The Threat Posed by Availability and Inadequate Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) to Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Case of Southern Sudan.

Paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement of the Masters of Arts (MA) Degree in Humanitarian and Development Practice, Oxford Brookes University

By

Betty July Araba

Supervisor: Dr. Brian David Phillips

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Centre for Development and Emergency Practice, Oxford Brookes University, Headington Campus, Gipsy Lane. Oxford OX3 OBP UK
Declaration

I hereby declare that no portion of this dissertation has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other University or institution of Learning.
Dedication

I must extend my deepest appreciation to my loving father and friend Rev. John Gwodi-Kupajo, mother and friend Joyce Poni and my siblings; Yenda, Poni, Luate, Dara and Opani who are my real sources of strength, hopes and aspiration. I love you so much!
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Abstract

The alarming threat posed by the proliferation of Small Arms and Light weapons (SALWs) has, in recent years, attracted global attention on how to stem the worldwide free-range movements and misuse of these weapons. SALWs are cheap and readily available to those who wish to acquire them legally or illegally. They are easy to use, even by children, contributing to high numbers of child soldiers in the world. The increasing demand for SALWs and their nature has made these weapons difficult to track, easily transferable from legal to illegal hands, illegal to another illegal hand and ultimately diverted for criminal activities.

Apart from their use in armed conflicts, SALWs are increasingly being used by civilians, gangs and criminals to terrorise, intimidate and control communities, influence politics and sustain livelihoods. Moreover, in post conflict situations, desperate and impoverished people turn to guns to make a living by accosting traders or breaking into homes and robbing them. In addition, there is a worrying trend whereby individuals and communities are resorting to SALWs in order to solve their disputes, which usually end in loss of lives and creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity. The majority of the victims of this gun-based violence are civilians. Thus the socio-cultural, political and economic damage and destruction that SALWs can cause to society are often felt long after the conflict they were acquired for is over. It is imperative that policy and decision makers at all levels give it the most urgent attention it deserve if post conflict societies are to recover and development.

Using Southern Sudan as a case study, this paper examines the threat posed by SALWs to post conflict communities and the existing initiatives, at the global, regional and national levels, to control their availability and reduce their potential risks. It also explores the reasons why the Sudanese civilians still demand SALWs as well as problems associated with such demand and how effective measures that are ‘people centred’ could be designed to address the problems. Lessons for Southern Sudan are drawn from Mozambique and Sierra Leone. The study is however concerned that considerable research and policy initiatives are devoted to the supply side of the SALWs debate, such as illegal exports, weapons registries, marking and tracing, to nearly total neglect of the demand discourse. The paper argues that a holistic approach that combines measures to regulate the flow of legal and illegal weapons that trickle into open-market and paying attention to the factors that drive people’s demand for SALWs would be desirable.
Map Showing Sources and Routes of SALWs into the Sudan

Sources: Small Arms Survey (2001)
Chapter One: General Overview

1.1. Introduction

The fragility of the recently achieved peace in Southern Sudan can partly be attributed to the availability of uncontrolled Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in the hands of both the military and civilians, which could potentially hamper the post-conflict development and reconstruction efforts in the entire country. Although the threat posed by the proliferation of SALWs may be universally acknowledged, there is still lack of a globally accepted definition of SALWs.

According to the Report of the UN Panel of Government Experts, A/52/298, (UNGA, 1997), Small Arms are defined as a sub-set of light weapons which can be fired, maintained and transported by one person. Light Weapons, in contrast, are described as a range of weapons portable by man, animals or machines. The panel made further distinction between the two, whereby Small Arms are designed for personal use, while Light Weapons are designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. According to the report, Small Arms include revolvers, self loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine assault rifles and light machine guns. Light weapons, on the other hand, include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of calibres of less than 100mm (UNGA 1997: para26). This definition, which focuses mainly on barrelled guns, leaves out an array of equally lethal weapons like machetes, clubs and swords as witnessed in the Rwanda genocide of 1994.

The widespread availability and proliferation of the SALWs has been the source of increased insecurity and demand for more weapons in both warring and non conflict states, all over the world. A study by Small Arms Survey (2002) estimated that there were more than 639 million SALWs in circulation in the world, out of which, the civilian population, possess almost two thirds of the global total, which is at least 378 million firearms. These weapons are
distributed by more than 600 companies in about 95 countries that legally produce SALWs but the numbers of companies involved could be even more if the countries in which illicit production takes place are included (Small Arms Survey, 2001). The presence of these weapons, however, have increased and protracted insecurity for individuals, communities and countries because small arms have become weapons of choice in armed conflicts, violent crimes and post conflict environments (Berkol 2002). Nowhere is the evidence of this is clearer than in many African countries affected by ongoing armed civil wars such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan (SIRPI, 2000).

The use of arms in these conflict countries has led to high casualty rates among both the military and civilian populations, destruction of property and worsened poverty levels. Available data indicates that over 50% of the SALWs victims are civilians, most of whom are women and children (ICRC Study, 1999). Even in post conflict situations, women and children still remain vulnerable to SALWs. In Southern Sudan for instance, a total of 54 innocent women and children belonging to the Didinga tribe were massacred in May 2007 by heavily armed civilians from the neighbouring Toposa tribe (Sudan Tribune website). The weapons used in the massacre ranged from small to heavy artillery that have infiltrated to the hands of civilians during the just-ended civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan.

Often, after armed conflicts, most of these weapons remain in the communities and thus posing threats of homicides, robbery, and armed violence. In Southern Sudan, the availability of SALWS in the hands of various warring groups and civilians, almost two years after formal cessation of war, is widely acknowledged as posing serious threat to post conflict reconstructions (Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), 2006). The warring groups comprise of government forces, Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and Other Armed Groups (OAGs) including the Southern Sudanese Defence Force (SSDF) and the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF).
This paper argues that the control and management of SALWs in Southern Sudan is fundamental to the building of healthy and peaceful communities in post war era.

1.2. The Scope and Structure of the Study

The focus of this study is the threat posed to reconstruction efforts in post conflict southern Sudan. The study is intended to benefit from the experiences of Mozambique, Angola and Sierra Leone, drawing from their approaches and experiences, including agreements, treaties, conventions, and local initiatives which followed their relative success in handling of the SALWs dilemmas. These countries are chosen on the basis that, like Southern Sudan, they have suffered long armed civil wars that left a devastated economy, exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries and a host of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

This dissertation is organised in five chapters. Chapter one will give a general overview of the study; introduction, background and rationale of the study, research questions, methodology and the scope of the study. Chapter two will discuss the literature review and explore experiences as well as drawing lessons from Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Chapter three will focus on the initiatives on the control of SALWs at international, regional and national levels. It will also look the efforts of civil society representatives and state governments. Chapter four will explore the availability and factors that drive demand for SALWs within the communities of Southern Sudan. It will examine the problems associated with SALWs on the socio-economic and political situation of the local population and the country at large. Chapter five will finally look at recommendations and conclusions for southern Sudan.

1.3. Background Study and Rationale

Sudan is a nation with manifold regions, tribal groups, livelihoods/styles and religions. This diversity has often led to conflicts and violence that engulfed the whole country. Most of these conflicts may have had their roots in ancient traditional feuds that might have been
resolved, among other ways, with rudimentary weapons like bows and arrows, spears, swords and machetes. The impacts of these conflicts were of small scale and manageable in comparison to today’s where SALWs are used. The proliferation and accumulation of SALWs without control protracted armed conflicts and exacerbated violence. The prolonged civil wars in the Sudan, stretching for more than two decades, marred with devastating consequences, could also be accounted for by the widespread and easy accessibility of SALWs (HSBA, 2006).

The North-South civil war, which was brought to a halt by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on January 9, 2005 between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and former rebels, the SPLM/A was the longest violent conflict in the region. It began in 1983, shortly after the collapse of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement between northern and southern Sudan. The war was over resources, role of religion in the state and the rights of minorities. It is estimated that over two million people perished and more than half million forced to flee to the neighbouring countries (Ozerdem and Babiker, 2002; Danforth, 2002; HRW 2006:16, Randolph, 2002:1).

Due to the armed conflict in Southern Sudan, the Sudanese civil population particularly in the South became highly militarised and armed with SALWs. Bradbury, et al (2000:17) stated that “the dividing line between civilians and soldiers in Southern Sudan is blurred”. The SPLA general units which comprise of local people are driven by defence rather than ideology. Like most rebel groups in the world, the SPLM/A is an irregular liberation army, which is relatively disorganized in terms of structure and orderliness. The prolonged civil war and the communal lifestyle of the southern Sudanese meant that literally every man, woman, and child participated in the war and has access to guns. This complicates the estimate of the number of guns in circulation in southern Sudan. Furthermore, the proliferation of SALWs in southern Sudan can also be attributed to the wars in the neighbouring regions such as Darfur, Eastern Sudan, and the neighbouring countries including Northern Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). This continuous availability of SALWs can therefore be associated to the cyclic natures of these armed conflicts in the region.

1.4. Study Aim and Objectives

1.4.1. Aim

This study is aimed at examining the problems associated with availability of SALWs in the post conflict situation in Southern Sudan and to suggest a set of guidelines for a more effective grassroots level approach to controlling SALW at the hands of civilians in southern Sudan.

1.4.2. Objectives:

Focusing on Southern Sudan, the objectives of the study are to;

1. Provide understanding of the factors that compel people to carry arms even in post conflict situations.

2. Examine and explain

- The socio-economic, political and cultural consequences of the widespread uncontrolled SALWs on communities in post conflict situation.
- The existing policies for controlling the availability of SALWs at international, regional, national and local levels (strengths and weaknesses), and how the shortcomings of such policies can be addressed for a more effective control of SALW.
- The roles of various actors and stakeholders in the post conflict reconstruction in controlling SALWs.

1.5. Research Questions

This research aims to answer the questions why almost two years after the historic signing of the CPA (2005),

1. Southern Sudanese civil population still need SALW? And how does this affect the socio economic and political stability of the country?
2. Local, national and international communities have not been able to control and manage the threat posed by these SALWs? And how might, international and national efforts to control SALWs be extended and adapted for greater impact at local level?

1.6. Assumptions

1. Factors which drive Sudanese civil population to possess arms are multiple and complex, and could be related to the failure of the state to offer protection to civilians and their livelihoods.

2. Disarmament cannot be pursued in isolation from addressing the factors that prompt people to use guns.

3. The management and control of SALW is essential if the local community is to feel the peace dividend.

4. Collaboration and cooperation between governments, relevant UN agencies, NGOs and civil society actors are essential for any disarmament or peace-building efforts to succeed.

1.7. Methodology

1.7.1. Introduction

The bulk of the information for this study is collected mainly from secondary sources; literature from text books, journals, internet websites and documents of international humanitarian organizations, United Nations (UN) agencies and government papers. Qualitative one-on-one interviews were conducted with individuals working for the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and individuals from the local communities. Mozambique and Sierra Leone, with nearly similar situations were reviewed to highlight the case of Southern Sudan.
The primary data was drawn from my personal and professional observations and experiences in Southern Sudan, semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, informal conversation with Sudanese in the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway, and meetings with Oxfam and International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). Internship with IANSA played a crucial role and reinforced my personal understanding of the existing initiatives of SALWs.

1.7.2. Data Collection Methods

The methods used to collect data involved reviewing literatures on the availability of SALWs, the problems associated with the availability of SALWs at local levels. It also looked at how the already existing and upcoming initiatives can be adopted and extended for implementation at grassroots level to improve the quality of civilian lives.

The semi-structured interviews and questionnaires were conducted through emails and telephone conversations. The questions included the following.

- Are guns available within the civilian population in the area where you work?
- If yes, how are they controlled and managed, and by who?
- If they are not controlled, how do these weapons affect the socio-economic and cultural aspects of the civilian population?
- What do you think should be done and by who?
- Who is already working on this issue? And how are the civilians involved in the control of the weapons?
- Why do the civilians own these guns?

I organised meetings with Oxfam’s Campaign Manager for SALWs control and the director of IANSA. The aim of the meetings was to learn the approaches used by international organisations in the control of weapons. At IANSA, where I was on an internship for three months, I was able to familiarise myself with their work and associated organisations.
From 2002 to 2006, I worked in Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal Regions in Southern Sudan with Lutheran World Federation and Save the Children Sweden respectively. It was during that time when I was exposed to how SALWs were used against the civilian population. These personal observations and experiences guided and reinforced my secondary data collection used in the study, especially in the understanding of traditional and cultural practices related to civilian possession of arms.

1.7.3. Limitations and Challenges to the study

- Lack of adequate documentation and statistical evidence of SALWS impacts in Southern Sudan
- Time factor - three months is not enough to come up with more comprehensive study conclusions.
- The selection of interviewees and NGO documents were based on availability. This limited the diversity of views represented in this study.
Chapter Two: Literature Review and Lessons from other Countries

2.1. Literature Review

The threat posed by the widespread uncontrolled SALWS has become a global issue affecting both nations at war and those not at war. There are thousands of deaths every day ranging from homicides, suicides, cattle raiding, robbery and accidents or cases of undetermined intent, all attributable to SALWs. The impacts of these weapons, from which no country is immune, are far reaching deaths, injuries, social disruptions of communities’ strengths and poor economic development (Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2004). As Eshete et al (2002) noted, the statistics in armed conflicts are alarming; 43 of the last 47 conflicts in the world have been fought with SALWs, yet 80-90% of the victims of these conflicts are civilians.

These weapons come from all over the world. The increasing number of countries and companies that produce SALWs indicate that the global SALWs industry has been growing in recent years. Apart from the weapons used during the world wars that are still in circulation worldwide, Forecast International (October 2000) estimates that in the years between 1980 and 1999, more than 43 million SALWs of all types were produced in Europe/Russia excluding US. The boost in production of SALWs is a sign of high demand for SALWs hence the need for coordinated action at national, regional and global levels. As Fitzpatrick (2006) suggests, polarisation and rent-seeking may be used as an economic approach to appraising SALWs demand. Fitzpatrick treats polarisation as a potential measure of conflict between groups of opposing political and economic interest, and treats rent-seeking as a pursuit of income outside of labour or investments, which lead to a set of political and economic motivations, which in turn gives rise to SALWs demand. The question however is; who should act and how?

The problems caused by armed conflicts and armed violence have attracted a lot of attention from policy makers, civil societies and academics the world over. The global approaches to dealing with these problems are channelled through the United Nations and
international community. The United Nations General Assembly resolutions on small arms from mid 90s have been directed primarily on collecting and destroying SALWs and harmonising export policies. For example, the resolution that created UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms issued a report in 1997 providing a standard (commonly used and quoted) definition of SALWs, described the causes of the proliferation of SALWs and made policy recommendations. Although the UN Panel of Government Expert's documents and recommendations directly and indirectly tackled supply and demand sides of SALWs control respectively, this research agrees with Muggah and Brauer (2004) that the supply side received much more attention than the demand side of arms control. The indirect initiatives towards the demand side of SALWs resulted into references contained in the Bamako Declaration of the Organisation African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), (OAU, 2000: vol.1.vii), but has not yet yielded much in the way of international norms. The implementation of the Declaration by member states who signed up has been poor, yet this Declaration is about what could be best for the civil population.

This research concurs with the Quakers United Nations Office (QUNO) and its partners, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) that “much of the policy response to small arms problems has been focused on regulating the supply and transfer of these weapons” (QUNO 2004:5). In series of Workshops in 1999, the QUNO identified poverty and economic inequality, lack of fundamental human rights, poor governance, malfunctioning post conflict programs such as Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and cultural attitudes as factors important to shaping small arms demand. Although QUNO and its partners are not region specific in their approach, this research ascertains that acting on and reducing these factors at civilian level might control demand for more weapons at individual and community levels especially in post conflict setting.

Another international intervention in the problems of armed violence is by the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice which was endorsed in 1998 and passed by the UN general Assembly on 31st
May 2001 as UN firearms protocol. According to Coe and Smith (2003), the UN firearms protocol contains the principles on firearms which focused on regulatory approaches to the civilian use of firearms. Measures such as penalties for gun misuse and illegal possession, marking and registration of individual firearms formed the principles for state adoption. Substantiated by the UN talk of expanding the UN Register of conventional arms, these principles have become the current recommendations for regional initiatives, especially in the African Economic Communities of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Nairobi Declarations as well as national legislations. While these are important aspects in controlling trans-national armed crimes, they neglect armed-related transactions within states with less or no regards for the demand discourse. As such, the scope of this UN Firearm Protocol is very narrow because the prime focus is crime prevention by controlling hardwares - the guns but not the people and their attitudes.

The UN Programme of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in SALWs in all its aspects emphasises their concern with the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this trade simultaneously from both supply and demand perspective. The UN PoA refers indirectly to the demand through its strong emphasis on prevention and by mentioning related issues such as development, the promotion of cultures of peace, conflict resolution, and security sector reform (Regehr, 2004). The programme, however, does not put enough emphasis on how urgent the implementations should take place and the language used in the document allows member states to often dither in their practice. Although the UN PoA initiatives are designed to tackle issues caused by the proliferation of SALWs at national and local levels, it is worth noting that these initiatives usually tend to have very little involvement of the local people who experience the direct consequences of armed conflict. Little or no attention has been paid to solve the root causes and reasons for the demand of SALWs. Addressing the problems of these people should remove demand and ensure responsible handling and use of the guns.
Not surprisingly, more convincing efforts to mainstream demand perspective into development is emerging from humanitarian organisations and UN agencies, previously not directly involved with SALWs control and disarmament processes. Practitioners caught at the margins of armed civilians and disarmament have started incorporating a demand approach into their programmes, particularly development agencies such as UNDP, World Vision International (WVI), United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organisation (WHO) and OGB. Below are synopses of some of the programmes on SALWs in Africa:

- UNDP – operate a community disarmament programme in the Sudan.
- UNICEF – operate child soldier’s Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration and Go to School programmes in Southern Sudan.
- WHO – have health approaches to control of SALWs
- WVI – run programme of community development in Ethiopia to control SALWs
- OGB – campaign for Arm Trade Treaty (ATT) globally.

As part of their poverty reduction strategies, these agencies have begun to explore behavioural and attitudinal aspects associated with SALWs acquisition and possession and therefore recognising the clear linkage between armed violence and socio economic exclusions. Although not an absolute and only factor to driving demand and aggravating armed violence, the WVI experience with civilians’ economic development in Ethiopia is vital and has already set precedence over the reduction of the availability of SALWs from civilian level of demand (Eshete and O’Reilly-Cathorpe 2000).

There is still a missing link between the policy makers and civil society in attempts to control SALWs particularly in the policy arena and regulatory regimes so far in place. In deed many policies, agreements and protocols and declarations of principle such as the Bamako Declaration, the UN Firearms protocols and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) were developed with little input, if any from civil society. This top-down approach to the threats posed by SALWs reflects the seriousness with which those in authority treat the
problem. There is however, some realisation of the important role that civil society can play in the development of comprehensive approaches to stemming the SALWs endemic as demonstrated by the active participation of the IANSA an its partners with their people’s consultation programme, ‘Have Your Say’ in the UN Arms Trade Treat (IANSA Control Arms, 2006). resolutions are based on the decisions of the policy makers, rarely including the civil society. Such imposed decisions encourage dependency from the UN by the civil population. The exception being at the UN ATT where IANSA has, with its partners, connected with all categories of people in their people’s consultation program “Have Your Say” found on their website. Indeed, the campaign for the UN ATT was spearheaded by civil society representatives like OGB, IANSA, and Amnesty International (AI).

In southern Sudan however, civil society is playing a very important role in security and peace building through targeting needy civilians in the regions where raiding and child abduction are made worse by the availability of SALWs. Bonn International Conversion Centre (BICC) for example, in partnership with GoSS local administration and the South Sudan Interim Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (SSIDDRC) is providing civic trainings/education to civilians before disarmament takes place. Their modules for training include; SALWs and Development, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Global and Regional Agreements on SALWs control, Youth and SALWs.

At local level is the CPA implementation. The formal end of the second Sudanese civil war in January 2005 left small arms in the hands of both the military and civilians. Despite the fact that the control of SALWs was indirectly referred to in the CPA document especially in the Security Arrangement Protocol of September 2003, it was not explicit enough. In addition, there were inadequate efforts by the GoS to enable the implementation of the measures that could directly improve the security of the Southern Sudanese civilians.

These weaknesses in the CPA left the GoSS weak in its attempts to ensure security for its citizen. It could also explain the reasons why the SPLA use military force towards civilian disarmament hence perpetuating the cycle of insecurity after CPA. All these factors made the
civilians desperate for survival creating the demand for weapons. It is at this point of frustrations that HSBA (2006:1) described Southern Sudan as “one of the most dangerous places to be a civilian in the 20th Century”. And besides, armed conflict and armed violence robbed the civilians of their socio-economic strengths, communal security/protections that cost them lives, properties, devastated economy, infrastructures and social security.

The Sudan and the southern region in particular, lacks reliable estimates of data, comprehensive research and documentation on any aspect of SALWs. There are no national documents showing the numbers and distribution of weapons, the volume of local production and transfers of SALWs in the country as well as the socio-economic costs of guns violence and number of victims (HSBA, 2006). The lack of documentation can be attributed to the protracted armed conflict that lasted for more than two decade, during which the whole infrastructure was destroyed. During the armed conflict between the SPLA/M and the GoS, international organisations and UN agencies including WVI, World Relief, ICRC UNICEF and UNDP were primarily engaged in emergency relief provisions in IDP and refugee camps. If there were data collection, a correlation between weapons injuries and availability of arms, could be a possibility (ICRC Study, 1999).

In the 2006 report, the HSBA, a multi-disciplinary research project made a claim that their project was the “first Victimisation survey ever undertaken in Southern Sudan” and among the few that are “directly involved with Southern Sudanese civilian security” (HSBA, 2006). Though the HSBA is raising awareness on the Southern Sudan’s insecurity situation, which is perpetuated by the widespread SALWs, it does not suggest specific guidelines to the GoSS and non-governmental Organisations (NGO) on how civilian disarmament should be carried out and who should be involved. Moreover, it only covers the two states of Bahr El Gazal and Upper Nile out of ten states, and this does not even make a better representation of the insecurity situation in Southern Sudan as a whole.
2.2. **Experiences Learnt from Other Countries.**

To a larger extent, Mozambique and Sierra Leone had gone through similar situations to what is happening in South Sudan. The two suffered brutal civil conflicts and armed violence which left behind a bitter legacy and lots of SALWs used during the wars. The use of SALWs in these countries during the conflict destroyed lives, infrastructures and devastated the economy. These countries, have however managed to confront these post war challenges with the assistance of the international community, particularly the UN and Regional Peace Keeping Operations and the efforts of their national civil societies.

My aim of using these countries is not only to look at the similarities in situations but also on the successes and failures they faced during their post conflict reconstruction.

### 2.2.1. Mozambique

The 16 years conflict (1975 -1992) between the Frente de Liberatazao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO) claimed 100,000 civilian lives, properties and ruined Mozambican economy (McDonough 2004). Mozambique suffered massive destruction of capital during the civil war, with nearly 40% of all its immobile capital either completely destroyed or eroded beyond use (Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001). The two parties had been involved in formal peace talks since 1988. Through negotiations, they agreed that RENAMO recognises FRELIMO’S authority and, the FRELIMO government would delay important legislation and the holding of multi party elections. These agreements provided common grounds for negotiations, which led to the signing of the Rome General Peace Agreement in October 1992.

During the conflict in Mozambique, Russia and China supplied the majority of the weapons to the ruling FRELIMO (Vines 1998). The disarmament process was partly successful in Mozambique because during the disarmament planning process in the early 1992, Russia provided detailed information of what it had shipped to Mozambique, which helped in the tracing of the SALWs. In 1995, INTERPOL noted that the government of Mozambique
distributed tens of thousands of AK-47s to the civilian militia units in 1982 though few were returned. Such information made tracking of weapons very easy, hence easing the DDR process.

McDonough (2004) referred to the Mozambican’s Arms control program as successful because the process was patient with the long term disarmament period (nine year) which eventually led to collection of more than 600,000 weapons and pieces of ammunitions. He further noted that the achievements are both in terms of the quantities of guns collected as well as the impact it made on the wider society.

The ONUMOZ, a UN peace keeping operation in Mozambique failed to produce meaningful disarmament. The ONUMOZ Peace keepers who took part in the disarmament of Mozambique did not destroy the arms they had collected. Instead, the arms were recycled back to the communities through theft and redistribution hence rise and continuous circulation of illegal weapons and its associated armed violence (Vines, 1998). These failures and the associated consequences made ONUMOZ unpopular. Although total disarmament would be difficult within a limited timeframe, the mission failed even to accomplish the more modest goal of destroying the weapons it had collected and earmarked for decommissioning. As a result, the weapons continued to circulate and armed crime rose sharply after the conflict ended.

Community initiatives, mainly, faith-based organisations were active in the Mozambican disarmament process. These faith-based organisations including the Christian Council of Mozambique’s (CCM) program played a great role in the collection of guns that enhanced the process of disarming civilian. This initiative provided farm tools to the people in exchange for guns while allowing the owner to remain anonymous if they chose to and it helped to build trust and encouraged many more people to hand in their guns. This approach yielded a big number of guns and contributed to reduced violent crime through. The ‘gun into hoes’ program was introduced in 1991 during the peace process and was supported by the Southern African Bishops Conference. By January 1997, the programme was noted to have collected 874 firearms, 79 other weapons (like knives), and over 20,000 armaments ranging from bullets to
Bazooka shells. Unlike the arms for money program in Sierra Leone that led to replacement of old weapons with new ones, this tools for arms took into considerations the needs of the local population and turned destructive weapons into development tools.

The post UN disarmament period in Mozambique was also regarded successful, a reflection of growing confidence in peace at the local level as well as in the policy makers. Since 1995, disarmament in Mozambique had taken off and the rusting weapons caches were no longer a threat to internal security. However, fresh weapons coming through the Maputo port and elsewhere now pose the main security threat. Ironically, South Africa suffered the most after peace in Mozambique because it has been the leading destination for the SALW's flowing from Mozambique. However, joint police operations and a change in market demand for guns in South Africa brought about a decline in the weapons trade.

2.2.2. Sierra Leone

The civil war in Sierra Leone erupted in March 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by the late Foday Sankoh, a former corporal in the Sierra Leone Army took up arms against the government of Sierra Leone. According to Adebajo (2002), the outbreak of the arm violence in Sierra Leone can be traced back to political failures of Siaka Steven (1968 – 1985) and General Joseph Momoh (1985 – 1992), and the collapsing economic conditions such as the failing country’s Diamond revenues. This conflict resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and displacement of more than 2 million people (Adebajo, 2002).

After a long period of civil unrest and series of peace agreements in Abidjan, Conakry and Lome, the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed the Lome Peace agreement on 7th July 1999 in an effort to end the civil war between them (Adebajo, 2002). Although the agreement called for the disarmament of RUF rebels, the peace Accord did not last because the RUF rebels kept their weapons that were used to start another war. It was until the British government intervened militarily that the rebels were finally defeated and stability started returning to Sierra Leone.
However, the restoration of Foday Sankoh, as the custodian of the weapons of the Sierra Leonean government before his death in 2003 was a big mistake because the victims of the war, mainly the civilians would see such status as reward for rebel activities raising mistrust of the government.

It is sad to note that the UN approach to disarmament in Sierra Leone paid less attention to the role of the neighbouring countries such as Liberia and Burkina Faso in supplying weapons to Sierra Leone. The flow of SALWs continued to exacerbate the conflicts in Sierra Leone and made it difficult to control SALWs from the supply side. The international community and the UN Security Council, in addition to their peace keeping role in Sierra Leone, tried to control the flow of weapons into Sierra Leone by placing travel, economic and military embargo (UN Security Council 1132, 1997) on Sierra Leone. The embargo did not stop the proliferation of SALWs since the neighbouring countries continued to provide Sierra Leone with these weapons.

The government of Sierra Leone though had recovered weapons from the RUF over the years, they did not methodically trace their origin. An attempt was made to introduce a registry of RUF weapons in 1994 at the Ministry of Defence, but without success. As a rule, any weapons captured from the rebels were distributed to the local units of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) hence recycle of weapons to civil population.

The Transitional Safety Allowance (TSA) perpetrated purchase of more weapons contravening the aim of reducing the widespread misuse of arms from circulation. Berman (2000) mentioned that the means by which weapons were taken from circulation created more unforeseen problems such as tension from rewarding former brutal rebels for evil deeds, and high prices to increase demand for more weapons and business of guns from the neighbouring countries (for example, Guinea) hence proliferation of SALWs in the country. He condemned the US$ 300 transitional safety allowance that was offered in return for weapons because it created more demand and business for more weapons. The fact that these weapons were purchased for a very high fee (US$300) made replacement with a modern weapon very easy.
2.3. Lessons Learnt from the Two Countries

The process of disarmament in each of the two countries was full of difficulties, most of which were similar. The difficulties ranged from weak mandates of the various UN operations and missions regarding disarmament to lack of a clear definition of what disarmament should entail or the criteria for conducting a successful disarmament exercise. There were often no clear distinctions between disarmament and demobilisation and the UN also failed to provide the countries with the necessary resources to deal with the disarmament process to ensure proper collection and decommission of these weapons.

The two countries also differed in the modalities they employed in the disarmament processes. In Mozambique, they exchanged tools for arms, while in Sierra Leone arms were exchanged for money, which led to replacement of old weapons with new ones.

There was also the issue of interpreting mandates. In Mozambique, for example, the disarmament process ran into serious problems during the UN peace keeping mission because they maintained that they were in Mozambique to watch but not act on any failures. There were cases where the rebels would hand in old weapons in bad conditions for public image and keep the good condition weapons for future use. Although the UN peace keepers knew what was happening, they did nothing about it as their mandate limits their operations. At the end of the day, weapons remain in the households while some were sold to the neighbouring countries (McDonough 2004).

The other area of difference and difficulties was on embargos. In Mozambique, lack of arms embargo at the time of disarmament contributed to the failures of the DDR process. During the UN disarmament process, a lot of effort was devoted to the removal of weapons possessed during the conflict. The process did not remove or control the illicit ownership of the weapons as anticipated because new weapons had been imported by both parties. This, however, meant that depleted arms caches were restocked, or relocated, with new equipment.
In Sierra Leone, the approach prior to establishing the UNOMSIL by the Security Council as a response to the May 1997 coup, which failed, was through sanctions and armed embargos.

There were also differences in how the collected guns were disposed. Unlike the case of some caches in Mozambique, most of the weapons collected under the DDR in Sierra Leone were not destroyed. Berman (2000) noted that ECOMOG, which played part in the DDR, only dismantled the weapons’ working parts such as bolts, many of which were easy to reassemble as for the case of the AK-47. The failure to destroy these weapons, which was attributed to reasons such as ECOMOG and government of Sierra Leone wanting to recover their weapons lost to the RUF rebels led to recycling of these weapons to local population.

It is clear that if some of the above pitfalls are to be avoided in southern Sudan, then lessons need to be learnt about disposal methods, disarmament strategies and adherence to the mandate of the UNIMISS. We shall explore these issues in more depth in chapter 5.
Chapter Three: Policy Initiatives to Control of SALWs

3.1. Introduction

SALWs are a class of weapons that have been overlooked too long by governments and policymakers world over. There is no universal treaty, legally binding and applicable law to effective control of SALWs. As the detrimental effects of SALWs on all aspects of individual, national and international insecurity increase, policy makers have begun to come up with initiatives in order to control further proliferation of these weapons and their associated problems. Although these initiatives are in existence, and more are under way (for example the ATT), they have not been effective enough to deal with these problems because most of them are principles and have not been taken seriously by state governments. The language used in SALWs’ declarations and protocols is weak and the issue of local demand for the weapons is not explicitly pointed out. In the regional and global agreements, civil societies and the state governments make decisions for the civil populations without consulting the people, who are usually the direct victims of the misuse of SALWs.

This chapter therefore, introduces and examines international, regional and national initiatives and agreements that currently exist to control the proliferation and misuse of SALWs within states and across borders. The chapter begins with analysis of some of the international, regional and national agreements.

3.2. International Initiatives

Since the uncontrolled proliferation of SALWs is global in nature, common standards for SALWs control are needed to effectively combat the illicit transfer of these weapons at global level. The key existing global initiatives in place include the UN PoA which resulted from the UN conference, the UN firearms’ protocols and the Wassenaar arrangements. They play vital role as stepping stones to the development of regional agreements and national legislations meant to represent good opportunities for engagement of civil societies that will trickle down to
grassroots levels. However, these international initiatives do not affect non member states of the UN, non signatories nor do they represent a complete view of all regional initiatives. The non member states of UN and those that are not signatories (for example USA) are still producing and flooding the international markets with SALWs, perpetuating arms proliferation. These International bodies do not only lack ‘global soldiers’ to enforce and monitor the implementation of the UN initiatives, but also the initiatives and agreements not legally binding.

The UN conference on the illicit trade in SALWs held from 9th to 20th July 2001 is one of the international initiatives to address the control of SALWs from a global perspective. Although it was the first of its kind where most UN member states had the opportunity to discuss the illicit trade in SALWs in all its aspects, it ignored the licit transfer of SALWs that end up in the hands of bandits and human rights abusers. The conference contributed to a better understanding of the nature of SALWs, concerns and priorities of different countries and sub-regions. It also contributed to civil societies developing actions to address SALWs problems and even put firmly SALWs in the political agenda, where civil societies can demand change from their governments. However, there were inadequate follow ups and no monitoring of implementation of outcomes. The civil societies were mentioned but were not comprehensively informed of their roles and duties. The conference’s aim was restricted to addressing illicit trade but did not examine the management of licit weapons and convenient way of disarming civilians.

One of the significant outcomes of the conference is the UN Programme of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALWs in all its Aspects. The UN PoA was purposeful on preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in SALWs in all its aspects, commitments to monitoring and implementation, and international co-operation. This program took into account interests of regional initiatives such as the Bamako Declarations and concerns of civil societies.

The second main international initiative is the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol which was conducted under the auspices of the Vienna UN ECOSOC Commission. The protocol has
some salient shortcomings, for example, it is silent on the legal production and trafficking in firearms, their components and ammunitions that might end up in abuse of human rights in some parts of the world. The protocol, however, has strong provision that put emphasis on crime prevention and criminal injustice across states.

The third international initiative is the Wassenaar Arrangements (WA) on the Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. It was established in 1996 to deal with risks to regional and international security and stability related to the spread of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies (WA website). Amongst its key objectives are the promotion of ‘transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional and dual-use goods and technologies’ (WA Website). The emphasis on transparency is based on the key elements of voluntarily information sharing between states concerning transfer of controlled goods.

Although the WA was initially concerned with conventional weapons and their exporters, its member states by 2000 reaffirmed the importance of responsible export policies, and effective export controls over SALWs. By 2002, they agreed on a set of good practices and criteria for export of SALWs. The participating states agreed that before supplying any country with weapons, they need to consider factors like accumulation of arms, risk of diversion of weapons that will aggravate conflict or abuse of human rights as well as compliance of the concerned country to international human rights and humanitarian laws, obligations.

It is not clear how member states should ensure that the principles of the WA are complied with but what is apparent is that some member states including China and Russia and continued to supply SALWs to countries such as Sudan contrary to the WA (Small Arms Survey, 2001).

3.3 Regional Initiatives

Regional initiatives concerning the control of SALWs exist for example in Europe, Africa, the Americas and the Pacific Islands. In Africa, there are mainly three correlated regional
efforts to the control of SALWs, all under the umbrella of the Bamako Declarations. In nearly identical language, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), SADC and the Nairobi Protocols committed most of the African countries to develop strong, harmonised regulations of transfer, possession and use of arms within and across borders. Some of these initiatives only gained ground in some countries, but exist in principles with less impact particularly at community level in other countries. The poor implementation of these initiatives, for instance the Nairobi protocols, are manifested by the availability of weapons used in the cattle raids among the pastoralist communities (Toposa of Sudan, Turkana and Pokot of Kenya and the Karamojong of Uganda) across the borders of Southern Sudan.

At the continental (Africa) level is the December 2000 Bamako Declaration on the African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALWs. In 1996, the African states through the OAU called for an in-depth study into the ways that could reduce SALWs proliferation across the continent. The 1999 OAU’s 35th Summit held in Algiers was also in preparations for the 2001 UN Conference on SALWs. It provided good forum for African states to agree on common approaches aimed at addressing problems related to the use, transfer and production of SALWs. This eventually found expression in the Bamako declaration whose principles were extensively used in the negotiation of the UN PoA for African countries. Although the Declaration places no binding obligations on the African states, it is the only document that commits all the states of African continent to common principles on small arms (Scott 2003). It is also through this Declaration that most African states agreed and committed themselves to regulate arms internationally, regionally and at state levels. These states together with civil societies also agreed to put more emphasis on appropriate measures to control illegal transfers of arms by manufacturers, suppliers, traders, and brokers as well as destruction of confiscated weapons. At regional level, attention was paid to strengthening regional and continental cooperation on information exchange among police, customs, and border – control officials and coordinating and harmonising legislations over marking, recordkeeping and controls governing imports, exports, and licit trade.
The Bamako Declaration aimed at ensuring action on SALWs that are coordinated across Africa led to the birth of the regional protocols and agreements such as the SADC, Nairobi declarations and the ECOWAS. Although these Declarations recognise the role of civil society through its representatives, the implementation has been very poor and slow. It is true that addressing the problem of SALWs is complex and requires long term commitments, there has been lack of prioritisation of this issue among African state (Bamako Declaration, 2000).

The 2001, SADC Protocol on the control of Firearms, Ammunition and other arms related materials in southern Africa was the first legally-binding treaty to regulate SALWs in Africa. It has been ratified by all the member states from Southern Africa except Angola, DRC and Swaziland.

The second regional initiative in Africa is the 2004 Nairobi Protocol against illicit proliferation of SALWs in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. The Protocol is a legal expression of the principles of the Bamako declaration and the 2000 Nairobi Declaration which committed its member-states to fight the flow of SALWs within their states and across state borders. The Protocol required states in the region to put in place laws and regulations, and to carry out a concrete and coordinated agenda that promotes human security. Although the protocol was signed by Burundi, Djibouti, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania, it is only Ethiopia that submitted a ratification instrument and as a result, the protocol is weak.

The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Import, Export and Manufacture of SALWs is the third sub-regional initiative in Africa. In 1998, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Togo, Senegal, and Sierra Leone agreed to control SALWs in their states and region. Since the ECOWAS was not legally binding, the heads of states of the ECOWAS signed a new convention on June 2006 that can allow them to impose a sanction on countries that do not comply with its restrictions.
3.4. National Initiatives

The GoS has strong legislation that controls civilian possession of firearms. The legislation was active before the civil war in most parts of the country. Its weakness was that the legislation was written in Arabic with no English or local translations and therefore many Sudanese were not able to understand. Currently in Southern Sudan, the CPA has been the point of reference. However, it only focuses on disarmament and not comprehensive in its operations (CPA 2005). Moreover, the GoSS has not prioritised the need to put laws in place that would govern possession and use of weapons in public places. This leaves the bulk of the work to those humanitarian organisations and UN agencies whose mandate is on protection of human rights and humanitarian laws.
Chapter Four: The Availability of SALWs in Southern Sudan

4.1. Introduction

This chapter will review and discuss the nature and scope of SALWs, the demand for arms by the civil population, process by which small arms find their way into civilian hands, and the problems associated with SALWs. In addition, it will explore the implications of unregulated SALWs in Southern Sudan and their effects on post conflict reconstruction of the country.

4.2. Situation Analysis

Sudan has been experiencing series of armed conflict since it gained independence in 1956. The most devastating of those conflicts has been the war between the northern and southern regions of the country where only 11 years (1972 to 1983) of relative peace have been observed in the last 50 years (HSBA, 2006). Other armed conflicts that devastated Sudan include the July 2003 Darfur conflict in western region of Sudan and the Eastern Front Opposition (Beja Tribe) conflict of the north-eastern region of Sudan. The Sudanese problems of marginalisation are compounded by religious differences, ethnic diversity, inequality in development and tribal divides, at all levels of the societies. As state protection and human security deteriorated in these protracted decades of conflicts, civilian population resorted to taking up arms for individual and community protection hence demand for weapons (Small Arms Survey 2001). In comparison with the rest of Sudan, the Southern Sudan region suffered most of the burden of the undocumented proliferation and misuse of SALWS.

As observed by Small Arms Survey (2001:173) “the war in southern Sudan is the most under-reported wars in the international media” where both sides are believed to have a long and insidious records of using SALWs to commit human rights abuses, including rape, slavery and killing of civilians. After the 2005 CPA that was signed between the GoS and the SPLA/M, the agreement officially ended the north-south armed conflict, and mandated the incorporation of the SPLA/M into the new Government of National Unity (GoNU) while they (SPLA/M)
hold its status as the autonomous government of South Sudan until a referendum is held in 2011.

Though the CPA acknowledges and made references to the disarmament of both civilians and OAGs, it did not completely end armed violence in Southern Sudan. The intra-south skirmishes mainly between the SPLA/M and the SSDF continued until the Juba Declaration of 8th January 2006 brought them to nearly close (Young, 2006). The warring groups in the Sudan, with their vested interests continued to arm militias and civil population, posing threats to post conflict reconstructions. These weapons possessed by the militias such as the White Army of Upper Nile, and civilians that are yet to be removed from circulation has put Southern Sudan in a vicious circle of direct and indirect problems of insecurity, mortality, poverty and deteriorating economy.

According to Peters (2006), the Director of International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), direct and indirect problems posed by SALWs come in many forms, which include; gun culture, armed violence in conflict zones, street crimes, accidents and suicides as well as solution for disputes. The study finds out that by resorting to use of guns to settle personal or community disputes are symptoms of breakdown of law and order and institutional process for addressing issues of injustice. In addition, the culture of armed violence indicates loss of confidence on authorities hence demand for SALWs. With these forms of violence, it is estimated that millions of lives were lost to SALWs during the decades of civil war while others to gun inflicted homicides and suicides.

4.3. The Nature, Scope and the Proliferation of SALWs in Southern Sudan.

Apart from Egypt and South Africa, the bulk of SALWs are produced in the Western World and Asia, yet they are widely used in Africa to abuse human rights. In 1999, there were eleven major armed conflicts in the African states of Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea – Bissau, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and
the Sudan, fought by SALWs that supplied by Europe, US and China (SIPRI, 2000). On Average, African countries have become the major recipient and users of SALWs.

Sudan is among the recipients and conduit of SALWs from the world and to other countries in Africa (Chad, DRC, and Uganda). It is estimated to have 1.9 to 3.2 million weapons in circulation; with 2/3 in the hands of civilians, 20% in the hands of GoS and the remaining arms held by GoSS and OAGs (HSBA, 2007). Despite its domestic production, the UN Comtrade statistical data (2007) claimed that Sudan spent about US$ 70 million to import SALWs from at least 34 countries, out of which 90% were imported from China and Iran, between 1992 and 2005. However, these figures would be higher if the real value of all legal and illegal trade were computed.

The figure below show how these guns end up in countries where human rights abuses prevail despite restrictions by UN and the international community through international conventions and sanctions.
Figure 2: Lifecycle of a gun

Life cycle of a gun

- Manufactured: Guns produced globally every year
- GUN DEALER OR ARMS BROKER
- Military & Police
  - Seized, surplus, obsolete stocks
  - Domestic supply or international transfers
- Military & police
- Firearms used or destroyed by police, military, national authorities
- General misuse
  - Assault
  - Homicide
  - Suicide
  - Accidental injuries
  - Family violence
  - Mass shootings
  - Kidnapping
  - Armed robbery
  - Rape
  - Threats, trauma
- Misuse during conflict
  - Violations of human rights
  - Torture
  - Rape
  - War crimes
  - Guns remain in use after conflict
- Gun recovered by authorities
  - Post-conflict demilitarization
  - Gun buyback
  - Guns seized by police
- Arms dealer or arms broker
- GUN DEALER OR ARMS BROKER
- Organized crime
  - Guns obtained from domestic or international sources
- Potentially intervention
  1. Strict licensing of gun use and registration of guns
  2. Global Arms Trade Treaty
  3. Stockpile management
  4. Global brokering treaty
  5. Application of UN principles on use of force and firearms

*Figure from the Small Arms Survey, Geneva. This is an illustrative diagram and is not intended to be comprehensive.
Berkol (2000) claimed that SALWs, unlike heavy arms, circulate on both the military and the civilian markets (figure 2 above). While the military markets involve legal transfers from the producers and certified states (mainly from western World) to the purchasing state (mainly developing state), the civilian markets are flooded with excess arms that might result from either military budget cuts or producer’s surplus production (Small Arms Survey, 2001). This might explain why Southern Sudan is awash with SALWs although no one has systematically demonstrated the number of weapons present in Southern Sudan and how they arrived there. While it is not possible to accurately pinpoint the means by which the SALWs found their way into Southern Sudan and eventually into the hands of the civilians, four possible ways may be identified.

The first obvious means is arms being captured from enemies, soldiers defecting from armed group and to a lesser extent through theft and robbery. The weapons used in the civil wars in the Sudan were reported by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) as mainly seized by rebels from the government depots (HRW Africa 1998:44, Small Arms Survey, 2001:174). They also claim that the majority of the SPLA/M weapons were captured in battle while others were stolen when Garang defected from the GoS. Indeed, the late Dr. John Garang, former leader of the SPLA/M, was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Sudanese army before he defected in 1983 to found the rebel movement that launched what he called the SPLA/M. His group defected with government weapons to launch the war of liberation. The fact that the SPLA/M mainly composed of the Southern Sudanese civilian population, these weapons end up in the local communities and villages of south Sudan.

The second route by which SALWs proliferated into the hands of civilians during the war in Southern Sudan was when both GoS and the SPLA/M, for tactical and strategic military reasons armed the civil population to fight their rivals. In 1980’s for example, while the GoS created and armed the Murahalin militia in Bahr el Gazal, the SPLA recruited and armed civil population of the same area. HRW Africa (1999) also documents how the GoS provided arms, ammunitions, and effective prosecution immunity for the militia it created. The most
devastating impacts of the Murahalin raids occurred in Bahr el Gazal in 1986/87 where over 1000 Dinka displaced civil population were massacred in Ad-Daien (Deng, 2003). The creation of these militias and the provision of arms had the effect of creating animosity between and amongst different ethnic groups like the Baggara, Dinka and Nuer which resulted in the severing relationship between these groups.

During the conflict between the GoS and SPLA/M, university student were forced by GoS for compulsory military training and service in frontlines before graduation. Many civil servants and civil population were exposed to use of guns and owning guns after the service. In the case of the SPLA/M, their source of manpower was the Southern Sudanese civilian population, who were recruited either by force, propaganda or through intimidation. Local chiefs were ordered to collect tax, food and human power for the war against the GoS.

A third and rare means by which some civilians came into possessions of SALWs is by way of inheritance from family and relatives or friends. While working in the Southern Sudan, I also witnessed cases where guns were used as gifts to family members, especially to older boys. Though the purpose was not to commit murder which may not be avoidable, the latter happened after intoxication with Alcohol or disagreements.

The fourth means, as HRW Africa (1998: 44) noted is that majority of the SPLA/M’s weapons were purchased in the open market and shipped through Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea. It was in these open markets that civilian population were exposed to purchasing weapons, and sometimes more than one weapon was purchased without restriction. The cheap prices of these weapons made almost everybody in the local communities to purchase more than a gun.

Reyneke (2000) noted that in Africa, “An AK- 47 Automatic rifle, which can easily be carried, maintained and assembled by a ten year
old child, can be bought for the price of a chicken or a goat”. Allio and Candia (2007) of the New Vision Newspaper in Kampala noted that “on the Uganda-Sudan border, an AK-47 rifle goes for Ushs.100,000, a pistol for Ushs.50,000 and a bullet Ushs.200. Inside Sudan, an AK-47 goes for a few chickens”.

4.4. Motivations for Civil Population Demand for SALWs

Although the desire for SALWs over other possible choices of weapons are influenced by easy availability, variety, and social norms (WHO, 2002; Villaveces et al., 2001), most groups of people, potential users of SALWs demand these weapons due to the threat posed by the arms for which they are sought.

“While not by themselves causing the conflicts in which they are used, the proliferation of SALWs affects the intensity and duration of violence and encourages militancy rather than peaceful resolutions of unsettled differences. Perhaps most grievously, we see a vicious circle in which insecurity leads to a higher demand for weapons, which itself breed still greater insecurity” (UNGA, 1997:2).

Demand for SALWs in the world market can be understood from the perspective of three principle actors: the state for its armed forces and other security institutions, non-state actors such as liberation movements to fight for independence or removal of dictatorial regimes, civilians (as individuals or groups) to safeguard their themselves and their livelihoods. While traditional approaches to control arms and disarmament of conventional weapons focus at demand by states, this study will mainly focus at the civilian motivation to possess arms after the CPA.

One of the major motivations for SALWs is the need for protection. The failure of the state to provide security to its citizens prompted many Southern Sudanese to protect themselves by all means. In Southern Sudan, during and after the civil war, civilians and their livelihoods have been threatened by bandits and cattle raiders with less or no protection from the state government. In telephone interviews (2007) with an officer in Institute for Promotion of Civil
Society (IPCS), it emerged that the local population in villages are more insecure than people in town because there is no legal and physical protection from the government. The officer further noted that while travelling to the nearest local market, many civilians carry guns to protect themselves against robbers (picture below).

In the absence of the GoS, the SPLA/M or the international community in providing security services to the people of Southern Sudan, the population took security matters into their own hands by acquiring SALWs and organising routine patrols (see picture above). Pastoralist communities like the Dinka, Nuer, Mundari, Toposa, Didinga and Lotuko have to increasingly depend on SALWs to protect their cattle against cattle raiders. While individuals and community efforts to provide security on a self-help basis have positive benefits, it is difficult to regulate and monitor them and sometimes instead of becoming agents of protection, they become sources of insecurity for other communities. For example, the White Army in Upper Nile, an informal gang of young men, originally created to protect cattle herds during. Armed with modern weapons, the White Army soon began to expand traditional rivalries with other groups to terrifying proportions (Young, 2006).

The thirdly, the absence of strong state security institutions, that are capable of delivering security, order, peace and justice force Southern Sudanese civilian to take up arms. In Southern Sudan, there are few, professionally trained police personnel that have been dealing with issues of law and order, particularly violent crime at community levels. The few available
personnel are stationed in the main towns of Juba, Wau, Yei, Rumbek and Malakal. The remaining towns are still governed by former rebel soldiers who have no knowledge of professional standards of dealing with civilians and crime issues. Criminals and law offenders are militarily handled by the use of the gun. While individual, family and community security is the business of the individuals and their communities.

The existing legal systems and institutions are far from meeting international human rights standards with appalling conditions. For examples, there are poor prisons for housing suspects and convicted criminals. In these conditions, it is tempting for individuals to take the law in their hands in order to protect or safeguard themselves and their families from harm.

The Fourth reasons relates to the pessimism amongst many Southern Sudanese about the sustainability of the CPA. Though the CPA was received with jubilation by Southern Sudanese, the euphoria was short-lived. Many Southern Sudanese still remember the historical Addis Ababa peace Accord of 1972, which brought the Anyanya (1956 – 1972) war to an end but collapsed just after a few years because the then GoS under the leadership of Nimeiri reneged on some commitments. As a result, many Southern Sudanese do not trust subsequent governments of Sudan, especially a government of Omar al-Bashir who toppled the government of Sadiq al-Mahad through a coup. Thus, while the CPA was well-received, many people still believe that the GoS will at some point breach the terms of the CPA and war might break again, which might be even more vicious than the war just ended and hence the desire to own a gun, just in case insecurity returns.

The fifth reason is competition over scarce resources. While there is an increasing acknowledgement that a range of negative social and economic conditions, including poverty and lack of basic services are conducive to instability and violence, the bottom line is that the availability of guns transforms social instability into armed violence and armed conflict which exacerbates poverty, competition over resources, and alienation. Predictably, the supplies of arms lead to increased demand for them. Higher rates of crime in urban settings encourage higher levels of arms retained in households.
The sixth reason is abuses from the security sector. Safer World, an International non-governmental organisation (INGO), has noted from its work in the security sector reform that, the unprofessional and unaccountable police and security forces can create mistrust within communities. Due to the mistrust, it becomes difficult to secure cooperation of the local communities to stem the flow of SALWs, instead it increases demand for more weapons.

The seventh reason is wealth accumulation. For some people, in particular youngsters, and especially when faced with very limited options, quick accumulation of wealth by illegal means such as use of guns in a lawless environment is irresistible, interviews with an IPCS coordinator (2007). Among the young men of the pastoralist communities in Southern Sudan, cattle raiding and looting have become the easiest means of accumulating herds of cattle, which is essential for paying bride-wealth during married ceremonies. While these practices pre-date the current volatile situations created by the civil war, they have gained special notoriety in the context of increasing availability of SALWs and the efficacy with which they have gained power over people and resources.

In a final analysis, the reasons why people buy arms are intricately related and create a vicious cycle whereby insecurity due to lack of protection from state compel civilians to acquire arms and the increased availability of arms in hands of civilian also fuel widespread lawlessness, disorder, and a culture of impunity, which exacerbate the security situation. Moreover it strains available resources and efforts by government to address the problems and to stamp its authority. Thus local conflicts can quickly spiral out of control while bandits commit crimes without effective deterrent. During the peace times, arms have continued to spread into civil society as families arm to protect themselves and their assets against bandits as well as gangs continue to arm themselves in order to compete with rival groups for wealth and fame.

### 4.5 Problems associated with the proliferation of SALWs

In communities where SALWs dominate, development activities are either halted or suspended for indefinite periods of time, schools close, commercial activities including private
investments are stopped and forced to flee offshore or in other countries, and in the long run, the whole economy grinds to a halt. This is often worse in societies that have just emerged from civil war, where buildings are destroyed, bridges blown up and human resources either dead or injured (UNDP, 2002). While SALWs do not by themselves create violence where they have been used, their relatively widespread availability intensifies and increase insecurity which lead to greater demand for weapons (Boutwell and Klare, 2000). Boutwell and Klare also claimed that the direct impacts of SALWs are death and injuries of civilians, sexual violence such as rape, harassment and intimidation, cattle raiding and violent crimes. All these factors undermine the effects of post conflict recovery and reconstruction.

The problems associated with SALWs are manifested both directly and indirectly among the Sudanese communities as illustrated in the figure a below.

**Mapping the direct and indirect problems of SALWs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct effects</th>
<th>Indirect effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Mortality and Morbidity)</td>
<td>(Externalities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides</td>
<td>Public health (E.g. increasing injury burden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict</td>
<td>Criminality (e.g. privatized security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender based violence</td>
<td>Humanitarian Impact e.g. militarised civilians and refuge camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development (e.g. declining development assistance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Small Arms Survey 2001.*

### 4.5.1. Socio-cultural

One of the striking problems that resulted from the availability of SALWs is the breakdown of social capital. Among the Southern Sudanese both within and outside Southern Sudan that I talked to, informed this study that the disintegration of social capital has been one of the main causality of armed violence during the conflict and increasingly worse after the CPA. During the civil war, the GoS and the SPLA used ‘divide and rule’ tactics to fulfil their interest. One tribe, for instance the Nuer communities were armed by the GoS against the Dinka
communities mainly to weaken the SPLA/M. Likewise, in Eastern Equatoria, the Toposa were also armed against their neighbouring tribes (Lotuko, Murle and the Boya) who were noted as SPLA/M supporters. This, however, did not only cause injuries and death during the war, it also increased enmity and bad relationships and associated violence between the tribes and their neighbouring communities.

Due to the bad relationships among the Southern Sudanese communities and their neighbours, shared ceremonies such as marriages and agreements between them deteriorated, and fighting over shared resources such as water points and pastures become common and vicious. Clan clashes increased and revenge was ruthlessly exacted and SALWs became weapons of choice. It also affected the perception held by one tribe against another, as clearly stated by Mackenzie and Buchanan—Smith (2004) that,

“the Dinka and Nuer came to be perceived by their neighbours as power-hungry groups that oppressed minorities. The Murle were perceived as hostile, aggressive and backward. The Toposa and the Kachipo were perceived as having a culture that encourage killing for fame and respect, and the Anyuak were perceived by their neighbours as trying to dominate resources by claiming that all resources belong to them”

A Society awash in weapons often finds itself caught in a culture of armed violence mainly through a gang culture, which is common among countries in post conflict environment where Southern Sudan is not an exception. The gang culture existing in Southern Sudan and Equatoria region, for example, represents a social context within which the use of violence is prevalent. This further polarises power relations among tribes which eventually created demand for weapons attained both legally and illegally (Freeman, 2001). Experiences from Colombia show that the gang-gun culture prevails where SALWs are rampant. For the case of Southern Sudan, among young ex-combatants particularly demobilised child soldiers who have known little about the world outside war, their weapons become a means of gaining status and making a living, either through individual acts of street crime or as organised criminal operational group.
SALWs have also been implicated in cases of gender-based violence. After the signing of the Sudanese CPA without immediate disarmament, most fighters returned to their homes with their weapons posing threat to families. Due to this proliferation of SALWs in the communities, many Sudanese women and girls are constantly exposed to the increasing risk of serious harm of rape, unwanted pregnancies, death and infection with HIV/AIDS. According to Kakwa Development Forum (KDF) December 2006, unpublished local news letter in Yei county of Central Equatoria state, the number of girls and women that were raped to death by armed men increased significantly after the CPA and return of armed men from front lines. The KDF also noted that the SALWs were used to intimidate these women not to cry for help. In addition, the use of these guns perpetuated forced marriages. From the author's observation while working in the Sudan, these cases were common in rural areas were the GoSS presence are not felt. Armed men and boys could intimidate vulnerable girl and their families in order to marry their girls.

Another problem posed by the proliferation of SALWs is the negative change in cultural aspects and emergence of culture of violence into the communities of Southern Sudan. Culturally, spears, arrows and bows, clubs, machetes and swords were basically used for keeping family security, hunting, marriage ceremonies, symbols of traditional dances, and masculinity for boys, exceptionally used for fighting and punishing culprits of violence. Among some communities like the Kakwa of Central Equatoria State, quiver and spears form part of marriage ceremonies. It is therefore, due to the advent and widespread availability of SALWs commonly used to fight for justices at peer and family levels that these traditional weapons lost their social significance to more lethal weapons.

Another problem that result from the availability of SALWs is the increase in ‘cultures of violence’ and breakdown of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms among communities. In the traditional days, killing or raping of women and children was a taboo among the Dinka, Didinga, Nuer and Bari communities. Those who committed such crimes were required to undergo rituals of penance. The perpetrator would be required to sacrifice a bull or a goat and
jump over it to cleanse himself and his community of this abominable act. Among the Nuer communities the killer would be bled as atonement for the person killed. A spiritual leader would use a fishing spear to draw blood from his right shoulder to symbolise drawing the blood of the slain person, and he would sacrifice an animal (NSCC, 2002). The widespread availability of SALWs among these communities however, has led to an increasing culture of "zero or no tolerance" where guns and bullets are used to solve disputes. Moreover, before the gun culture taking of another person's life was not allowed, save it in exceptional circumstances, which is not the case today where a person is more or less seen as away of compensating for the other relative's lost life. It is more of 'an eye for an eye' justice or vengeance rather than justice per se (NSCC, 2002).

The presence of SALWs aggravates both the patterns and consequences of forced migrations. Besides the displacement during the civil war, some communities after the CPA still face insecurities that drive them to locations such as town centres for safety. With AK-47 in hands, bandits and criminals who in the past carried out cattle raiding and looting have resorted to systematic rape and killing that drive people to become internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). For instance, there is lately a concern by the Didinga community in Eastern Equatoria about the persistent armed attacks by Toposa people aimed at driving the Didinga of Lauro away from the 'gold and fertile land'. In the letter to the governor of Eastern Equatoria states, Didinga community stated that the Toposa used SALWs to wipe out the Lauro communities in order to occupy their lands and lamented that the Toposa attacks "...would have been minimal if it was not for the machine guns" (Letter to Governor EES, Sudan Tribune, Aug. 2007).

The continued acquisition and accumulation of SALWs during and after the civil war not only threatened communities with displacement, death and injury but also obstructed community access to food, shelter, health care, education and other basic services, and could also hinder any efforts to development (Muggah and Berman, 2001). In the villages of Southern Sudan for example, where pupils without protection, find themselves assaulted while they travel miles to attend school. Girls are the worst affected. As a result, many girls, in fear of rape and
armed violence, drop out of school and this possibly accounts for the high illiteracy levels in the region.

Despite the bleak scenarios discussed above, there is some relative security in Southern Sudan and reasons for optimism because some communities have refused to succumb to the allures of SALWs. Therefore, there are courageous efforts and commitments made by some communities such as the Akobo civilians, to accept voluntary disarmament (see pictures below), so that they can enjoy the CPA dividends mentioned by the policy makers.

4.5.2. Economic

One of the visible consequences of the proliferation of SALWs in Southern Sudan is the devastation and collapse of the economy. While all aspects of security, personal and social were affected by war and easy availability of the SALWs, economic progress in Southern Sudan has been severely retarded. The once booming production and export of coffee, cotton, timber and wood from the central and Western Equatoria states, the transportation sector, the export of hides and skins amongst the pastoralist communities have all but collapsed. While most of the active manpower died during the armed conflict, the remaining population lives in constant fear of looting, injuries and death. Some communities spend time nursing their loved ones in hospitals, which time could be used positively in productive activities. Lack of proper storage facilities, infrastructures such as roads, bridges or means of transport frustrated most farmers
who had no market to sale their produce within Sudan nor had means of to export to the neighbouring countries. Most often, they lose valuable items to bad weather conditions armed robberies. The widespread availability of small arms and their misuse during and after the civil war have long term implications for the overall development of the region.

Another inevitable problem of widespread SALWs proliferation is reduced agricultural productivity and increased poverty. In Equatoria region, especially among the pastoralist communities, the level of violence increased during the civil war and after the CPA. The pastoral communities whose livelihoods are dependant on the cattle, lost almost everything to armed cattle raiders. This is because the availability of SALWs created massive cattle stealing, which prompted most cattle owners to sell part of their herds to purchase modern and sophisticated weapons and hire armed persons to safeguard their animals. Besides these expenditures, cattle owners face a lot of challenges and expenditures in treating and compensating family members who get injured or killed during the process of fighting against cattle raiders. All these factors amounted to loss of wealth and eventually increasing poverty.

The proliferation of SALWs also posed a great threat on both national and international investors in Southern Sudan. There are cases of armed robberies and intimidation by use of guns in southern Sudan. Some of the investment companies had to spend a lot of money on security, which frustrated some investors because of low profit from their investments. To date, hotels in Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan are still in temporary accommodation due to fear of losing to armed robbers in case of an attack.

The direct and indirect problems associated with _free range_ availability of SALWs in Southern Sudan go beyond death and injury to pervasive atmosphere of insecurity. This sense of insecurity scared investors, both local and international hence retarding economic progress. Although the broad array of indirect socio economic impacts might be hard to measure and devastating, this study believes that the opportunity cost of such weapons in terms of foregone investments, health costs and lost education opportunities run into billions of dollars. These indirect impacts emerge only gradually ‘after the smoke clears’. Then it becomes obvious that
global spread of SALWs is exacerbating human insecurity, fuelling the creation of ‘cultures of violence’, and undermining the stability of states and region. Indiscriminate arms use not only jeopardizes individual welfare and livelihoods, it also imperils broader sustainable development opportunities from the local to the international level.

The widespread availability and misuse of SALWs in Southern Sudan during and after the war increased the rate and levels of vulnerability especially on women, who are mainly family caretakers. Most victims of gun violence are young men and women, who have potentially high energy for production and whose loss is felt directly in economic terms both at family and community level (Muggah and Berman, 2001). Instead of spending time in productive activities, most women are charged with caring for the injured hence reducing time for economic production. In addition, the youth and active population in the Sudan were killed, disabled and made unproductive due to firearms; this reduced the productivity level of the population to dependents.

Southern Sudan without the war would be among the African countries that could attract high number of tourists. Her wild life diversity is of a high economic value that would attract foreign currency and development to the region, leading to increase in the country’s economy. Most of the animals died and some displaced during the war although a few of the animals that went to exile in the neighbouring country may be returning to the Southern Sudan.

Besides, the availability of weapons after the war has led to increased poaching. Hunting is a traditional practice of southern Sudanese over generation. Initially, bows and arrows were used and were on small scale. However the loss of cattle to raiders, left most community to depend on wildlife for meat. The presence and availability of guns has doubled the rate of extinction of the wild animals. Poverty and inadequate food for the people made hunting the only source of food.

The decades of the civil war in the Sudan caused widespread displacement both within the country and across borders. Sudan has more IDPs than any other country in the World. The IDPs are very vulnerable to armed banditry along the roads. When some have been able to
return, especially after a long period, it is to find that their land has now been taken over and
occupied by the SPLA. Recovering these occupied lands/plots has been a problem because the
SPLA will claim to have liberated the land and already owns it. Most of them especially in
Chukudum, new sites and Yei use their guns to intimidate landlords not to recover their
properties. The loss of land has, however, affected the production of agricultural goods and led
to famine, dependency on relief and neighbouring countries.

Whilst some host communities have absorbed IDPs well, in other areas it has fuelled
tension, even conflict, where there has been competition for scarce resources. Due to
availability and easy access to weapons, both the host communities and IDPS resorted to use of
guns to solve their difference.

4.5.3. Political

The proliferation of SALWs has raised the cost of maintaining personal and public
order where by investment companies’ end up putting much into hiring security guards that lead
to increase in cost of investments hence high prices to recover such investments. This expense
diverts resources from investment in the economy of Southern Sudan and the ability to help
create jobs and raise the standard of living in the country. In turn, all of these promote
acquisition and use of more guns/weapons for legitimate protection and illicit purposes by
private firms and individual citizens. This is evident in both villages and towns of Juba, Yei,
Rumbek and Torit where most SPLA/M leaders, investment companies (AFEX hotel, Hertz
Car Company) and rich individuals including humanitarian organisations are guarded by heavy
machine guns, said for protection. Majority of these guards are former SPLM/A using guns
acquired during the war.
Chapter Five: Recommendations and Conclusions

In this study I have been examining the threat posed to post conflict reconstruction of South Sudan by the availability and demand for SALWs, which are in the hands of the SPLA/M, OAGs and the civil population. The study also looked at the experiences of three African countries that have been through conflicts and examined what lessons could be drawn from their experience, if south Sudan is to avoid the same pitfalls. Given below are some of the recommendations reflecting on the key issues raised in the discussion.

5.1. Recommendations

The UN PoA, the Nairobi Declaration, SADC and the ECOWAs recognise the need for all bodies of governments and state governments signatories to these agreements to have a responsibility to control SALWs; both their possessions within state borders to protect its citizens, and their exports across its border to ensure respect for international human rights and humanitarian law of each individual world over. These agreements have, however, not been respected by state governments and some members of the UN Security Council (France, China, USA and UK) who account for 88% of the world conventional arms export, partly due to lack of monitoring and having penalties in place to ensure commitment.

Therefore, at the international and regional levels, this study suggests the enactment of strict covenants to ensure implementation of control measure for the reduction of SALWs their control. This must be followed by penalties to both the supplier and recipient, should the weapons end up in wrong hands.

It also suggest the cooperation of all the governments and the communities directly affected by such violence in the stemming and removing the flow of arms and the spread of arms production. It is only by this means that women, men, and children will feel protected.

Often times, armed conflicts in one state spill over to the neighbouring countries especially in regards to flow of weapon and refugees. The civil war in Liberia, for example, had gross impact on Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ivory Coast, while the Sudanese protracted conflict
spread off to parts of Northern Uganda, DRC, Northern Kenya and Chad. Therefore, only strong and well coordinated inter-state efforts may contain the problem. We can start to see efforts in this direction in East Africa and horn of African, where the countries have developed national plans of action and toughened borders. Nevertheless, the implementation is very slow and lacked national prioritisation. This research, basing on experience from Mozambique, strongly recommends that there is need to prioritise the control of SALWs in a well coordinated manner across borders.

Meanwhile at the local level, especially within the context of South Sudan, this study recommends that the GoSS and its partners; UNMIS and humanitarian organisations should establish proper national security structures before disarmament could start. The military, police and prison personnel need to be in place, not only in the major cities, but at the Boma levels as well, to guarantee proper security for the civilians. These structures as they exist in Southern Sudan needs stronger capacity building to meet international humanitarian and human rights standards so that citizens and civil society advocates can trust them in enforcing the law and prosecuting crime.

After setting up professional security structures and institutions in southern Sudan, the study recommends that there should be no need for civilians to own guns. Should need be, then strict legislation involving individual responsibility for maintaining family and public safety and proper record system with police, must be put in place first. Strict licence must be obtained by meeting a series of criteria including minimum age, clean criminal records, undergoing safety training and establishing a genuine reason for needing to own a weapon. This study suggests that reporting (monthly or after every three months) to renew and cross check proper handling records may be vital.

One of the primary generators of the demand for SALWs is their easy availability. The regulation and control of these weapons from both supply and demand levels may reduce the SALWs negative impacts at particularly community level. Ineffective control feeds demand, just as surely as persistent demand undermines control. Further more, legally available arms in
situations of political tension and adverse economic and social conditions are just destabilising and as certain to generate demand as illegally acquired weapons. It follows then that demand reduction requires a clear policy commitment to control supply. The GoS and GoSS must exercise transparency and accountability to its people and international community, and only import what it can consume for the security of its citizen and not to stockpile for future use. This will build trust in a post conflict society to understand why the state needs weapons and how much it has.

GoSS IDDRC should develop a realistic national plan, and implement effective DDR programmes that will take care of control, storage and destruction of collected SALWs. Experience from Sierra Leone and Mozambique suggests that the failure to destroy arms does not only result in the recycling of these arms back into the local population but also incites mistrust between different communities and the arms collectors. This study suggests that GoSS and GoS should destroy weapons that have been collected to prevent them from being re-sold.

Equally important is the need for the community to see that the power that is assigned with the responsibility of collecting arms and its destruction is impartial. This is especially so, where there is inter-community rivalry and suspicion or cattle rustling is prevalent. To build trust within such communities the persons charged with the responsibility and the process should be transparent and impartial.

Reducing availability can also be possible through introducing arms embargo on national governments to ensure government commitment to the process. The international suppliers should ensure that the weapons in the hands of national governmental institutions like the police and military are well managed before new ones are procured. Experience from Mozambique suggests that lack of embargo during the Mozambican ONUMOZ DDR led to rearmament of both parties at that time. New weapons flooded the country to replace the old rusted weapons that were stored in caches or destroyed. However, for Sudan, both GoSS and GoS to be committed to these process, they must be monitored and be charged with arms embargo.
GoSS IDDRC and its partners should adapt from the UN PoA the public awareness and confidence building programmes on the problems and consequences of the illicit trade, possession of SALWs in all its aspects, including public destruction of surplus weapons and the voluntary surrendered arms involving civilians. Civic education should be carried out right among the parliamentarians, government officials and then the local communities. The use of body guards by sons, close relatives and wives of top military officials to get their ways or resolve conflicts needs to be checked. International humanitarian organisations should not assume that government officials at top positions are knowledgeable or have high levels of awareness. The study therefore suggests that, government officials, members of parliament, those with affiliations to body guards and the military need to understand the DDR process before the civil populations.

At present, the GoSS is carrying out Civilian DDR in some parts of Southern Sudan, such as the Jonglei and Upper Nile states but the approach and the process was so militaristic and coercive that generated more insecurity than before. This study suggests a more professional and persuasive approach to be adopted. It is recommended that the military should not be directly involved in the civilian disarmament, except to monitor the process, being carried out by a trained group of Southern Sudanese, at all levels: national, state, county. The process should be civilian friendly with no force being used. The local communities should be educated enough before the guns are removed from them. Proper information needs to be given to them on why the disarmament is necessary and who is and should be involved in the process. Where possible, simultaneous programmes should be running across communities where there is mutual mistrust.

Experience from Mozambique shows that direct involvement and participation of the local people, right from the planning process is vital to the civilian DDR and control of SALWs process. The involvement and the direct participation of the local communities as active participants rather than as sources of data, has a crucial role in the control of SALWs. Therefore, GoSS IDDRC can ensure active participation and peaceful non armed violence.
disarmament among the civilians of South Sudan through the Boma (small unit of the GoSS), churches and community leaders.

Unlike the exchange of guns for money that was carried out in Sierra Leone, the Mozambique experience sets the best precedence for the use of Tools for Guns programmes. The SSDDR, UN agencies and civil societies involved in the disarmament of both Civilians and military personal need to design a program of buying off guns not with money but using tools and equipments from the civilians. This should be carried out in consultation with the local communities to find out the tools of their interest in exchange for these arms. A variety of tools and equipments that will give the local populations choice must be provided and these should include reconstruction items, farm tools and transport facilities. For example, corrugated iron sheets, nails, cement, hoes, cows, bicycles and radios. This worked in Mozambique with the local population, and there is no reason why it should not work in south Sudan.

A study by World Vision Ethiopia which focused on weapons use among the Amhara and Oromo peoples in Antsokia, found that attitudes and behaviour relating to weapons ownership changed dramatically over the course of development projects that improved economic levels of the communities through reliable agricultural production and sales which had a direct effect on levels of violence. The study which resulted in significant community transformation and reduction of the availability and demand of SALWs emphasises the central importance of changing attitudes through sound development projects, which south Sudan would do well to emulate.

5.2. Conclusions

This research has argued that to be effective in the control of SALWS, the hardware (weapons) and their users (people) must be addressed concurrently at international, national and local levels at the right time. Moreover demand for SALWs needs to be looked at as the interplay between motivations, means and availability to attain the weapons, so that interventions to reduce demand takes account of both the ‘demand and supply discourses’. A
better understanding of the threats posed by the proliferation and misuse of SALWs in Southern Sudan can be gained by looking at the problems, their causes and consequences at local, national and international levels, otherwise, any intervention is bound to fail or create more insecurity.

Although some suggestions have been made based on the experiences from Mozambique and Sierra Leone, the data presented in this study has raised more concerns that need to be addressed by the GoSS IDDRC in attempt to civilian disarmament. One of which is the prevailing situation in, which Southern Sudan is not conducive to undertaking large scale disarmament. Until there is a more reliable and effective security establishment by GoSS from towns to the villages, SALWs control is not, at the moment the best strategy to pursue to help curb the proliferation and misuse of SALWs.

This study maintains that the culture of armed violence in south Sudan is a legacy of decades of internal conflict. Although the fighting has ended, people continue to use weapons as the first solution to solve their problems. Even minor disputes often turn deadly due to the widespread availability of SALWs and the collapse of rule of law. The study acknowledged that while the creation of the Interim SSDDRC was a major step forward, it is aware that the commission is not yet fully operational and it lacks the capacity, resources, and the political will needed to become effective. On the other hand, the study maintains that the efforts by the government and international community, supported by civil society, are now better resourced and timed, though they are not comprehensive or well coordinated.

The study has argued that within local communities there is lack of serious trust between civilians and the authorities responsible for maintaining security. There is hardly any dialogue between civilians and local authorities on Small Arms issues. Dialogue needs to be encouraged between these groups to help ensure that disarmament efforts are inclusively accepted, sustainable, and effective, and addresses underlying root problems. Unless the attitudes of civilians, security forces, and authorities are modified, the demand for weapons will still remain. To transform this dependence on weapons into skills for non violent conflict
resolution is important work, requiring long term commitment. Without a strategy to develop capable, resourced, and south Sudanese efforts, current activities will be of limited effectiveness. An internationally supported long term strategic plan is needed as well.

This study has argued the need to involve security forces, local authorities, civil Society and civilian groups in all aspects of disarmament and control of SALWs. This involvement of the police, armed forces, and other security forces will lead to development of new policies and practices. Individuals and groups must find ways to deal with their own fears and find common solutions to improve security. The study believes that regional and international support for the government is needed, if it is to increase its understanding and capacity to carry out the disarmament work effectively.
## Appendix: Ranking of the World Small Arms Producers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Unassessed*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Albania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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</table>

3 23 29 40

*Inadequate information currently available to permit ranking


From: [www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan)


Project Ploughshare Ontario:


From:[http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/source_documents/UN%20Documents/Others%20UN%20Documents/A_52_298.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/source_documents/UN%20Documents/Others%20UN%20Documents/A_52_298.pdf)


From: [www.smallarmssurvey.org/source_documents/UN%20Documents/Others%20UN%20Documents/A_54_298.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/source_documents/UN%20Documents/Others%20UN%20Documents/A_54_298.pdf)


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