Capacity Development was applied to the Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project, a multi-million dollar capacity building initiative undertaken by six of the world’s largest non-government organisations (NGO). This study is an opportunity to explore alternative paradigms, to understand if real world capacity building is shifting its understanding and ethos from traditional skill building focus to that of a more holistic appreciation for the social processes involved in change. The study reviews the ECB Project’s approach to staff capacity building, analyses the gaps and identifies good practice based on primary and secondary research strategies. The research structure identifies asymmetries and synergies between theory and practice by categorising information into the seven categories featured in Kaplan’s framework. The study’s data collection and analysis methodology included document analysis and personal interviews with global ECB project implementers, national staff responsible for carrying out the activities, and capacity building experts external to the project. The research concludes by summarising how the key findings of the case study relate to Kaplan’s framework and offers a conclusions about the framework itself.
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Life gives us people who lead us on our journey, and for that I am very grateful.

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Shaun Rude, Autumn and Hob Murphy, you give me balance and perspective. You remind me of where I come from and who I want to be.

Jonathan Treagust, I dedicate this piece of work to you.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACBF</td>
<td>African Capacity Building Foundation</td>
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<td>AI</td>
<td>Appreciative Inquiry</td>
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<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance</td>
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<td>APIP</td>
<td>Annual Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>CBHA</td>
<td>Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community based organisation</td>
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<td>CDRA</td>
<td>Community Development Resource Association</td>
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<td>CEP</td>
<td>Country Engagement Plan</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CRED</td>
<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>Emergency Capacity Building</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<td>HERR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Emergency Response Review</td>
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<td>Hyogo Framework for Action</td>
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<td>IDNDR</td>
<td>International Decade for National Disaster Reduction</td>
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<td>International Development Research Center</td>
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<td>Interagency Working Group</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government organisation</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>Save the Children – United States</td>
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter summary
In order to understand why emergency capacity building is of relevance, this chapter will introduce the increasing costs of disasters, and a snapshot of disaster trends. It will then introduce Allan Kaplan’s Capacity Development Framework (Kaplan, 1999), which will be applied to a case study. A description of the case study – The Emergency Capacity Building Project – will then be presented. The question of what is ‘good enough’ in capacity building then posed. Finally, the chapter outlines why this study is timely and relevant.

1.1. Why emergency capacity building matters
A recent review of humanitarian emergency response found that humanitarian aid workers are facing new challenges such as the economic crisis and security risks. The Humanitarian Emergency Response Review, chaired by Lord Paddy Ashdown concluded that to simply improve our capacity to meet the status quo in emergency response was not enough (2011). The report proposed that new approaches to capacity building, resilience, leadership, accountability, innovation and humanitarian space needed to be found in order to “meet the new challenges” (HERR, 2011, p.2). Preparedness and response experts like John Twigg, believe the human and financial cost of disasters continues to rise (Twigg, 2004). In 2010 alone, more than 215 million people were affected by natural disasters (Development Initiatives, 2010). In 2009, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member governments spent USD 11.8 billion on humanitarian assistance alone (development Initiatives, 2010, p.6). Those who implement such large-scale investments, often aim to do so in line with the humanitarian imperative to alleviate human suffering without a political or partisan agenda. These words are easily spoken but are much more difficult to follow because disasters are a complex interface of vulnerability, risk and exposure to hazards. Improving humanitarian assistance means addressing the deep rooted vulnerabilities and risks faced by local communities as well as ensuring humanitarian workers have the leadership ability, skills, relationships, power and trust required to design, deliver and coordinate effective life-saving assistance.

The topic of emergency capacity building has particular significance in today’s world because in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes, risking lives and spinning in a continuum of unsustainability, aid agencies must find new ways to build the capacity of emergency responders to increase the effectiveness in which disaster-affected populations are supported (IASC, 2010). The 2011 Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) report on Leadership in Action, aptly states that “While
individuals can develop their own leadership skills, it is the organisation and the system as a whole that create a context within which these skills can most effectively be put to use” (Buchanan-Smith, Scriven, 2011, p.6). Emergency capacity building aims at assisting the aid industry in its professionalisation.

1.2 Kaplan’s Capacity Development Framework

Allan Kaplan, formerly of Community Development Resource Association (CDRA), a development and capacity building organisation, focuses on the unique interface between organisational change and individual capacity development. He advocates the need to abandon reductionist discourse in exchange for a more morphogenic approach where relationships and the ‘(in)visible’ social patterns and behaviours matter as much as the process of building essential skill sets (Kaplan, 2002). Kaplan developed a theory in the early 1990s, later published in the 1999 United Nations Dossier, ‘Organisational Capacity: A different perspective’. The theory outlines seven elements of capacity that are considered requirements upon which all other capacity is built upon: Context and Conceptual Framework, Vision, Strategy, Culture, Structure, Skills and Material Resources. Within these elements, Kaplan outlines what he considers visible and invisible capacity building processes, treating capacity building as living and dynamic concept. The invisible concepts referred to (Kaplan, 1999) are not easy to tangibly measure, such as one’s attitude, one’s perception of the world, how the individuals of an organisation fit together to create the whole. Therefore, Kaplan’s framework is built upon a loose hierarchy that values the invisible social processes first and the tangible outputs second. He believes capacity building should be seen as a “point of transition” where “processes will at times lose their coherence, form and rhythm, so as to enable the new to emerge” (Kaplan, 2002, p. xviii). The specifics of Kaplan’s framework will be described in further detail in the Methodology chapter.

Kaplan’s framework was considered alongside other frameworks but was ultimately chosen because of its longevity of existence, with more than two decades of application across the NGO community and beyond (Fowler and Ubels, 2010, p.2). The framework identifies seven organisational components, placed in loose hierarchy, and viewed as necessary to maintain changes in capacities over time. The components are described below (Kaplan, 1999).

a. **Context and conceptual framework** – A framework that reflects the organisation’s understanding of the world. Its attitude, confidence and ability to believe it can affect its world.

b. **Vision** – Interaction between understanding of particular context and appreciation of particular responsibility yields organisational vision.
c. **Strategy** – Organisational vision yields an understanding of what the organisation intends to do; strategy is a translation into how the organisation intends to realise its vision.

d. **Culture** – The norms and values, which are practiced in an organisation; the way of life; the way things are done. What people say they value and believe in and what is practiced in the organisation are often very different.

e. **Structure** – Roles and functions are clearly defined and differentiated, lines of communication and accountability untangled, and decision-making procedures transparent and functional.

f. **Skills** – The growth and extension of individual skills, abilities and competencies – the traditional terrain of training courses.

g. **Material resources** – Finances, equipment, office space, and so on.

Kaplan believes a paradigm shift is required in an approach to capacity building, describing it as an “important and ubiquitous concept…with little coherent or collective appreciation – either for the theory or the practice” (1999, Development Dossier, n.p.). He calls for alternatives to what aid practitioners are doing now, for “genuine attempts to think through one’s own practical response to thoughts of implementing such an alternative perspective” (1999, Development Dossier, n.p.).

1.3 The Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project

The primary goal of the Emergency Capacity Building Project is to demonstrate, “Improved speed, quality, and effectiveness of the humanitarian community in saving lives, improving the welfare, and protecting the rights of people in emergency situations” (Morris and Shaunghnessy, 2007, p.i). The project began in March 2005 and is scheduled to finish in 2013.

The ECB Project was conceived by a group of seven emergency directors who were responding to the need to rise to the new and complex challenges that NGOs were facing when responding to disasters (Morris and Shaunghnessy, 2007). In 2003, the NGOs formed an Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Emergency Capacity with seven members, including CARE USA, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children US (SC-US), and World Vision International (WVI) (Braun, 2004). Collectively the seven agencies represented USD 3 billion in spending on relief and development aid, of which USD 1.2 billion is spent on relief assistance alone (Braun, 2004). Some 50,000 staff members work on projects in over 100 countries around the world (Braun, 2004).
In 2004 the IWG published a scoping study entitled, *Report on Emergency Capacity: Analysis For the Interagency Working Group on Emergency Capacity*, which identified emergency capacity gaps specifically within the member organisations and more broadly, within the industry (Braun, 2004). The project began shortly after the publishing of the study.

The project is funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, Microsoft, European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), Department for International Development (DFID) and others (ECB, 2011, Morris and Shaughnessy 2007, CARE 2008). It has been split into two phases. Phase I, ran from 2005 – 2007 with an estimated budget of USD 5.2 million (Social Impact, 2007), and was focused on building agency capacity around four themes:

1. Humanitarian staff capacity building
2. Accountability and measurement of impact
3. Disaster risk reduction
4. Information communications technology and resource development

Phase II began in 2008 and is expected to finish in 2013 with a confirmed budget of USD 5 million and a fundraising target of 12 million (personal communication, 27 January, 2012). Its focus is on creating global impact on themes one through three listed in Phase I, by targeting capacity building efforts at three levels:

1. Field-level
2. Six ECB member agencies
3. Partner and non-ECB members

The ECB Project spans across Bangladesh, Bolivia, Indonesia, Niger, and the Horn of Africa (including Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia). The countries were selected on the basis of “geographical distribution; level of disaster or emergency risk; political stability; regional linkages and the potential reach of learning developed within the consortia” (ECB, 2011). Additional considerations were given to “diversity of contexts or settings, including urbanization, linguistic and cultural background, and climate trends for each country” (ECB, 2011).

The ECB website lists 26 partners, including UN agencies, local partners, communities, learning institutions and universities as well as national government actors among a broad range of others committed to improving disaster management capacity. At a country level, each consortium has an agency that is committed to leading the implementation of the ECB
Consortia Engagement Plan (CEP), which includes activities created around the following objectives (ECB, 2011):

- Improving their performance in recruiting, retaining, developing, and deploying skilled staff;
- Increasing their accountability to affected populations and communities;
- Decreasing the risks from disasters through local and national government policy changes;
- Improving the coping mechanisms of participating communities;
- Improving the coordination in preparedness and response;
- Developing agreements and work towards implementing joint response activities; and
- Gathering data and document lessons for sharing with global agencies and sectors.

**The ECB Project: ‘Good Enough’?**

In 2007, ECB put together a resource called the *Good Enough Guide*, which seeks to achieve a structured approach to impact measurement and accountability. Accountability and impact measurement was one of four thematic areas within the ECB Project. It is significant because it applies to all aspects of their work as well as the central aspect of this study: What is ‘good enough’ when it staff capacity building? What ethos should the humanitarian sector follow when conducting capacity building? How do we ensure that capacity building efforts place disaster affected people in the forefront of our agendas? How should we approach evaluation of capacity building? How do we measure the impact of social processes that often have ‘invisible’ outcomes? The following quote establishes a baseline for what being ‘good enough’ means to ECB agencies, based on *The Good Enough Guide*.

“To evaluate being ‘good enough’ means choosing a simple solution rather than an elaborate one. ‘Good enough’ does not mean second best: it means acknowledging that, in an emergency response, adopting a quick and simple approach to impact measurement and accountability may be the only practical possibility. When the situation changes, you should aim to review your chosen solution and amend your approach accordingly. The Good Enough Guide aims to help field-based staff ask two questions and use the answers to inform the work they do and the decisions they take (2007, p.7).

The sentiment of this *Good Enough Guide* is a reminder for practitioners to ask themselves hard questions about the impact they are having on a disaster-affected population, and how they can best include the populations they are assisting in planning, implementing and

1.4 Relevance and timeliness of the study
This study is timely because the ECB Project has passed its half way mark. Conceived out of my desire to better understand emergency capacity building, and coupled with the fact that I have personally worked in emergency responses where ECB was present, it gives me great personal fulfillment to be able to reflect on a real life project as a way of understanding the relationship between theory and practice. Finally, this study is occurring at a particularly relevant time because it precedes a PhD thesis, in which the aim is to design a relevant framework that can be applied to a practical humanitarian context. This Master’s dissertation is an invaluable opportunity to evaluate the complexities of translating theory into practice.

1.5 Chapter outline
Chapter one begins with an introduction to disasters, followed by a description of the two major components of this study: Kaplan’s Capacity Development Framework (1999) and the Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB, 2012). It then discusses the timeliness and relevance of the study, followed by an outline of each chapter. Chapter two explains the aim and objectives of the study. Chapter three presents the design and methodology as well as the limitations and ethical considerations of the research. Chapter four discusses disasters and emergency capacity building by tracing back the history, exploring present and past theories, and the complexities layered within the themes. Chapter five is an analysis of how Kaplan’s framework translates into practice through application to the ECB Project. Key findings, gaps and good practice are presented in the analysis. Chapter six draws conclusions about how ECB’s project relates to Kaplan’s framework. It includes interview comments from Kaplan himself, and draws four conclusions about Kaplan’s Capacity Development Framework.
CHAPTER 2   RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES

Chapter summary
This chapter explains the aim and objectives of this study. It outlines the study’s scope, outlining that the study is an examination of how theory translates into practice along with the identification of gaps and good practice.

2.1 Aim
To critically review how Allan Kaplan’s Framework for Capacity Development translates into practice by using the Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project as a case study.

2.2 Objectives

1) Review the ECB Project’s approach to staff capacity building using Kaplan’s framework for capacity development.

2) Analyse gaps in the ECB Project based on Kaplan’s theoretical framework.

3) Identify aspects of good practice in the ECB Project based on Kaplan’s theoretical framework.

2.3. Scope of the study
The ECB Project’s size and reach makes it a desirable subject of study because no comparable effort at emergency capacity building has been attempted (Social Impact, 2007). Due to the breadth and scope of information available about the topic of capacity building, this dissertation will focus on only one case study – the ECB Project.

It will focus on understanding the challenges of building capacity within a consortium; establish a baseline of what ECB says it will do through analysis of project documents verses what it actually does through key informant interviews with ECB Project implementers, NGO representatives (field and global levels) as well as ECB partners and capacity development experts. The study will use Kaplan’s framework as a lens to generate key findings about ECB’s staff capacity building approach taking the time to look at how well the theory applies to the real-world capacity building efforts of a multi-million dollar project.

As an illustration, this study will look at one of the four themes ECB conducts capacity building on: staff capacity building. The other themes on Accountability and Impact
Measurement, Disaster Risk Reduction and Information Communications Technology will be considered within the broader context but will not be looked at in great detail. This is not a study to establish how effective ECB is at achieving its mandate; rather it is a study looking compares theory and practice. It aims to expose the gaps between theory and practice whilst identifying areas of success and good practice. It was anticipated that with universal principles, one should discover an easy interface between Kaplan’s theory and ECB’s practice.
CHAPTER 3 DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Chapter summary
This chapter begins by exploring the difference between design and methodology. It then explains the reason a case study and theoretical framework was chosen as the design framework and the ways in which qualitative data analysis was employed as the primary methodology. The role of Appreciative Inquiry as a cross-cutting theme within the methodology is then presented, followed by a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen design and methodology framework. The role of the researcher as an insider and outsider to the study is then explained. The chapter concludes by outlining the limitations of the study and ethical considerations.

Design and methodology of the study
David de Vaus, author of Research Design in Social Research (2001), writes that design and methodology are different concepts, and therefore must not be confused. A design is the structure used to answer a research question before data collection or analysis can commence. Using an analogy, de Vaus says a builder must first decide the type of building that is required – a skyscraper, apartment block or office building – before a work plan can be developed. Research design is similar, he says, in that one must develop an overarching structure before selecting a methodology in order to: “ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible” (2001, p.9).

3.1 Design
A single case study examined through the lens of Kaplan’s Capacity Development Framework is the chosen design for this study. In order to explore the components of emergency capacity building, I have chosen to apply Allan Kaplan’s Framework for Capacity Development as a way of interpreting the ECB case study and drawing conclusions about the information harvested. This particular case study will strive to make theoretical generalisations, in order to answer the question: “What does this case tell us about a specific theory (or theoretical proposition)” (de Vaus, 2001, p.237). This particular design combination aims to offer an avenue for exploring how theory can be applied to real world situations. The ECB case study, when applied to Kaplan’s framework will aim to build: a “full picture of the sequence of events, the context in which they occur, and the meaning of actions and events as interpreted by participants and their meanings as given by a context” (de Vaus, 2001, p.237).
The weaknesses in the design are accounted for and offset in so far as possible. Firstly, it is acknowledged that while case studies have the potential to arrive at fuller, richer understanding, for many years they have been the “ugly duckling of research design” because they are often seen as ‘soft’ options (de Vaus, 2001, p.219). To counter this, an analysis of the ECB Project’s documents was done by inserting qualitative data into Kaplan’s framework categories to analyse shortfalls and synergies.

Secondly, case studies can have conflicts regarding their validity – by both those participating in the study and those reviewing the study externally. The way that facts are laid out and described for a case study are always through the researcher’s perception, subsequently imposing personal perceptions of what is ‘true’ – and thus unintentionally slanting the facts through the researcher’s own interpretation (de Vaus, 2001). Simply by mentioning certain facts and selecting to omit others, and by listing those facts in order of priority, the researcher is in danger of presenting information that is already biased (de Vaus, 2001, Yin 2003), risking internal validation. However, by being upfront, intentional and explicit about the selection and ordering process, the researcher can mitigate risks and ensure internal validity.

Thirdly, case studies are often criticised for having no basis of generalisation to a wider population (Bryman, 2008, de Vaus 2001), for being, “just that – a case – and cannot be representative of a larger universe of cases” (de Vaus, 2001, p. 237).

The strengths of the case study as a design for research is its ability to intensively examine a single case, to account for and analyse the influence of a range of factors including the likes of context, history and time. Cousin, author of Researching Learning in Higher Education, says that case study analysis is “messy terrain” which involves “a degree of connoisseurship, that is, a nose for an emerging focus, a supportive theoretical literature, exemplary stories and vignettes, appropriate methods to use, analytical moves to make, data to shed or to keep and write-up flair” (2009, p.137). Within each successful case study, parameters are set to ensure adequate time for data collection and analysis while maintaining the depth required for the study to be informed and successful. Cousin writes that conducting analysis of multiple case studies risks neglecting the “science of the singular” which aims to grapple with the complexity depth and uniqueness of a case and to “self-consciously dance with the tension between the specific and the general” (2009, p.134). Cousin also makes the argument that “the real business of case study is particularization, not generalization” (Cousin, 2009, p. 135); in other words, it is important to look for uniqueness.
3.2 **Methodology**

Successful studies, and more specifically case studies, have strong methodologies that demonstrate internal and external validity through the means of gathering and analysing information. This study is centred on qualitative data analysis through primary interviews – semi-structured interviews conducted with ECB Project partners; and, secondary data collection and analysis from publicly available ECB sources. The goal of which was to gain an overall sense of the ways the ECB Project reflects the seven aspects of Kaplan’s Capacity Development Framework through a “structured, planned and purposeful” methodology (de Vaus, 2001, p. 251).

3.3 **Document analysis and key informant interviews**

A baseline assessment of quantitative secondary data was developed by looking at a myriad of 19 ECB generated documents, including final reports, external evaluations, lessons learned and case studies. Key information and findings were then plotted into Kaplan’s seven categories. Out of the 19 documents, the primary sources were narrowed down to:

2. ECB Tools Summary, 2010
4. ECB Phase I Final Project Report, 2008
5. ECB Phase I Final Evaluation Report, 2007
6. ECB Project Mid-Term Review, 2006
7. Emergency Capacity Report, 2004

Seven key informant interviews were then conducted as a second methodology for collecting and analysing information in order to focus specifically on discovering the strengths and weaknesses of the practical implementation of Kaplan’s seven framework aspects. Additionally, the interviews assisted in understanding where the ‘pure’ idealized abstraction departs from the practical (de Vaus, 2001, p. 251). A summary of the key information interviews is available in Appendix E, listing the organisation, level of authority, gender and date the interview was conducted.

The semi-structured interviews were conducted with ECB Project staff, NGO Agency staff from senior levels, in-country humanitarian directors, senior management in the Consortium for British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA), a consortium aimed at strengthening coordination and capacity of the humanitarian sector. Allan Kaplan, the author of the Capacity Development Framework, was also interviewed.
Key informants were selected by their ability to communicate a national or global perspective on capacity building and the ECB Project in order to keep analysis at a broad level. The national level was included because specific consortia experience contributes to the larger picture of the ECB Project as a whole. Interviews lasted for one hour, unless the interviewees were enthusiastic and wanted to speak about the topic longer. Ten people were approached for interview, and all agreed; however, due to scheduling conflicts, only seven were able to interview. Each interviewee signed a consent form that allowed for the conversation to be recorded over Skype. Interviews were then transcribed and quotes emailed for approval as an additional measure of ensuring the research was ethically sound. Interview questions and transcriptions are attached in Appendix D.

3.4 Appreciative Inquiry, a cross-cutting theme
One cross-cutting theme central to the ethos of this study has been that of Appreciative Inquiry (AI) as a means of ensuring the research remains rich in the lives and perspectives of people and their relationships. AI recognises that “[e]very organisation was created as a solution designed in its own time to meet a challenge or satisfy a need of society”, including and especially, the Emergency Capacity Building Project (Cooperrider and Whitney, 2005, p.1). The AI methodology has been around since the 1980s, and has been used in the non-profit sector with Save the Children and World Vision (Cousin, 2009). Cooperrider and Whitney (2005) believe that at the heart of Appreciative Inquiry is the assumption that “organisations are centres of vital connections and life-giving potentials: relationships, partnerships, alliances, and ever-expanding webs of knowledge and action that are capable of harnessing the power of combinations of strengths” (2005, p.1). Ultimately, Appreciative Inquiry allows the researcher to link relationship with perception, action and output, acknowledging that capacity building is about the process as much as the result.

3.5 Framing the research
My background in emergency response and more specifically, my experience with World Vision and its work with the ECB means that I am both an outsider and an insider in this study. I was superficially familiar with ECB and its objectives but not until taking up this study did I fully realise the multiple layers of the project, its ambitious nature and the complexity of its activities and dynamics. My first introduction to ECB was in Sri Lanka in 2007 when the Good Enough Guide was released. My second interaction was in 2009 during the Padang earthquake in Indonesia when the Indonesia consortium responded together as one humanitarian community. The mixed reaction to the response motivated me to learn more about ECB’s approach to capacity building.
3.6 Limitations of the study

There were a number of limitations within this study, which were acknowledged and countered when possible. Firstly, more key informants would have been helpful. Due to the fact that interview were held during the Christmas season, many NGO staff were not available. From an NGO perspective, the Horn of African and Indonesia consortia were the only consortia represented and thus diminished the diversity of consortia perspectives and the ability to capture endogenic capacity building processes (Anderson and Woodrow 1989, Simillie 2001, Kaplan, 2002).

Secondly, if we consider the single case study structure a limitation to verifying how well Kaplan’s capacity building framework translates into practice, then it could have been beneficial to study another case similar to that of ECB. But, since no such one exists (Morris and Shaughnessy, 2007) the study immediately focused on a single case.

Finally, all studies are in danger of meeting a self fulfilling prophecy, described here by de Vaus: “In any research there is always the danger that the researcher’s expectations and values will inadvertently dictate the way he or she collects and interprets information” (de Vaus, 2001, p. 83). I expected to find that ECB’s activities and approach to capacity building closely mirrored the components mentioned in Kaplan’s framework, demonstrating value in having a theory that so readily translates into practice. I therefore was conscious to listen for evidence that countered my expectations.

3.7 Ethical considerations

This study followed the principles of voluntary participation. Interviewees were invited to participate after given an information sheet that explained the research project. All but one interview were anonymous and confidential as requested by the interviewees; interviewees were given the option to opt out at any time. Consent to be interviewed was given by all who accepted the interview invitation.
4 LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter summary
This literature review discusses two central themes. The first is about disasters, and includes deconstruction of the concepts of vulnerability, risk, hazards and the origin of disasters. A discussion of the theories that explain disaster and everyday risk follows with an overview of the disaster management cycle. Disaster response actors are then examined, with a focus on the overlaps of their roles and responsibilities. Finally, disaster preparedness is explored through consideration of the Hyogo Framework for Action and the paradigm shift to preparedness.

The second theme, emergency capacity building, spends time exploring the difficulties in defining capacity building. A list of definitions is produced, along with a description of how the ECB Project and Allan Kaplan define capacity building. A range of frameworks used by capacity building actors is then discussed, illustrating the many approaches to the concept. Capacity building is then critiqued for sometimes being neoliberalist, with its hegemonic, capitalist values and policies, and technocratic modalities of ‘building’ capacity. The critique suggests that perhaps there are unintended but harmful consequences of capacity building due to asymmetries in partnership, power and participation. Finally, the role of the capacity builder is examined as a way of understanding that there is a place for both external and internal actors in emergency capacity building.

4.1 Disasters and disaster response

Disasters are not ‘natural’
In 2010 ‘natural’ disasters killed more than 300,000 people, demonstrating a lack of ability on behalf of governments, institutions, the private sector and NGOs to save lives and protect livelihoods (World Disasters Report, 2011). In other words, the causes of disaster are a culmination of social, political, economic and technological vulnerability, which result in human and economic loss. Human loss of life due to disasters is highest in the poorest countries. On average, a developed country will see 22.5 deaths per disaster; medium level countries have 14.5 and least developed countries (LCD) average 1,052 deaths (IFRC cited in Wisner et al 2004, p.25). The poor are hit the hardest because for many, daily survival is a challenge, and disaster prevention a luxury. The poor often live on land vulnerable to drought and flooding; in buildings that do not comply with earthquake zones; or, in urban areas where streets are impassible for emergency vehicles. Although rich countries may record higher financial costs of disasters, the human toll is concentrated in developing nations, where the
poor have limited coping mechanisms. For instance, in 2010 more than 827.6 million people were considered slum dwellers by UN-Habitat (World Disasters Report, 2011) and more than one billion people are estimated by DFID to be malnourished (DFID, 2012).

Pelling’s book, *Natural Disasters and Development in a Globalizing World*, states that disasters are human induced and not ‘natural’ (2003). On a macro scale, globalisation can create issues of uneven distribution of food and fuel, unequal access to assets and unjust trade policies enhancing the vulnerability of countries and populations. On a local level, vulnerability increases with weak governance; cultural attitudes that overlook disaster preparedness; and, national policies that do not account for human safety.

The trends in disasters are closely linked with a myriad of factors: rapid population growth, especially in urban areas; chronic food insecurity due to floods or droughts caused by small changes in weather patterns; and, technological hazards such as the nuclear threat in Japan after the Sendai earthquake in 2011, or a chemical spill like the one in Bhopal, India in 1984. Climate change is causing sinking mega cities in Asia, rising sea levels along coastal delta areas and altered weather patterns (World Disasters Report, 2011). Weak governance systems are resulting in inadequate support services in transportation and health (World Disasters Report, 2011). Secondary disasters such as shack fires, epidemics and road accidents further increase the vulnerability of the poor.

John Twigg, author and specialist in disaster risk reduction, defines ‘disaster’ as “damage and disruption that exceeds the affected society’s capacity to cope (Twigg, 2004). The Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), a database of information on disasters, defines a disaster through the following criteria: ten or more people killed; 100 or more reported affected; declaration of a state of an emergency; or, a call for international assistance (Ganeshan and Diamond, 2009, CRED, 2012). Disaster is a complex and layered concept. The next section explains how and why disasters occur.

**Deconstructing vulnerability and risk**

Greg Bankoff, author of *Rendering the World Unsafe: ‘Vulnerability’ as a Western Discourse*, criticises donors for viewing disasters as physical events requiring largely technical solutions (2001, p.25). Bankoff believes that populations are at risk because of societal marginalisation determined by variables such as gender, class, age, ethnicity and disability (2001, p.25). Such marginalisation is what Ben Wisner, a researcher on disasters and risk, terms “vulnerability”. Wisner defines vulnerability as: “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that can influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with,
resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” (Wisner, 2004, p.11). Equally important, is recognition of the poor’s ability to offset their own vulnerability through existing capacities and assets such as labour, human capital, productive assets, household relations and social capital, writes social policy theorist and researcher, Caroline Moser (1998). Moser considers the multi-dimensional nature of capacity from the perspective of an individual, household, province, region and country. In an emergency it is important to ensure both vulnerability and capacity are accounted for and responded to appropriately. This concept is put into an equation by disaster and development theorist Andrew Collins, who calculates disaster risk by multiplying hazard and vulnerability, then dividing it by capacity as demonstrated in Figure 1. This equation demonstrates that without vulnerability, a hazard cannot do damage. For example, an earthquake in a shoddily built apartment block may cause high numbers of death if the building was not constructed according to building codes. If that same earthquake occurred with those same people standing in an open field where the hazard has been eliminated and there may be no deaths.

**Figure 1: Disaster risk equation**

This equation is calculated by multiply the hazard and vulnerability then dividing it by the coping capacity (Collins, 2009, p.20).

\[
\text{Disaster risk} = \frac{\text{hazard} \times \text{vulnerability}}{\text{capacity}}
\]

**Disaster theories and frameworks**

There are various models and frameworks that describe how unsafe conditions, marginaliation and global market forces can make people vulnerable to everyday and disaster risk. These include, Chambers and Conway’s definition of livelihoods (Chambers and Conway, 1992), which captures that livelihoods are complex and diverse realities of life. Their definition goes on to say that a livelihood means having capabilities and assets to make a living, and that a livelihood is sustainable when it can “recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short and long-term” (Chambers and Conway, 1992, p.6). Other theorists later joined the conversation about how vulnerability, assets, livelihoods and capabilities interact, including Anderson and Woodrow’s Capacities and Vulnerabilities
framework (1998), designed to ensure relief responses have a development angle and
distinguish between vulnerability and capacity in three areas: Physical (material), Social
(organisational) and Motivational (attitudinal) (Twigg, 2001). Moser’s Asset Vulnerability
framework (1998) is a way of categorising the tangible and intangible assets of the poor in
order to understand how asset management affects vulnerability. CARE International’s
Household Livelihood Security (HLS) model by David Sanderson (2000) is about getting
access to income and other resources in a way that will not only meet basic needs but also
withstand shocks and stresses. The Pressure and Release model developed by Wisner et al
(2004) demonstrates the progression of vulnerability through the categories of Unsafe
Conditions, Dynamic Pressures and Root Causes to emphasize the social causation of
disasters (Wisner et al 2004, Sanderson 2009). Complimentary to that model is the Access
model by Wisner et al (2004), which describes the economic and political causes of a disaster
and the role of livelihood strategies in reducing vulnerability (Wisner et al 2004, Sanderson
2009).

The frameworks listed above highlight the need to assess vulnerability, risk (everyday and
disaster) and capacity as dynamic concepts that change across time and space. People are
vulnerable to disaster risk because of man-made factors that occurs before a hazard makes
impact such as poverty, market isolation and social marginalisation. From this perspective, it
becomes more apparent that disasters are not an ‘act of God’ and can be prevented (Wisner et
al, 2004).

The Disaster Management Cycle
The Disaster Management Cycle illustrates that disasters and development are inextricably
linked (Twigg, 2004, Collins, 2009). ‘Disaster management’ is a term used to describe all six
stages carried out by relief and development actors (Twigg, 2004). The first three stages of
the cycle represent what is typically known as ‘disaster reduction’ or ‘disaster risk reduction’
(Twigg, 2004) and is focused upon by development agencies: preparedness, early warning
and mitigation (Collins, 2009). The last three stages typically engage emergency responders,
and are described by Twigg as relief, recovery and rehabilitation. Disaster management cycles
are nuanced differently, depending on the source used; however, the same principles of
preventing and mitigating risk, saving lives and sustaining lives still stand (Twigg, 2004). The
process of recovering from a disaster is not linear and looks different in each country,
province or state, family or individual (Heijmans, 2001, Bankoff, 2001). Therefore, to
illustrate the process of disaster management in a cyclical diagram is misleading; however,
for the purpose of illustrating a general process or chain of events, it can be helpful.
Disaster response actors and NGO staff roles and responsibilities
The actors involved in disaster is wide ranging – from government (local and national), fire services, ambulance, health, to the private sector, civil society, community based organisations (CBO), NGOs, donors, the United Nations (UN), and intergovernmental agencies such as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) – and increasingly, the military. For the purpose of this study, the focus will be on international NGOs, with consideration for how they interface with other actors. This study will specifically look at NGO staff members responsible for providing life-saving goods such as food, water, shelter and medicines. Emergency response staff deliver aid to populations with overwhelmed capacity to cope; and, in time, NGO staff shift to sustaining lives and livelihoods, eventually transitioning to long-term rehabilitation support. NGO staff play a number of roles including, acting as an interlocutor between policy and action; opening up dialogue between the government and its people; and, meeting service delivery gaps within affected populations. In an ideal world, emergency response teams train to protect and include the voices of the poor after a disasters occur; they are guided by their organisational priorities and partners’ ethos; employ social data collection techniques in a response; and design participatory programmes based on donor funding. However, NGO staff members are not typically the first responders in a disaster; people within the affected community are (unless
they themselves are affected). NGO staff follow on the tail of a disaster, employing systems and procedures to meet the needs of large numbers of people. Partnership between the community, NGOs and other actors begins to emerge at this stage. Discussion on partnership will be presented at a later stage in this literature review.

4.2 Preparedness

The United Nations (UN) declared the 1990s the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) in order to, “reduce the loss of life, property damage, and social and economic disruption caused by natural disaster, through concerted international action, especially in developing countries” (UNISDR, 2012). In 1999 the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Disaster (UNISDR), was formed as a successor to the IDNDR, to oversee the development of disaster reduction policy (UNISDR, 2012). Preparedness for emergency responders means building relationships with local communities, governments and response agencies; strengthening partnerships; coordinating information sharing and needs assessments; reviewing and evaluating project work; and sharing good practice with one another.

A 2006, UNISDR report titled Lessons for a Safer Future: Drawing on the experience of the Indian Ocean disaster, points to some key lessons learned after the 2004 Asia Tsunami. The report highlights that public awareness saves lives; diversified livelihoods systems build resilience; early warning is essential; adhering to building codes reduces disaster loss; humanitarian and development innovation is required to reduce disaster risk; and, that global cooperation is essential in preparing for hazards that span borders (UNISDR, 2006). These lessons may be known but there is still much to do to act them out.

The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and gaps in disaster preparedness and response

A few short weeks after the Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster, The Second World Conference on Disaster Reduction was held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan where the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters was agreed upon. The goal of this framework was to significantly reduce disaster loss by 2015 through five priority actions (UNISDR, 2012). A total of 186 countries signed up to the framework, making it pivotal in shifting the paradigm of disaster risk management to an approach that included prevention and preparedness (UNISDR, 2012).

A mid-term review of the HFA, indicated that a number of gaps in disaster preparedness remain, including: “a multi-hazard approach, gender perspective and cultural diversity,
community and volunteer participation, capacity building (italics my own) and technology transfer” (2006, p.44). Furthermore, it indicated that 62 out of 70 countries “do not collect gender disaggregated vulnerability and capacity information”, an area of expertise within the NGO sector and a viable opportunity for emergency responders to be capacity builders for governments, communities and local NGOs. This example serves to illustrate one of many technical areas of emergency capacity building and preparedness within which NGOs can better serve communities. The 2011 Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR), a report that investigates new trends and solutions in humanitarian action, articulates the need for emergency responders to be prepared to proactively prevent and respond to risks in the following statement by Lord Paddy Ashdown: “If we are to meet the challenges ahead, we have to be “ahead of the curve” rather than always behind; preparing for disasters, as well as reacting to them (2011, p.7).

4.3 Framing Emergency capacity building
An estimated USD 25 billion – nearly a quarter of all aid finance (Ubels, Fowler, Acquaye-Baddoo, 2010) – is spent on capacity building. The topic of emergency capacity building has particular significance in today’s world because aid agencies must find new ways of increasing the effectiveness of supporting disaster-affected populations in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes, risking lives and spinning in a continuum of unsustainability. Although tragic, emergencies often mark the start of an opportunity to ‘build back better’ (Smillie, 2001).

But what does it mean to ‘build capacity’? Who are the builders? What kind of capacity are they building? Why is there a need to ‘build capacity’ in the first place? And, is the way in which capacity building occurs, the ‘right’ or ‘best’ way? To write in ECB’s own language, is the way the humanitarian industry does capacity building ‘good enough’? The second half of this literature review will explore such themes and questions.

Capacity building defined
There is no “monolithic ‘truth’”, no single, all encompassing definition of capacity building (Ubels, Fowler, Acquaye-Baddoo, 2010) but there is a generic set of principles that come up in most of the literature (Blagescu, Young, 2006). Much like the concept of participation, sustainability and ownership, capacity building is defined by power, politics and values (Kaplan, 1999). It is a conglomeration of tangible parts (individuals, organisations, programmes, skill-building, competencies and capabilities), which comprise an intangible whole. A whole, which is a living and dynamic organism comprised of relationships, trust, attitudes and individual identities. The definition of capacity building changes based on one’s
perspective as a person, funders, implementer and recipient. The list of definitions below describes capacity building by a range of actors engaged in development and relief. It is possible to see capacity building as a means to an end or as a process in its own right.

**Figure 3: Capacity building definitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department for International Development (DFID)</td>
<td>“to facilitate individual and organisational learning which builds social capital and trust, develops knowledge, skills and attitudes and when successful creates an organisational culture which enables organisations to set objectives, achieve results, solve problems, and create adaptive procedures which enable them to survive in the long run (DFID Guidance Note on Capacity Building, 2009, p.2).”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank (ADB)</td>
<td>Capacity development is the process whereby individuals, groups, and organisations enhance their abilities to mobilise and use resources in order to achieve their objectives on a sustainable basis. Efforts to strengthen abilities of individuals, groups, and organisations can comprise a combination of (i) human skills development; (ii) changes in organisations and networks; and (iii) changes in governance/institutional context (ADB 2004 cited in DFID Research Strategy, 2008, p.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity is the emergent combination of attributes that enables a human system to create developmental value (Morgan, 2006, p.8).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allan Kaplan</td>
<td>Capacity is the ability of a human system to perform, sustain itself and self-renew (Kaplan, 1999, p.20).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue Lautze and John Hammock</td>
<td>“capacity building is any intervention designed to reinforce or create strengths upon which communities can draw to offset disaster-related vulnerability” (cited in Smillie, 2001, p.17).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ECB’s definition of capacity building**

Surprisingly, ECB does not have an easy to identify definition of humanitarian capacity building in its body of published literature. The statement that comes closest to being a definition of capacity building by the ECB Project is the following:

“Organisational capacity is about money, people, systems, policies, and technical resources. It is built through actions that develop competencies and mobilise resources, and through commitment, influence, and negotiation that produce organisational change” (IWG, 2004, p.3).
Kaplan’s definition of capacity building
Kaplan’s definition of capacity building is focused on social processes, on the intangible and tangible aspects of capacity building. He believes capacity building is an intervention that should only begin when an endogenous process of ‘development’ or change has already started. He believes capacity building is highly contextual, complex and often contradictory (Kaplan, 1999, n.p.). Ultimately, Kaplan is of the opinion that the organisations most effective in capacity building are process driven instead of results driven. He reflects on his lessons learned with CDRA in the following statement: “…all our work has shown that the departure point for capacity…lies in the ability to learn and focus, the adapt and respond, to move and change and develop, to harness creativity and innovation, to motivate and inspire its members, to achieve resilience and flexibility (Kaplan, 1999, n.p.).

Capacity Building Frameworks
The breadth and scope of capacity building networks, coalitions, frameworks and approaches is broad. When capacity building is not tracked as a separate activity, it is often incorporated into a project. Large government donor agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) have their own capacity building approaches. Others frameworks and approaches are regional such as the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF); a significant number are non-governmental and have a global focus such as the Center for International Development Research (IDRC). Some are focused on technical areas, such as the Public Health Preparedness and Response Core Competencies by the Association of Schools of Public Health. Others such as the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Capacity Measurement framework focuses on development or are humanitarian specific such as the Core Humanitarian Competencies framework by CBHA. Others are a mix of both such as the Development and Humanitarian Assistance, an Australian initiative. No single framework can be applicable to every context and every situation. Frameworks are a starting point for capacity building and offer loose guidance on what has previously been found useful. They require contextualisation and ‘out of the box’ thinking each time they are applied.

Capacity building’s unintended but sometimes harmful consequences
Capacity building inherently assumes a lack of something implied by the need to ‘build’. Its roots are steeped in movements designed and implemented by outsiders (Morgan, 2006). Morgan traces the origins of the concept back to the 1950s and 1960s when the assumption was that the ‘developed’ North knew what the ‘undeveloped’ South needed (Simillie, 2001). Although virtuous in its sentiment for wanting to lessen the disparity between “privilege and
deprivation, between security and vulnerability, and between power and impotence” (Chambers, 1997, p.7), capacity building has a shadowy history that can be criticised for its neocolonial, neoliberal agenda (Smillie, 2001, Dar and Cooke 2008). Smillie describes its past as a “neoliberal conspiracy” entrenched in a desire to push back the state otherwise described as “an integral part of draconian structural adjustment policies” where NGOs and civil societies are “expected to fill the widest gaps in social services” (Smillie, 2001, p.15).

Capacity building can be critiqued from the New Development Management perspective for not redressing the neoliberalist, technocratic agenda behind the drive to develop human resources and capacity (Dar and Cooke, 2008). New Development Management critics are those who see the collective concepts of development and the current autonomous management style of development agencies as being at odds with each other. Such critics want to bridge the divide between these concepts and apply the best of both to the development sector. In this instance, they might argue that capacity building partnerships are cloaked in neocolonialism: in concepts of log frames, lengthy written reports, evaluations of outputs and the articulation of detailed key performance indicators are types of skill building that does not lend to local ways of thinking (Dar and Cooke, 2005). Robert Chambers, a long time practitioner and development theorist, talks about the role of the neoliberalist ‘self’ in contributing to the development of the ‘overclass’ – aid workers with “multiple interlocking privileges, securities and advantages which keep it on top” and the ‘underclass’, those with “multiple interlocking disabilities, vulnerabilities and deprivations which hold it under” (1997, p.9). He cautions that our lack of self awareness leads us to unintended but harmful consequences that result in the transfer of our ideologies, values and ideas without listening to what is ‘relevant’ and ‘sustainable’ for our partners.

**Partnerships and power**

Capacity building is often done through partnership. When speaking about building the capacity of emergency responders in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall humanitarian industry as is the case with the ECB Project, then it requires groups, individuals and organisations to work together in some form of partnership. Rein et al, author of the *Cross-Sector Partnership as a Development Model*, write that interchangeable works and phases can be used to describe partnership, such as: “alliance, association, collaboration, compact, co-operation, dialogue, discussion, engagement, forum and working together” (Rein et al 2005, p.1). Regardless of the words we use for working together, Nabeel Hamdi, author of *Small Change*, describes partnership as an idealised concept, “one of those motherhood words incorporating everything good and desirable – mutual respect, accountability, transparency, shared values, shared objectives and the mutual pursuit of ends and

Rein et al, say the central premise for forming partnerships is that working together is more beneficial than working alone for a range of reasons including, “the possibility of achieving some form of added value by working together collaboratively” towards a …” common goal [that] can be reached by satisfying partner needs while sharing risks and rewards along the way” (2005, p.3). Business Partners for Development, a project that worked on tri-sector partnership, states in its literature that it is worthwhile to try to navigate partnerships’ sometimes murky waters: “They [partnerships] pose particular challenges, because they often seek to draw together very diverse interests, perspectives, and organisational cultures. However, they also offer significant potential gains if this diversity can be effectively focused and operationalised” (Business Partners for Development, P.3). In essence, with diverse partners comes diverse values, perspectives, identities, cultures, weaknesses and strengths.

**4.4 Asymmetries of participation and power within partnership**

The degree to which parties participate in a partnership is strongly linked with power, a concept explored in depth by Caroline Moser. Moser believes that genuine participation occurs when there is “an inevitable sharing and then transfer of power involved as social groups deliberately attempt to control their own lives and improve their living conditions” (1983, p.4).

Smillie describes the asymmetries as a dilemma, a choice between patronage or partnership (2001). Can an NGO deliver life-saving aid and build the skills of others in high pressure, time sensitive contexts? Are we asking too much; or, is the transfer of skills fundamental to long-term sustainability and therefore reduced efficiency in the short term an acceptable tradeoff? Smillie describes such a tradeoff as being, “between outsiders doing things themselves – meeting humanitarian needs in the midst of a humanitarian emergency – and working to build longer-term capacities among local organisations so that people will be better able to deal with their own problems” (2001, p.1). Too often it feels as though the global North is ‘teaching’ the global South. Kaplan believes those who teach must take time out to do some form of learning themselves (Kaplan, 1999, n.p).

Organisations working on capacity building often find themselves making a distinction between capacity building as a ‘means’ and capacity building as an ‘ends’. Building capacity as a ‘means’ translates into improving the overall impact of humanitarian response leaders, subsectors, institutions, government and civil society, through voluntary, bottom up measures. Classic constraints include inadequate grassroots delivery mechanisms and a lack of local
coordination structures (community, government or institutional) (Slocum, 1995). Evaluation of participation within capacity building has been criticised for focusing too much on quantitative measurement of specific objectives, rather than “the extent of real participation” (Moser, 1983, p.3). When looked at as an ‘ends’, Moser describes participation in capacity building as, “not a fixed quantifiable development goal but a process whose outcome is an increasingly ‘meaningful’ participation in the development process. Where the real objective of participation is ‘to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations, on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control” (1983, p.3). In summary, viewing capacity building as a means is crucial in making the paradigm shift Kaplan believes is required to ensure participation produces the necessary relationships, trust, sharing of power and amicable group dynamics (Kaplan, 1999).

Radodi, a writer on civil society, governance and urban poverty, suggests there is a tendency for NGOs to fail to understand power struggles between communities and to impose their own agenda. Capacity building is not about being neutral; rather it is about being impartial and inclusive; intentional about who is targeted the and extent of coverage (Radodi, 1999). It is here where we start to see the dynamics of social capital come into play – capacity building initiatives must think carefully about their engagement with groups and networks that already exist, the role of social cohesion, trust, networking and how information is communicated (Boesen, 2010). A contextual understanding of power dynamics, vulnerability and coping strategies must be understood in order for capacity building to be successful (Anderson and Woodrow, 1998). Capacities and vulnerabilities should be mapped out “to highlight the crucial factors, and to illustrate the relationships among factors that matter most to project effectiveness” (Anderson and Woodrow, 1998, p.10). In essence, NGOs should not make assumptions about the needs of communities without adequate participation otherwise the result is an inequitable partnership and poorly managed power sharing.

4.5 The role of self: a capacity builder’s profile

Here we come to an appropriate juncture for raising the role of self. Instead of technical ‘experts’ and ‘advisors’ much of the capacity building literature calls for change facilitators (People in Aid 2007, Capacity.org 2007, Saldamja 2006). They argue for the space to build relationships, trust, social capital and nurture creative thinking, rather than skill building, a concept traditionally associated with capacity building. Smille says one problem with those who are currently building emergency capacity is their inexperience with the subject matter: emergencies and capacity building. Smillie suggests that the capacity of capacity builders is limited because they are “[o]ften young, overworked, operating in high-stress situations, and subject to sudden reassignment, few are equipped or mandated to gain a deep understanding
of communities” (Smillie, 20). Capacity.org, a journal for capacity building, states that local
capacity builders are one of the most valuable resources for the change process because local
people’s reality or understand of the context is often more accurate than a that of a foreign
‘expert’ and often costs less (Capacity.org, 2009, issue 38). In Whose Reality Counts?
Chambers explores a similar concept, arguing that the local perspective should hold more
weight but that the foreign ‘expert’ often imposes his or her view of reality on local
communities, often times resulting in the wrong solutions being proposed. Chambers values
the local perspective over the foreign, promotes participatory solutions and recognises local
capacities as strengths instead of attitudes and behaviours that should be changed (1999).

Ultimately capacity building efforts must be mindful to transform the context or ‘place’
within which it operates, including policies, attitudes, culture, behaviours, stakeholders and
power dynamics where appropriate. Moreover, capacity building should be a “self-propelled
and self-guided processes of societies developing their own capacities” and not necessarily
“disconnected from external support. But their locus of control and dynamics are within the
societies concerned and not primarily induced and pursued from the outside” (Kaplan, 1999,
n.p.).
Chapter summary

This chapter will critically review the application of Kaplan’s Capacity Development Framework to the Emergency Capacity Building Project. Each of the seven elements of Kaplan’s framework will be discussed in what Kaplan describes as a loose hierarchical order of importance (Kaplan, 1999). Within each element the following analysis will be presented:

- A key finding about how well a specific component of the theory fared when applied to ECB’s practical capacity building work;
- gaps in ECB’s practice based on Kaplan’s framework; and,
- identification of good practice based on Kaplan’s framework.

Kaplan’s framework consists of seven components, all of which will be applied to the ECB Project’s work and critically reviewed.

- a. Context and conceptual framework
- b. Vision
- c. Strategy
- d. Culture
- e. Structure
- f. Skills
- g. Material Resources
a. Context and conceptual framework

Key findings

The first finding has to do with a lack of clarity on how the ECB Project defines capacity building. Within the documents analysed for this study, there was no obviously stated definition of capacity building as understood by the project. The 2004 Report on Emergency Capacity comes closest to articulating the Project’s understanding of capacity building, and writes that capacity building is about, “… money, people, systems, policies and technical resources” (Braun, 2004, p.3). Firstly, there is no clarity on whether or not the ECB Project was intention about the ordering of the concepts; however, if it did rank money first (material resources), it would be in direct opposition with Kaplan’s theory where money (resources) was ranked last. Kaplan believes that the Conceptual Framework, Vision, Strategy and Culture should come before everything else because they focus on process, and treat the concept of capacity building as a living, dynamic organism (Kaplan, 1999). Fowler and Ubels summarise Kaplan’s sentiments in the following way: “once organisational aims, strategy and culture are clear it becomes possible to structure the organisation… if one tries to do this the other way around the organisation becomes incapacitated” (Fowler and Ubels, 2010, p.13).

A second key finding is that the ECB project fulfills Kaplan’s criteria for having a well-developed context and conceptual framework. The project has articulated its understanding and perception of its context through a series of 50 or more online and publicly available tools, evaluations, final reports and case studies (ECB Project, 2012). These documents indicate a positive attitude about its ability to affect change. Some interviewees described the attitude as ‘overambitious’ (N1, N2, N3, N4, 2012), and one even referred to the agencies in the project as “self-deluded” in their belief (N4, 2012). The conclusion drawn from such comments is that the project is strong in its belief and attitude that it can improve the way in which agency staff respond to humanitarian emergencies, even if that attitude it considered unrealistic to some.

The ECB Project has identified gaps in staff capacity building from a scoping study of the member agencies. This list of items demonstrates that the ECB project is conscientious about its context and the trends it operates within. The gaps identified are: thinly staffed emergency
units with its personnel overstretched; a limited ability to rapidly mobilise qualified personnel; limited formal training and academic institutions offering degrees or certificates in the field of humanitarian training around the world; NGO preference to hire internal “known quantities” rather than new staff; limited success with emergency roster lists; a heavy reliance on international staff; weak national staff capacity; weak staff development systems, difficulty releasing internal staff for emergency deployments; challenges hiring staff for “second wave” assignments (three to six months later); availability of emergency personnel; reluctance of qualified staff to accept positions in insecure environments where aid workers are targets; and finally, staff burnout (Braun, 2004).

Not only is the project aware of its context, but its extension into a second phase is a demonstration of an attitude and confidence that suggests the ECB Project can impart a positive impact on the gaps identified above. The first three-year phase of the project achieved outputs of “12 research products, field guides, toolkits and pilot reports”. In the words of one interviewee, “Phase I, it was about the development of tools. But it quickly became obvious that once you have the tools you have to drive them through the system so Phase II came about. Now, Phase II is trying to change the culture that promotes cooperation and coordination, looking at the problem as a group instead of an individual agency (N2, 2012).”

Many of the interviewees spoke about ECB’s “convening power” and how unity and strength in numbers affected change in a range of issues, suggesting the potential for raising industry standard. For example, in Bangladesh, the ECB Consortia formed a joint advocacy strategy to influence seven aspects of Bangladesh’s first Disaster Management Law (ECB Project, 2012). One key informant described the ways in which ECB believed it could affect its world in the following statement: “Each planning framework, structure or approach if you like, were to respond to the three core objectives of the project being: capacity building at field level, organisational development around capacity building at the agency level and sharing of information and knowledge and developing partnerships at the sector level”(N1, 2012).

**Gaps**

Interviewees suggested that it prioritising the needs of the ECB partnership over individual organisational needs was problematic because there has been a long history of competition in raising funds between the agencies. One field staff member described his consortia as high performing but say that the “me first” attitude sometimes still prevails, but that progress was being made: “I used to see that agencies treated one another as enemies because they used to compete. But I think ECB has contributed to transformation in this area. But at the end of the
day, in an emergency, an individual organisation is always the priority. If you need staff then you offer a higher salary. For example, organisations still haven’t agreed on salaries. I don't know if that’s the nature of collaboration or HR. But some changes are happening” (N6, 2012).

A second key finding was the feeling that field staff were not consulted in the project design phase early enough. The challenge of leaders translating their ideas into an appropriate field-based activity was mentioned frequently. One key informant supported this finding with in the following comment: “It [ECB] was initiated by a group of very creative entrepreneurial geniuses… they were brilliant people but I didn’t get the sense that they had what it takes to implement these ideas. The strategy didn’t include the necessary activities to ensure it was implemented successfully. They needed buy in right down to the bottom level (N5, 2012).”

The 2007 Final Evaluation Report on ECB describes how the proposal was written and then countries were asked to go through an application type process to be chosen for the project. One key informant suggested that the reverse process should have occurred. He believed the countries should have been selected, followed by an analysis of their gaps and needs which could have then been followed by fully participatory design and implementation phases (N6, 2012).

**Good practice**

The good practice identified in ECB’s context and conceptual framework can be seen in the activities it engages in. Collaborative staff capacity building is complex because as one interviewee pointed out, there were already a great number of individual agency initiatives in motion, “it was difficult to say let’s clear the table and agree on something in common” when “[e]veryone had done a lot of investment in this area before coming together” (N2, 2012). However, the ECB Project was innovative and expanded its partnership network to find include CBHA, which was tasked with finding a workable consortia approach. CBHA analysed all the existing competency frameworks from ECB and CBHA member agencies. Using the commonalities of the frameworks as a foundation, CBHA then developed the *Humanitarian Competencies Framework* and the *Humanitarian Leadership Framework* for use by any agency.

Another good practice is the degree to which the project has made space for contextualisation and adaptability. For instance, each of the five consortia had its own engagement plans for how to work together. One interviewee described the background in the following statement: “These plans evolved quite organically from year to year so in that sense we’ve created a
structure that has changed and evolved…the Country Engagement Plans and APIPs [Annual Programme Implementation Plan] are really like an elaborate work plan. They are a series of activities focused around staff capacity building, DRR and accountability impact measurement with timelines and budgets in order for consortia to be able to structure their budget and their work…However, in order to identify priorities and create the contents of these documents there are several weeks, if not months of negotiations that go on” (N1, 2012).

b. Vision

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<th>Vision definition:</th>
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<td><em>Vision is the interaction between understanding of particular context and appreciation of strengths, weaknesses, responsibility and inner inspiration (Kaplan, 1999).</em></td>
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Key findings

Firstly, the vision of the ECB Project was consistent throughout the documentation used in this study and the interviews conducted. Interviewees echoed similar sentiments about the vision when asked if it was clear and understood by project partners. According to the 2008, ECB Final Project Report, the overarching vision of the entire project was to, “improve the speed, quality, and effectiveness of the humanitarian community in saving lives, improving welfare, and protecting the rights of people in emergency situations” (2008, p.1).

Secondly, key informants indicated that the diversity within the consortia was a weakness and a strength (N3, 2012; N6, 2012), which will be discussed further in the Culture aspect of this framework. Thirdly, many people interviewed, especially field staff, felt compelled to ‘do’ something about the obvious gaps in their work and said they knew their “inner inspiration” as Kaplan calls it – the communities they live in, work for and work with (N3; 2012, N6, 2012).

Gaps

Gaps seemed to crop up only when talking about how the vision was formed and communicated. No one outright disagreed with the content of it, but many cited typical challenges of partnership in the creation of the vision. Responsibility for creating it appeared by be more ‘top down’, whilst the responsibility for communicating it seemed to belong to no one in particular and the methodology used seemed less than satisfactory. For instance, one interviewee said,
You have to have a vision to start with and not just one person. In a set up like ECB, because you have six agencies, you have to have six people with a vision that is coherent and congruent with each other. You can have different expressions of it but it essentially has to be the same across all six. But then the second half of that is effective communication of that vision and the advantages of pursuing that vision; I think where ECB had problems is that second aspect was not given enough attention and effort (N5, 2012).

When asked about the challenges of building a vision within the five ECB consortiums, one key informant said, “I think the biggest challenge is ownership without a doubt – who owns the need and the management of vision. It’s a question of identifying the leadership and who has responsibility…” (N1, 2012).

**Good practice**
When looking at the successful intersection between theory and practice from an appreciative inquiry perspective, one can surmise that the overwhelming consent on the content of the vision is due to the fact that the ECB Project is responding to an obvious need: a need for a coordinated response to capacity building. According to Cooperrider and Whitney, perhaps the clarity of vision in the ECB Project is due to the fact that “(e)very organisation was created as a solution designed in its own time to meet a challenge or satisfy a need of society” (2005, p.1). Taking a step back from the content of the vision, and looking at the fact that the ECB Project felt the need to create a vision from the start of its inception is a strong indication that the theory of needing a vision to propel an organisation or consortia, is a reality in practice.

c. **Strategy**

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<td>Strategy is “how an organisation intends to realise its vision”. It is about the “constant interplay between doing, planning and evaluation”, forecasting impact and adjusting to unforeseen consequences (Kaplan, 1999, n.p.).</td>
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**Key findings**
The first key finding was that more qualitative data seemed to be available on the strategy aspect of the framework than any other aspect. There was unequivocal agreement that strategy was a necessary element of the ECB Project. There were a number of detailed
documents, including a 15 page logframe with goals, objectives and indicators (Social Impact, 2007), outlining ECB’s project strategy from a global and country level perspective. Country Engagement Plans, Annual Programme Implementation Plans are publicly available to all ECB members and non-members. The second finding was a mixed reaction to how the strategic direction and programmatic approach was defined. The scope and depth of a strategy, the look and feel and the responsibility for shaping it proved to be very complex. Thirdly, a fractured strategy implementation was an issue highlighted in all the interviews. What was on paper did not seem to directly translate in practice. Some interviewees believe strategy implementations tension was due to budget cuts (N5, 2012), others say it was due to an ineffective or unclear structure (N1, 2012), whilst others blamed the planning and design work carried out at the beginning (N2, 2012; N3, 2012). A fourth key finding that came from all of the interviews, and was only hinted at in some of the documentation, was that the ECB Project was conceived in headquarters (mostly Oxford), said N2, 2012) and channeled down to the field after little or no consultation with those who would be implementing the project (N3, 2012; N5, 2012). Fifthly, the project’s inability to prioritise and focus frustrated some of the interviewees (N1, 2012). Finally, the last key finding suggests that not enough time was budgeted in order to meet the goals and expectations of the project in a realistic and qualitative way (N5, 2012).

Gaps
The gaps identified did not in dispute the necessity of having a strategy element in the practice of capacity building. Instead, the gaps highlighted that there needed to be better guidance provided on how to implement a strategy. Even the meaning of what a strategy consisted of was questioned by one interviewee, and highlighted as a gap in the ECB Project’s consensus building, “Strategy means different things to different people. That’s one of the challenges” (N1, 2012). Other issues arose when speaking about multi-actor strategy development challenges. One interviewee commented that:

It’s difficult for a single organisation to do strategy… but of course, when you are talking about multiple organisations trying to do a strategy to work forward together, I mean, that’s just impossible. You can do it but the difficulties and challenges are multiplied exponentially. If you get ten people in a room discussing a particularly thorny subject, you are going to get 11 opinions on it. It’s not that you can’t do it – you can. It’s that we [ECB] consistently over reach and set expectations too high. In reality you have to prioritise. ECB set a strategy without a subsequent plan on how to reach that strategy (N5, 2012).
Aside from what goes into a strategy, the way in which the global strategy was formed seemed to concern some people. Those responsible for implementing the project on a global NGO level, those who directly implement activities in a particular country, and those who were consultants for the ECB Project, felt that much of the project was conceived at headquarters and then handed over to field staff without adequate consultant about how the project should run. As one interviewee stated,

For ECB they were building the concept of a collaborative project…they didn’t actually have their country partners on board, so they were developing a strategy at a global level for the creation of this project, this collaboration, but they didn’t have their implementation, their pilot countries, or as we call them in phase II, their consortia, actually agreed upon. It [ECB] was very innovative but in a way they were building the ship as they sailed the boat (N1, 2012).

Another interviewee took the point on implementation further and said, “You have the field staff who feel this stuff has been designed elsewhere and dumped in their laps without say whether it’s actually doable. That’s a micro illustration of the macro picture” (N5, 2012). Others countered that statement by insisting that ECB was driven by the practitioners and not the policy makers:

There is definitely a drive from the field and you can see that in the different approaches each consortia took. For example, the emergency response protocol drawn up in Indonesia worked for Indonesia. It was not transferable to Bangladesh. It shows it is not possible to have a structured approach that can be taken everywhere. ECB Lite’s Lessons Learned on how to put together consortia in other countries demonstrates this (N2, 2012).

One interviewee (N6, 2012) demonstrated how a perceived gap could be turned into a strength with leadership and decisiveness. By the time Phase II rolled around, he said he felt that the strategy development power was and should be, in the hands of the consortia as well as in the written documents of individual member agency strategies. The consortia he belonged to developed strategic plans before the global ECB Project team asked for them, seeing consortia strategy development no differently than strategy development for a single organisation. This particular person said the following about the gaps in ECB’s strategy development:
In my country it’s always about priority. We are talking about resources, number of staff and the need to pull on resources from partners. The output needs to be bigger than the input. The challenges are the usual suspects, timing, staff, resources etc. (N6, 2012).

In essence, one could argue that prioritisation and focus is the responsibility of each consortium, and that leadership plays a key role in assertiveness and agency. Finally, due to the fact that the project was grant based, it meant that a lot was expected in a short amount of time. Interviewees indicated that the strategy tried to do much and lacked focus and prioritisation. Perhaps some, if not all of these challenges, point to the fact that strategy development is a political process. Reflecting on this statement, one person said,

ECB is almost dealing with political almost political objectives...building capacity is about helping communities which, are vulnerable be able to be more resilient to risks and shocks. Part of that is political. Part of their vulnerability comes from the fact that they are poor and they are poor because of political reasons and many other things. The discreet, technical strategy only goes so far for political projects such as a capacity building consortium (N4, 2012).

**Good practice**

From document analysis, it appears that ECB’s global strategy documents are specific with well-researched, clearly articulated goals and activities. The ability for each consortia to contextualise its strategy demonstrates adaptability and flexibility. It offers an opportunity to follow Kaplan’s theory about the need to plan, implement and evaluate, and to treat capacity building as a living process. Finally, the ECB Project hired a communications manager who ensures information flows in a timely and reliable manner to its internal data base and publicly accessible website (N1, 2012).

**d. Culture**

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<td>“Culture is comprised of the “norms and values which are practiced in an organisation; the way of life, the way things are done. Many of the cultural aspects of organisations exist and operate unconsciously; what people say they value and believe in and what is practiced in the organisation are often very different. Without changing culture, other changes are likely to be short-lived and ineffectual” (Kaplan, 1999, n.p.).</td>
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Key findings
Deconstructing the culture of the ECB project has meant pulling back layers upon layers of complexity. The first finding in this aspect of the framework is that ‘organisational culture’ exists at many levels in this global ECB project. At the top layer the global project can be viewed as having its own organisational culture. After that, one can see a consortia culture manifest, where each country has its own interpretation of what the ECB Project means. The next layer can be seen as an agency layer, where individual aid organisations have their own cultural ways of doing things. Within aid agencies or country consortia levels, sub groups can be seen to form. There can also be informal groups where people come together under a shared purpose or understanding such as communities, faith-based groups, schools etc. Finally, at the basic level of culture is the individual.

The second key finding is that at the heart of culture are the people who comprise it. Fowler and Ubel, authors of The Multi-Faceted Nature of Capacity: Two Leading Models, write that “people bring many potentials, inspirations and struggles, each with their strengths and shadows which build the elements out of which organisation arises” (2010, p.17). The individuals who were interviewed for this study were open, reflective and self-critical.

One can conclude from the responses of the key informants that the individuals themselves have what Fowler and Ubel describe as openness towards working with the complexity of the human change process (2010). Ten people were invited to be interviewed; all accepted the invite (not all were able to participate due to conflicting time schedules). Considering the project is still underway and is hopeful for funding for a third phase, a willingness to speak to an outside researcher performing a critical review of a political topic, appears to demonstrate a culture of learning and self-assessment. Furthermore, each interviewee was critical and his or her organisation and able to reflect on the role the individual agencies fulfilled in the ECB Project. One interviewee, an expert on partnership and capacity building, suggested that the process of collaboration itself was enough to shift organisational culture to a greater or lesser extent: “I think that organisations can’t enter a partnership without being transformed by that partnership or at least being changed” (N4, 2012).

Gaps
Staff capacity building was the central theme interviewees were asked to speak about and in doing so, three clear gaps began to emerge. Firstly, ECB’s 2004 Staff Capacity report suggested the humanitarian industry needed to reduce its reliance on international staff; yet, a number of interviewees felt that foreign staff were driving the project. For instance, one person commented that: “All the capacity building within the ECB until last fiscal year was
driven by Oxford or by the lead agency in the country…surprisingly, most of the trainings inside the capacity building design are done by foreigners” (N3, 2012). Another key informant commented that the capacity building partnerships became most complicated during a rapid onset emergency and that international staff tended to “take over negotiations” around the ECB partnership table” (N6, 2012).

A second gap was around the lack of intentionality behind integrating development staff into emergency response training. The need for cross over between development and relief staff was noted in the 2004 Emergency Capacity Building Report. Without it, the report said a cultural divide would remain. One interviewee liken the failure to shift the mindset that disaster and development are intrinsically linked to that of a “old school” (N5, 2012) development approach that implements a project without adequate ownership and understanding. He said,

This cuts to the same issues NGOs have faced for years in terms of development. If you just blow into a village and you decide what they need without any input from the villagers and then just blow out again, you can go back a year later and your water well pump is broken. When you asked them why they haven’t fixed it they say, well it isn’t ours, it belongs to organisation x. The only way to do development adequately is to ensure their buy in and contribution from the villages. ECB seems to have made the same mistake; and maybe it’s because ECB is focused on relief instead of development. You have very different personalities and personal types who work in relief verses development. Somehow we did not see the log in our eye in regards to how to make this thing work in comparison to how we do our work on the ground (N5, 2012).

Capacity building emergency response skill sets in development workers may occur in the case where staff members are assigned to carry out both development and emergency operations; however, within the documentation used in this study, the was no obvious mention of targeting development workers to bridge what can be considered a very ‘traditional gap’ (Anderson, 1998) in the aid industry.

Thirdly, some interviewees suggested that five pilot countries were not enough to effect industry-wide change. One aid worker framed the impact of the ECB Project by stating that most of the participating NGOs worked in 100 countries or more. Yet, only five out of 100 countries had access to capacity building opportunities such as those inside the ECB Project.
He questioned whether that was enough to genuinely change organisational culture in the following comment:

For example, my organisation only knows about ECB from the countries where we participate in ECB consortia. This is similar for other agencies. It means that staff from dozens upon dozens of countries around the world don’t know about ECB and haven’t been touched by them, standards haven’t been raised, learning hasn’t been shared (N2, 2012).

**Good practice**

According to Kaplan, the success in this aspect of the framework rests on the notion that the ECB Project puts its words into action, and practices it says it values. Evidence of saying something and then doing it can be seen in the development of a number of tools that are now being used by agencies and their partners. For example, an emergency simulation guide and tool kit was developed. Each consortium now runs a yearly interagency emergency response simulation. Using this tool offers great risks and rewards. It requires trust and openness. In the words of one participant:

> Simulations, particularly interagency simulations, there’s a lot of trust that’s required for people to fully engage in those. I think when you are doing a single agency simulation you are washing your own dirty laundry inside your home; when you’re doing an interagency simulation you are exposing yourself and the successes and challenges of emergency response activities to your peers in other organisations (N1, 2012).

The same interviewee also suggested that joint fundraising could be seen as a sign of shifting organisational culture because agencies used to and still do, compete for funding. The NGO staff member said, “Fundraising requires trust because you are asking agencies to go to donors on behalf of a group of agencies and there’s a tremendous amount of trust that needs to be created between the different agencies to know that the best of interests of ECB are at heart” (N1, 2012).

Finally, the joint development of tools such as the *Trust Building Guide* and the *Good Enough Guide for Accountability and Impact Measurement* were cited by one key informant as good practice in the following statement:

*The Good Enough Guide* or any of the other guides that have been produced require trust. Again, there’s a huge amount of trust that needs to be created amongst those agencies that create guides based on what are the priorities, who’s doing what elements of the work, how’s
it going to be delivered, are the processes effective, are you getting the right information etc. Everything we do is based on trust being built between different groups of people in different relationships (N1, 2012).

One person spoke about the growth of interdepartmental communication in their organisation, especially between emergency responders and human resources. Another gave an example of building relationships with the media by having local journalists shadow emergency response staff in “peace time” with the view to improving upon biased reporting. One NGO staff member provided a more conservative view and described the changing of norms and values as weak, across the global project: “ECB is a supertanker where I work. My goal is to steer this supertanker one or two degrees. You don’t flip the wheel and expect the tanker to turn on a dime”. One or two degrees is an indication of change; large or small, EBC’s ripple is being felt in different ways across the humanitarian sector.

It is worth mentioning that more than one person did question whether ECB demonstrated good practice in organisational culture change. The following statement demonstrates the shades of gray in understanding how much cultural attitudes and approaches have shifted:

A lot of times we are very good at telling others what to do and we are reluctant to do it ourselves. And even ECB, to a certain extent, is guilty of this. I think it would have been more effective and might be more effective in the future if they handle issues of trust within the consortium. They’ve produced a tool that helps teams build trust amongst themselves but have they really applied the principles of capacity building to how the project is run and governed? (N4, 2012).

e. Structure

Structure definition:
Structure is when “roles and functions are clearly defined and differentiated, lines of communication and accountability untangled, and decision-making procedures transparent and functional” (Kaplan, 1999, n.p.).

Key findings
Firstly, the overall structure of ECB seemed to work well because it allowed a high degree of contextualisation for each consortium and autonomy for countries to develop their own priorities, activities and desired areas of focus. The Country Engagement Plans and Annual Programme Implementation Plans serve as a tangible example of such freedom. One person
said the structure allowed the relief directors in a particular country to meet ahead of Phase II to determine direction and priority areas of their new strategy. The second key finding in this aspect is that the ECB Project relied extensively on the good will of individuals, sometimes to the detriment of sustainability and institutional memory. This topic will be further explored in the Gaps section of this analysis.

Gaps

Interviews suggested the structure of the ECB Project changed a lot due to a shortfall in funding after the global economic crisis hit, resulting in an overburden of work on an already overstretched personnel. The ECB Project was conceptualised prior to the economic downturn, and it was suggested by one person that NGOs felt confident that their mainstream funding would fill funding gaps, if there were any (N5, 2012). However, this was not the case and ECB had to collectively fundraise the shortfalls. Key informants listed the burden of having too much to do as a gap. This is an unfortunate shortcoming considering that the ECB Project’s scoping study report on Emergency Capacity Building (2004) identified that emergency personnel were typically overstretched. One person articulated what seemed to be the Achilles heel of the structure in the following way:

In this business people are always overprescribed. The entrepreneurial types say there’s always a way to make the financial pie cover everything if you slice it a different way, and that’s simply not true. I consider the realist approach where in essence, organisations simply can’t afford to do everything you have to prioritise and decide what you are going to do. (N5, 2012).

Analysing gaps in the framework was difficult at times because many of the concepts overlap. For example, when speaking of roles and functions, many interviewees said they felt that headquarters was too involved in the design and planning stage and not enough consultation with implementers was done. Gaps in communication during Phase I were also identified by one person and attributed to a similar cause: headquarters staff not adequately opening lines of communications with field staff:

In ECB there are two different forums – the [national] implementers that meet together every month and then there’s the [global] directors’ forum – and they meet every quarter. The two can talk about the same things and come out with a different decision. I went to both … within the higher level there are more political discussions about organisational policies etc. At the project manager team level it’s easier because they are all field implementers and are people who know how to work in the
field and they somehow find it easier to reach conclusions or decisions than the others. Sometimes there is no communication between the different groups (N3, 2012).

Likewise, when asked about the functionality of decision-making, many felt that the field was not involved enough in key decisions as summarised in the strategy aspect in the last section.

**Good practice**

In essence, the ECB Project’s contextual nature and decentralised decision-making structure enabled consortia to remain independent and make decisions that were best for them. Similar sentiments were echoed by agencies that had well-established capacity building programmes and were given the option of supplementing their existing programmes with ECB tools instead of being forced to comply with a centralised approach that might not have been appropriate. However, the disadvantage to such a structure was that some agencies were described as being apt to attribute progress or positive change to their own agency instead of ECB. It was speculated by one person (N2, 2012) that such behaviour could be attributed to the necessity to build organisational confidence in those inside and outside of the individual agencies. Another area of good practice is that the structure made learning transparent and accessible to all by making tools and lessons learned available to non-member agencies to grow and learn.

**f. Skills**

Skills definition:

*Described as “individual skills, abilities and competencies – the traditional terrain of training courses” (Kaplan, 1999, n.p.)*

**Key findings**

In the ECB Project’s experience, skill training was not the foci of the entire project. Relationship and trust building was a large priority that arose through skill building activities. However, it did provide a useful vehicle for building relationships and trust. This is supported by the fact that some of the larger agencies believed they had enough in-house training options but chose to collaborate on skill-building training in the interest of getting to know their partners and building up networks. Secondly, individual agencies with highly developed capacity building training programmes, appreciated the autonomy to continue on with maturing these programmes without facing limitations or restrictions.
Gaps
There were no obvious gaps that necessitate highlighting here. Some felt that training focus could have been on one thematic area or another; however, there was no consistent evidence presented that suggested a major gap in training. Most of the comments were directed at lack of available resources, which will be discussed in the next framework aspect.

Good practice
Formalised teaching of the theory behind emergency practice was noted by one interviewee (N3, 2012) as helpful in affirming what many local staff already “knew from experience”; and in essence, served as a confidence booster. This person shared that:

Most local staff had humanitarian experience before they received training. When they finally came to the training they weren’t necessarily learning something new but were more-or-less confirming or affirming what they already knew with the theory they were being taught (N3 2012).

Skill training was also seen as useful particularly for first responders, local staff who lived and worked in the communities their aid agencies were responding in. For those who had never been involved in a disaster, emergency response training actually did supplement their knowledge. The following statement supports this finding:

The tendency in the humanitarian field is for local people and local organisations to respond first when disasters happen. Most of them have never been trained before. At the national level you can identify there are very few humanitarian trainings that exist. Usually those that do exist are accessible for international staff only. So you will observe that those first responders aren’t necessarily trained. The trained people come later and give additional support but informal support has already been given. Local staff only get access to training long after they’ve been in an organisation. It happened to me. I started my humanitarian work without any training. I read what I could and learned from others how to do my work. I only started to receive formal training around two years after my first initial encounter with this industry and only after I had gained some seniority” (N3, 2012).

Finally, when there appeared to be difficulty reaching consensus about the types of local staff capacity building trainings that should occur, the ECB Project looked outside itself and reached out to CBHA, an consortium with a mandate to improve emergency response. One
person said that CBHA and ECB seemed like a natural bridge to be built (N4, 2012), another described CBHA as pooling together all the agencies’ ideas and coming up with a framework for capacity building that supports the commonalities (N2, 2012). IN its 2010 report on Humanitarian Capacity Building Programme: Objective 1, Final Report, CBHA writes that it created the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework through a “synthesis from existing frameworks from 12 of the 15 CBHA member agencies” (CBHA, 2010, p.3).

**h. Material Resources**

Material Resources definition:
*Material Resources are described as “finances, equipment, office space, and so on” (Kaplan, 1999, n.p.).*

**Key findings**

This section has three key findings, all of which can be seen as gaps between the application of theory and practice. Firstly, many of the key informants stressed that the overall impact of the project could have been greater if the resources matched project expectations. The global economic crisis had a subversive effect on the ECB Project’s financial and human resources, consequently impacting its structure and strategy. The Gaps section will explore this finding in more detail below. A second key finding was around sustainability and the lack of foresight into ensuring continued progress. Many interviewees suggested that the project had an overreliance on good will and trust, which was not sustainable due to staff turnover. Thirdly, the last key finding – although extreme in its nature – had to do with the discussion about the possibility of private development firms taking over the role of NGOs. One key informant believed that private development firms could carry out emergency response and rehabilitation more cheaply and efficiently than NGOs (N2, 2012). He cited the post-war context in Kosovo, where the geographic spread was small enough to allow for one private development company to distribute shelter materials, for example. The concern raised was that humanitarian principles and possibly even the humanitarian imperative could be compromised if private development firms were to begin to creep into the multi-billion dollar aid industry. Is such a take over a real threat to NGOs? This finding will also be further explored in the Gaps section.

**Gaps**

The way in which the economic downturn and resultant shortage of funding affected the ECB Project suggests that perhaps the biggest lesson learned is that resources must match ambition. When asked what were some of the key challenges in ECB, one person said,
The big variable is the funding. Everybody had a lot of core funding before the economy collapsed. Nobody worried about funding gaps. We committed to fundraising 7m out of 12m. When the economy collapsed everybody ran out of cash and this meant that ECB had trouble, firstly to perform, and secondly to meet the objectives it had set out to meet. We had to drop some of the objectives, let go of some staff and trim down the activities. Half of the project was shot in the leg at the beginning. Everything had to be done on a shoestring and it’s difficult to be innovative. The project’s impact is pretty amazing, personally speaking, but it would have been much bigger had we had the resources we expected (N2, 2012).

The second key finding around lack of sustainability, is raised as a gap because from the conception of the ECB Project there has been no exit strategy. As long as the funding continued, new phases were added (N1, 2012). Another reason for listing sustainability as a gap is the concern raised by key informants that there has been an overreliance on good will. One person felt that unless the ECB project was written into the job descriptions of individuals, much of the effort to coordinate would diminish with the staff that moved on or were forced to prioritise other initiatives with budgets and resources that required monitoring. One person said the following about how a lack of material resources affected the structure and overall sustainability of the project:

The disadvantage in the way it was laid out was that there was no money budgeted or set aside to ensure people in the various agencies had ECB included in their day job. In this business people are always overprescribed and when push comes to shove, you do the things you are evaluated on and if it’s not in your job description, even if your supervisor supports your work in ECB, it’s just not going to happen (N5, 2012).

The last gap noted was put forth by one person who took a big picture approach and spoke about the ECB Project’s goal to increase the speed and efficiency with which humanitarian aid is delivered. This person felt the humanitarian niche was under threat due to an industry-wide inability to collectively organise and raise the standards of delivery. He feared that if private companies took over the humanitarian industry, they would create a niche role for themselves much in the same way the military has and push NGOs out in the following statement:

In addition to needing a job, we are involved in humanitarian operations because of certain values or/and needs and interests for helping others. A business is motivated
by profit and driven to supply the best product it can for the market where it operates. Humanitarian responses are becoming billion dollars affairs, and the sum of humanitarian organisations' inefficiency and the higher cost of operating under social parameters if and when humanitarian organisations become fully efficient, gives a definite advantage to private businesses…

Once such a business captures the market, as we can see with the U.S. military today, it does not need to be cheap since there is no more competition--no point of entry for new players in a system controlled by lobbyists on K Street. So if humanitarian workers really do care for the humanitarian charter, for the code of conduct, for human rights, then they must become as efficient as possible so what separate their costs from private businesses' costs is the monetary value of that social contract. ECB is a timid but glorious attempt at addressing inefficiency by joining efforts, sharing resources, etc. (N2, 2012).

Whether this fear is legitimate or not, it highlights a bigger question around sustainability of humanitarian organisations at large. Are they are risk of eliminating themselves? And, if organisations were pushed out by another source, what would happen to the codes of conduct and who would uphold the humanitarian imperatives valued by the industry? Does such a scenario boil down to fear mongering; or, it is a strong incentive for emergency capacity building to genuinely make a difference? These are broader questions that discussions about material resources resulted in.
6 CONCLUSION

Chapter summary
This chapter draws conclusions about the ECB Project’s work and reflects upon the ease with which they relate back to Kaplan’s framework. Interview comments by Kaplan himself, offer further insight into the complexities of capacity building and following frameworks. Finally, this chapter ends by exploring four conclusions about Kaplan’s framework, including the importance of contextualisation, its applicability for consortium use, issues of sustainability and the way in which it was developed.

6.1 Relating the findings back to the study of Kaplan’s Framework for Capacity Development

a. Context and conceptual framework
The ECB project’s 2004 scoping study, semi-annual reports and mid-term evaluation demonstrate a repeated analysis of the context and a willingness to update their understanding of the fluid and dynamic aspects of the themes and concepts they are conducting capacity building on. This specific case study has demonstrated that great value is placed upon understanding the humanitarian context within which the project is operating, an important concept in Kaplan’s framework.

b. Vision
The process the ECB Project used to cultivate its vision failed to include field implementers, according to interviews and project documentation. However, the content of the vision – “to look at and share local capacity to respond to emergencies without necessarily proritising their own vision and mission, but not neglecting them (N3, 2012) – was communicated in one form or another by all who were interviewed.

c. Strategy
In summary, strategy was found to be essential for the ECB Project. Various ‘strategic’ documents went into great depth to outline approaches, priorities and activities. Interviews revealed concern for how ambitious the project strategy was and indicated a need for more focus. However, this is not a reflection of a flawed framework. Rather, it is a reflection of how this specific project implemented strategy. The framework did not try to be an operation manual; instead it offered simple guidelines on what a strategy should look like. To this effect, the project demonstrated the strategy component of the framework is crucial and necessarily in capacity building.
d. Culture
Kaplan believes that an organisation is a combination of live dynamics such as how individuals, groups, and sub-sets of groups engage; to this end, he writes that an organisation’s, “specific identify is a combination of its own internal integrity and its relationship with others”. The analysis of the culture of the ECB Project shows that humanitarian culture is changing within its five pilot countries and the individual organisations and persons involved although, in different ways, at different times and with different outcomes. The 2008 ECB Final Report on Phase I, indicated a shift in culture and understanding by stating that “…Within the IWG, the substantially increased levels of trust, coordination, improved relationships, and willingness to share information and resources has been the ECB Project’s most important outcome” (Social Impact, 2007, p.49).

e. Structure
Kaplan cautions that organisational structure is too often the focus of capacity building projects, and that too often structure is the starting point of capacity building (Fowler and Ubels, 2010). To some extent, the ECB Project seems to have fallen prey to this trap. The 2004 Report on Emergency Capacity mentions structure in the opening pages of the report and stresses the need to ‘get it right’ in order for this project to ‘succeed’. It is easy to understand why the emphasis on structure would exist; the chance of a donor accepting a multi-million dollar proposal without a clear structure is slim. Perhaps there is a clash between economics and social sciences because economics demands to know how the machinery of capacity building is going to work. Yet, experience with social science and social processes tell us that human beings are unpredictable and that it is difficult to determine what the outputs of a relationship will be.

Additionally, the NGO members of the IWG involved in the project may have wanted to know what the general structure of the project would be to ensure their understanding of a fair partnership was being met before entering into a binding agreement to work together. Proposing roles, functions, lines of communication and accountability, and decision-making mechanisms is an essential element of a partnership agreement.

f. Skills
Kaplan stresses that skill building is the traditional terrain of capacity building but that recognition of the social environment means that capacity building has grown into so much more than just the training of a specific skill set (1999). Interviewees largely felt that skill building was an important avenue for creating space and opportunity to nurture relationships,
build trust, open dialogue and generate positive energy. People indicated their jobs were busy, and whilst they valued meeting people, they also valued the opportunity for professional development and growth.

g. Material Resources
There could be no more discrepancy between theory and practice in this study than in the area of material resources. All of the interviewees lamented about inadequate financial and human resources to carry out the scope of work within the ECB Project. ECB’s seeming inability to balance the pairing of resources and activities meant that interviewees placed greater importance on material resources than Kaplan did in his framework. When this point was raised in an interview with Kaplan, he acknowledged that resources were important but cautioned against making them the focus of capacity building initiatives in the following statement:

I would never say … don’t worry about the resources; they will take care of themselves. In many situations if there aren’t enough resources to do what you are trying to do, then you can’t do it. You end up getting frustrated, irritated and angry. But I still believe what the framework says is true: there are many things you can do. If there aren’t the resources to do what you want, then look at what’s possible rather than carry on doing what you did before. Resources are important (N7, 2012).

6.2 Conclusions about Kaplan’s framework
This study will conclude with three overarching critiques of Kaplan’s framework. Firstly, there is a critique of the concept of a ‘framework’. Due to the fact that each situation is different, it seems unfair to try to label it or ‘impose’ a structure upon it. In an interview with Allan Kaplan, he immediately acknowledged that frameworks are problematic. He said, “Frameworks never work entirely. They are like analogies. You can’t translate them completely. You have to assess every situation as a unique and individual situation (N7, 2012).” However, if one were to use labels, then Kaplan’s framework seems to strike the balance between providing guiding principles and allowing contextualisation to shine through. Kaplan said he intentionally did not give a title to his capacity building work out of the acknowledgement that frameworks often prevent appropriate contextualisation (N7, 2012) but that it later became known as Allan Kaplan’s framework for Capacity Development (N7, 2012). He said,

I don’t like these frameworks. I’m very scared of them. I am still working in the broad area of capacity building and I don’t think of that framework at all because
frameworks are dangerous things. They get people to think inside of boxes. Capacity is nothing if it’s not there to open people up and make them fluid and flexible and responsive and all that good stuff. I think I’ve tried to keep away from naming it as a framework. The fact that people think of it as Allan Kaplan’s framework is something that emerged afterwards so it doesn’t really have a name. You could think about it as a levels of complexity framework, I guess (N7, 2012).

Having recognised the challenges with frameworks, a second critique is that Kaplan’s framework appears to be broad enough to be applied to capacity building efforts in emergency response or otherwise because they communicate “levels of complexity” that are meant to be guiding principles that meet the needs of living organisms (N7, 2010). When asked whether the framework could be applied to the ECB Project, Kaplan said,

My answers are conditional because I don’t know what’s happening in these countries, and I don’t know what these organisations are doing. The framework must resonate with the individual, the organisation, the group, the network, the association and the consortia; there is no intrinsic difference. The hierarchy of complexity in the framework is the same for all. A human being and a group, an organisation and a consortium: they are all living beings for me. They are often not treated as living beings but for me, they are. They have certain needs and the capacity framework is trying to respond to those levels of need (N7, 2012).

Thirdly, one of the underpinning principles of the framework is sustainable capacity building. However, culture, particularly the culture of the global North, could be seen as paradoxically being responsible for rendering the framework unsustainable by turning a live, social process into an inanimate “how to” manual that is intended to give life to the activities that initially suggested sustainability in the first place. Kaplan succinctly captures this idea when asked what recommendation he had for the ECB Project to ensure its capacity building work was sustainable, which he describes as paradoxical:

Here’s a bunch of enthusiastic people coming together, learning from each other, learning from the situations, building their capacity etc. Now they are moving on. So they write manuals so the six organisations can induct new people into the ways they have learned. The paradoxical thing I’m going to say is that those manuals are the problem because these enthusiastic people who are now moving and writing these manuals didn’t get to where they are through manuals. They got to where they are through openness. The system opened and said we are going to build something new,
we are going to experiment and explore how to do this thing. As soon as you bureaucratise that you are going back to the old set up. The very people who, out of their inspiration, are writing these manuals would never have come to this inspiration had they started through manuals.

Finally, perhaps this framework is compatible with the ECB Project case study because it was built out of practical experience. Kaplan says, “It was never a theory. It was something that was developed through a group of people working on the ground, analysing what they were seeing” (N7, 2012).

The conclusion of this study is that frameworks can be problematic, but that guiding principles and ideas can be helpful for individuals, organisations and consortiums doing capacity building. This particular framework keeps the process of building capacity alive and energetic by placing value upon social processes, and allowing those processes to evolve in natural ways without forcing results or expectations onto the people involved.
REFERENCES


BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDCIES – A: ETHICS FORMS

1. E1B1 Form

---

**Section A - You & your project**

- What is your name?
- What is your student number?
  
  10092585

- What is your email address?
  
  10092585@brookes.ac.uk

- What is your supervisor’s name?

- What is your supervisor’s email address?
  
  dsanderson@brookes.ac.uk

- In which Department are you studying?

- What course are you taking?

- What is the topic area of your research?

- On what kinds of topics will you be collecting data from the participants in the research?

---

**Section B - Your participants**

- What kind of participants will be involved in your research? (Please tick one – if more than one, then complete a separate form)

- Briefly describe these participants

- NGO staff, project implementers

---

**Section C - Your data collection**

- When is your data collection likely to start?

- What will be your method of data collection?

- What kind of data will you be collecting?

- Will it be possible to avoid asking for personal data from the participants?

- Will it be possible to ensure the participants are not being deceived in any way?

- Will it be possible to ensure the participants remain completely anonymous?

---

**Section D - Declaration**

- I declare that I will

- give all participants an information sheet conforming to university guidelines

- not contact any participant until my supervisor has approved my Information sheet, research questions and methodology

- be sufficiently well-trained in necessary methods of data collection and analysis

---

**Student signature**

Date: 20 Dec 2011

**Supervisor signature**

Date: 22/12/11

**Module Leader signature**

Date: [Handwritten]

---

You may only start fieldwork when this form has been signed by your supervisor & your Module Leader.
2. Ethics form HSS.E1

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

Ethics Review Checklist

This checklist should be completed by the student undertaking a research project which involves human participants and must be checked and signed by the project or dissertation supervisor. The checklist will identify whether an application for ethics approval needs to be submitted to the Faculty Research Ethics Officer.

Before completing this form, you should refer to the University Code of Practice on Ethical Standards for Research involving Human Participants, available at www.brookes.ac.uk/res/ethics and to Faculty guidelines, which are included in the relevant online module or course handbook. You should bind a copy of the approved form in your final project or dissertation submission. As the principal researcher, you are responsible for exercising appropriate professional judgement in this review.

Working Project Title: A Critical Analysis Of Emergency Capacity Building: The Work Of the ECB

Student: Pamela Sitko

E-mail address: gudgic@gmail.com

Course/module: MA, Development and Emergency Practice

Supervisor: David Sanderson

E-mail address: dsanderson@brookes.ac.uk

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<th>Yes</th>
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1. If the study will require the cooperation of a gatekeeper for initial access to groups or individuals to be recruited (e.g. pupils, employees of a company, members of a self-help group), will you be unable to obtain this?

2. Will the study involve discussions of or responses to questions which participants might find sensitive? (e.g. substance abuse, traumatic experiences)

3. Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety, or cause harm or negative consequences, beyond the risks of everyday life?

4. If the study will involve participants who are unable to give informed consent (e.g. children under the age of 16, people with learning disabilities), will you be unable to obtain permission from their parents?
Research Study Information Sheet
Oxford Brookes University

Researcher: Pamela Sitko
University: Oxford Brookes
Course: Masters in Development and Emergency Practice
Contact details: gudgic@gmail.com; +447990504412

Study title
A critical analysis of emergency capacity building: The work of the ECB

Invitation
You have accepted an invite to take part in a research study. Before we begin, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully.

What is the purpose of the study?
To critically analyse the translation of capacity building theory into practice through by using Allan Kaplan’s capacity building theory and the Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) coalition as a case study.

Why have I been invited to participate?
You were asked to participate in this research because of your experience with ECB and your global perspective on implementing capacity building initiatives.

Do I have to take part?
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. I have provided this information sheet as a background to the study. I will also ask you to sign a consent form attached in this email. You are still free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.

What will happen to me when I take part?
By phone or by Skype, a pre-determined list of questions will be asked. The interview will take between 40-60 minutes. The information discussed is not anticipated to be of a sensitive nature. All questions will follow from publicly available resources shared on the ECB website (www.ecbproject.org).

What are the possible benefits of taking part?
I’m hoping this interview will give you an opportunity to reflect on the work of ECB and to get to know Oxford Brookes University a little better.

Will what I say in this study be kept confidential?
All information collected about will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). Confidentiality, privacy and anonymity will be ensured in the collection, storage and publication of research material. Data generated by the study must be retained in accordance with the University's policy on Academic Integrity and kept securely in electronic form for a period of ten years after the completion of a research project.

What will happen to the results of the research study?
The research will be submitted to Oxford Brookes University and graded as part of a requirement for completion of a Masters degree. Interviewees may have access to the final product. Please indicate if you would like a copy of the final product in the interview or through email.

Who is organising and funding the research?
I am conducting the research as a student of Oxford Brookes University. No funding has been provided.

Who has reviewed the study?
This research project has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee, Oxford Brookes University.

Contact for Further Information
Please feel free to contact me at gudgic@gmail.com for further information. If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, please contact the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee on ethics@brookes.ac.uk.

Thank you for taking the time to read the information sheet.

January 2, 2012
APPENDCIES – C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS - SAMPLE

Dissertation Aim
To critically review how Allan Kaplan’s Framework for Capacity Development translates into practice by using the Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project as a case study.

Objectives
1. Review the ECB Project’s approach to staff capacity building using Kaplan’s framework for capacity development.

2. Analyse gaps in the ECB Project based on Kaplan’s theoretical framework and the perception of the ECB Project partners.

3. Identify areas where theory successfully intersects with practice based on Kaplan’s theoretical framework and the perception of the ECB Project partners.

Pam’s notes:
- There are 12 questions in total; 6 mandatory, 7 options to tailor to specific interviews
- To ask all 12 questions in an interview means 5 mins per question
- To ask all in 40 mins means 3 mins per question

Interview Script
1. Thank you for making the time to speak with me.
2. This interview will take 40-60 minutes.
3. Your contributions will remain anonymous
4. The main crux of this interview is to understand how capacity development theory translates into practice; therefore, I’d like to ask you some questions about ECB’s work. The themes we will talk about today were sent to you in an email a few days ago. Don’t worry if you haven’t had time to read it. I’ll brief you on each one as we go along.

Do you have any questions? Shall we begin?

Interview date: ______________
Interviewee name: ______________
Organisation: ______________
Position: ______________
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework Aspect</th>
<th>Description of framework aspect</th>
<th>Interview question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Context and conceptual framework</td>
<td>A framework that reflects the organisation’s understanding of the world. It’s attitude, confidence and ability to believe it can affects its world. This is a coherent frame of reference, a set of concepts which allows the organisation to make sense of the world around it, to locate itself within that world, and to make decisions in relation to it.</td>
<td>1. How would you describe ECB’s confidence and attitude towards believing it can affect genuine change in staff capacity? Are there any weaknesses?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vision</td>
<td>Interaction between understanding of particular context and appreciation of particular responsibility yields organisational vision. Vision is the driving force, it’s the organisational inspiration that reacts with reality. A good vision identifies abilities and strengths and plans possibilities based on those.</td>
<td>1. Describe how ECB’s vision or ‘sense of purpose’ harnesses’ its strengths. Is the vision sufficient for guiding the coalition’s CB activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Strategy</td>
<td>Organisational vision yields an understanding of what the organisation intends to do; strategy is a translation into how the organisation intends to realise its vision.</td>
<td>1. What were some of the challenges ECB faced in designing and implementing its strategy? Are these unique to coalition CB?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Culture</td>
<td>Kaplan says: “Without changing the culture of an organisation, any other changes are likely to be short-lived and ineffectual. Many of the cultural aspects of organisations exist and operate unconsciously: what people say they value and believe in and what is practiced in the organisation are often very different.”</td>
<td>1. How can ECB expect to change organisational culture when it’s comprised of so many different organisations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Structure</td>
<td>Roles and functions are clearly defined and differentiated, lines of communication and accountability untangled, and decision-making procedures transparent and functional.</td>
<td>1. What are the key challenges with the current structure? Are these unique to coalition CB? - the lines of communication; - the lines of accountability; - transparency and efficiency of decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Aspect</td>
<td>Description of framework aspect</td>
<td>Interview question</td>
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</table>
| 6. Skills        | The growth and extension of individual skills, abilities and competencies – the traditional terrain of training courses. | I. Kaplan’s framework emphasizes relationship and trust building before skill training can occur. Do you agree with this? Is this ECB’s finding? Please comment.  
2. Is there anything that surprised you about training emergency personnel? |
| 7. Material Resources | Finances, equipment, office space, and so on. Martiaing resources are important and allow an organisation to do CB. (Pam: ecological environment created for CB. Mention long term positions created etc) | Without continued funding, how will ECB be able to build capacity at its current rate?  
- How will it balance the need for material resources when funding ends?  
- What measures are in place to ensure a minimum level of material resources continue? |
| 8. Power and partnership |                                 | Can you comment on how power is shared? Does the field have a strong impact on activities? In what ways is ECB ‘bottom up’ |
2. Vision  
3. Strategy  
4. Culture  
5. Structure  
6. Skills  
7. Material resources | 1. Could you rank Kaplan’s categories in the order of importance based on your experience with ECB? |
| 12. Additional comments | Is there anything you would like to add? | N/A |
APPENDICES – D: SUMMARY OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS TABLE

Table 1: Summary of key informant interviews

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<th>Number</th>
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<td>Global project implementer</td>
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<tr>
<td>N2</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
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