“A recipe for another war of revenge”: The Lasting Impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland, Zimbabwe

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Abstract

Although the Gukurahundi massacres officially ended in 1987, they remain a prominent issue in contemporary Zimbabwe. This study investigates the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland’s society in an effort to understand the reasons behind the existence of contemporary pressure groups in the affected region. Eight semi-structured interviews with twelve people were conducted in person in Zimbabwe. The sensitivity of the topic, and thus the ethical considerations for the safety of those interviewed and the researcher limited the cohort to those deemed safe to talk to.

The results of this study demonstrate that the Gukurahundi continues to have a lasting impact on the affected regions through two noticeable themes: a lack of acknowledgement and a lack of development. The combination of these has resulted in Matabeleland harbouring a deep-seated resentment that has culminated in the creation of pressure groups condemning the government for its crimes. These groups pose a grave threat to the security of the region, either through their own civil unrest or through the fear that the government will unleash a ‘Second Gukurahundi’ in response. Thus, the need for reconciliation in order to prevent any further bloodshed has become urgent.

This research makes three recommendations that stand as prerequisites to national reconciliation: national acknowledgement, national apology, and communal reparations. It is widely believed that if the government adhere to these proposals then the tensions of the past will ease and the process of recovery can finally begin. However, the government’s current stance of denial underpins the risk that the issue will remain unresolved and thus violence will return once more to Matabeleland.
**Statement of Originality**

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/ investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.

Signed: **Ben Teuten** (candidate) Date: 25th September 2015

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

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**Statement of Ethics Review Approval**

This dissertation involved human participants. A Form TDE E1 for each group of participants, showing ethics review approval, has been attached to this dissertation as an appendix.
Acknowledgements

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A special thanks goes to all those who accommodated me in Zimbabwe. Unfortunately due to the sensitivity of the topic, I am unable to name names but you know who you are. Your hospitality was second to none and you ensured that I felt at home. It was a pleasure spending time with you all and I can assure you that I will be back!

Last and by no means least, I wish to thank my best friend, for without him my love for Zimbabwe would not exist. His kind-heart and determination to do good continues to inspire me.
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Agricultural Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCJPZ</td>
<td>The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAAAF</td>
<td>The Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGPO</td>
<td>Local Government Promotion Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRF</td>
<td>The Legal Resources Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mthwakazi Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFS</td>
<td>Mthwakazi Free State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLF</td>
<td>Matabeleland Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Mthwakazi People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPRC</td>
<td>National Peace and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUST</td>
<td>National University of Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONHRI</td>
<td>Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISI</td>
<td>Police Internal Security Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMR</td>
<td>United Mthwakazi Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIDCO</td>
<td>Village Development Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WADCO</td>
<td>Ward Development Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU–PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (armed wing of ZANU-PF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (armed wing of ZAPU)</td>
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<td>ZNA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Army</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 Context

The Gukurahundi takes its title from the name of an army unit created in the 1980s, but has since become synonymous with the operations undertaken by this brigade. Therefore it has become the code name used by the Zimbabwean government to suppress the supporters of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in the predominantly Ndebele regions of the country between 1983 and 1987. Under the pretext of combating armed insurgents, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) government killed an estimated 20,000 innocent civilians in Matabeleland North, South and in parts of the Midlands. Although the massacres officially ended in 1987 due to the Unity Accord that brought peace to the country and a unification of Zimbabwe’s two main political parties, the issue of the Gukurahundi has yet to be fully resolved. With past wounds still raw, anger and resentment linger in the affected regions thirty years after the atrocities took place. These emotions have culminated in the creation of pressure groups condemning the government for its crimes and some even calling for the secession of Matabeleland as a free independent state.

It is against this backdrop that the significance of this investigation becomes apparent. The recent creation of pressure groups combined with the general feeling of indignation in Matabeleland and in parts of the Midlands has created grave concerns of civil unrest. Time has now become of the essence as the Zimbabwean government has repeatedly denied its involvement in the Gukurahundi massacres, as demonstrated in May 2015 when Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko declared the Gukurahundi “a Western conspiracy” (Maponga, 2015). However, Stuart Doran’s upcoming book *Kingdom, Power, Glory: Mugabe, ZANU and the Quest for Supremacy, 1960-1987*, which is due to be published later this year, is said to directly implicate Mugabe and ZANU in the atrocities (Doran, 2015). In a *Daily Maverick* article aimed to publicise his new book, Doran states that foreign archival evidence has revealed Sydney Sekeramayi, a minister in Mugabe’s office, telling a colleague that “not only was Mugabe fully aware of what was going on – what the Fifth Brigade was doing was under Mugabe’s explicit orders” (Doran, 2015). If Doran’s book is published before the Zimbabwean government reconciles these unresolved grievances, it is widely
believed that these new allegations will be the breaking point for the Matabeleland people and violence will return once more to Zimbabwe.

1.2 Research Aim and Questions

This dissertation therefore aims to investigate the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland’s society. By highlighting these lasting impacts, it is hoped that the results will give a clear understanding of the reasons behind the pressure groups’ existence in the affected regions. Only then can recommendations be made for the recovery of Zimbabwe.

In order to do this a number of questions must be asked:

1. Has the Gukurahundi indeed had any lasting impacts on Matabeleland?

2. If yes, what effects has this had on the people of Matabeleland?

3. And what measures can be recommended as steps towards recovery?
2. The Gukurahundi

2.1 Historical Background

In April 1980, Robert Mugabe emerged as the first Prime Minister of the newly independent Zimbabwe. A nation that had experienced more than a century of racist colonial rule and two decades of civil war, Mugabe famously called for national reconciliation stating, “We were trying to kill each other; that’s what the war was about. What I am concerned with now is that my public statements should be believed when I say that I have drawn a line through the past” (Flower, 1987, cited in Carver, 1993, p.71). However, the first challenge to reconciliation came with the creation of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). This army was expected to include elements of all three warring parties from the civil war: the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA); the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA); and the Rhodesian armed forces. Aside from the friction of working alongside their previous enemy, the two liberation forces had a history of suspicion and mistrust. This can be dated back to 1963 and ZANLA’s creation where a political rift in Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU party culminated in a new liberation movement, ZANU, under the leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.27). Although the two groups had a mutual interest in securing independence from the Rhodesians, they differed in almost every other aspect, for example ZAPU and ZIPRA had a Communist ideology and were Russian-trained, whilst ZANU and ZANLA declared themselves Maoist and were Chinese-trained. As well as this, the two groups traditionally recruited support from two different areas of the country, ZIPRA from the Western half and ZANLA from the Eastern half. It was this regional support that Breaking the Silence (1997, p.27) highlights as increasing the tribal perspective associated with each party:

ZAPU and ZANU, and their military wings ZIPRA and ZANLA were not tribalist by policy, and both Shona-speakers and Ndebele-speakers could be found in both groups, but increasingly regional recruitment, together with mutual antagonism, led to a growing association between ZAPU and Ndebele-speakers.
Although the origins of tribal enmity lie outside the remit of this study, what remains clear is that there was uneasiness between the two ethnic groups as well as suspicion between the two political parties. With that in mind, the 1970s brought sporadic fighting between the two liberation movements further escalating the tensions.

Therefore the unification of the armed groups into the ZNA was both complex and tenuous, as demonstrated by only 15,000 out of the 65,000 ex-combatants integrating into the army by the end of 1980 (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.32). This slow process resulted in the government decision to move ex-combatants into housing schemes near major centres thus making the integration quicker and easier. However, often ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants were thrown together and disputes between the two were not uncommon. Tensions finally broke down in November 1980 when Enos Nkala, a Government minister for ZANU-PF, publicly declared ZAPU as the “enemy of ZANU-PF” and “that the time had come to form vigilante committees to challenge ZAPU on its home ground” (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 2000, p.186). This resulted in two days of open conflict between the two armies in Entumbane holding camp in Bulawayo, and although subdued, the fighting resumed in early 1981 leaving a total of 300 dead (Berkeley and Schrage, 1986, p.19).

The Entumbane fighting of 1980 and 1981 was a catalyst for the large-scale defections of the ex-ZIPRA combatants that ensued. Defectors interviewed in *Breaking the Silence* cited personal security as the main reason for leaving combined with a disillusionment of the national army (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.32). However, many of those who defected took their weapons with them and resorted to armed banditry resulting in their categorization as dissidents by the ZANU-PF Government. Although ZANLA also cached arms for insurance, the discovery of weapons in February 1982 by the Zimbabwean government on properties owned by ZAPU and around ZIPRA assembly points resulted in the dismissal of ZAPU Government Ministers and the arrests of senior ZIPRA commanders for treason (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 2000, p.188). Alexander *et al.* (2000, p.188-189) go on to explain that after this discovery “the room for political conciliation disappeared” as Mugabe treated the incident as definitive proof that ZAPU had been planning an armed revolt. ZAPU was further implicated when in June 1982 ZIPRA guerrillas were connected to an attack on the Prime Minster’s home and shortly after, these dissidents
killed six foreign tourists in Matabeleland North (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 2000, p.188-189). Although Nkomo repeatedly condemned the armed dissidents and their actions, widespread atrocities continued to the extent that by the end of the conflict there had been 600 murders, of which more than 100 were ZANU-PF officials (Berkeley and Schrage, 1986, p.25). Therefore, the ZANU-PF Government responded with large-scale suppression of the Matabeleland regions. However, what *Breaking the Silence* (1997, p.3) disentangles is that there were two conflicts occurring simultaneously in Western Zimbabwe. The first conflict involved the dissidents and Government troops from 4 Brigade, 6 Brigade, the Paratroopers and the CIO. The second conflict involved Government agencies that were primarily 5 Brigade, the CIO, and the ZANU-PF Youth Brigades, and all those who were believed to support ZAPU, who were primarily unarmed civilians.

### 2.2 The Fifth Brigade

The second conflict, on which this study will focus, was code-named ‘Gukurahundi’ which loosely translates from Shona to mean *the rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains* (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.45). Its name being derived from that of the Fifth Brigade which was the army unit set up for this purpose. The Fifth Brigade was specifically created by Mugabe after the Entumbane disturbances and trained by North Korean advisors. Answerable only to the Prime Minister himself, the Fifth Brigade was almost exclusively Shona-speaking ex-ZANLA guerrillas whose chain of command by-passed “the intermediate levels observed by the rest of the army” (Berkeley and Schrage, 1986, p.33). Training having begun in 1981 finished in December 1982 when Mugabe handed over command to Colonel Perence Shiri with the instructions to go forth and ‘plough and reconstruct’ (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.47). With these instructions, Fifth Brigade was quickly deployed to Matabeleland North in 1983 and then to Matabeleland South in 1984 where they developed a reputation for their brutality by indiscriminately massacring thousands of unarmed civilians.
2.3 Matabeleland North – 1983

Fifth Brigade’s arrival into Matabeleland North coincided with the Government’s ratification of curfew laws. People were severely restricted in movement thus allowing the Brigade to wreak destruction in these areas as information was difficult to come by and people could not escape. In the space of six weeks, Fifth Brigade had executed over 2000 civilians, tortured thousands more and destroyed hundreds of homesteads (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.48). Most of those killed were shot in public executions, involving between one and twelve people, however it was not uncommon
for large groups to be massacred at one time as seen in Lupane on March 5 where 62 men and women were murdered on the banks of the Cewale River (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.48). Other forms of intimidation and harassment included the ‘pungwe’, a ZANLA mobilisation method that combined singing and dancing with political education. However used in this context the pungwe exploited people for their tribal and political affiliation as *Breaking the Silence* (1997, p.51) elaborates, “the songs were in an unfamiliar language, the dance was forced, the slogans were anti-ZAPU, and the ‘festivities’ were accompanied by beatings and killings”. The use of the pungwe reminds us that the harassment of unarmed civilians was, at least superficially, to root out armed dissidents. However Mugabe’s speech in April 1983 demonstrates the lack of discrimination of the Fifth Brigade, “Where men and women provide food for the dissidents, when we get there we eradicate them. We don’t differentiate when we fight, because we can’t tell who is a dissident and who is not” (Berkeley and Schrage, 1986, p.38).

Fifth Brigade’s atrocities saw a marked decline in March 1983 when the CCJPZ met with Mugabe and presented him with a comprehensive report on the abuse in Matabeleland North. Although initially he refuted these claims, in April 1983 the curfews were lifted and in July Fifth Brigade was withdrawn for ‘retraining’ (Berkeley and Schrage, 1986, p.37). However this was not before thousands more civilians ‘disappeared’ - a change in tactic by the Fifth Brigade so as not to attract more attention. Although in April 1983 Mugabe declared that the atrocities of Fifth Brigade would be thoroughly investigated, this appears to have been an empty promise. Within the year Fifth Brigade had been redeployed in Matabeleland South where once more unarmed civilians were massacred in their thousands (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.54).

**2.4 Matabeleland South – 1984**

The military operation in Matabeleland South can be differentiated to that of Matabeleland North due to the strategy involved. Once more the government enacted curfews to control the population under the pretext that armed dissidents were hiding in the area. Whilst there were never more than 200 dissidents in Matabeleland South, the government responded with a force of over 15,000 troops (Meredith, 2007, p.69).
The difference however between the two military operations was that this time the government used a policy of forced starvation to wreak its havoc. In 1984 Matabeleland South was experiencing a three-year drought that had left the region destitute and its inhabitants reliant on relief services. The curfew imposed by the government that covered some 5,000 miles and more than 400,000 people, prevented any relief aid from getting to those in need (Berkeley and Schrage, 1986, p.135). This forced starvation gradually took its toll as thousands of rural civilians became malnourished with one health official estimating that those inside the curfew area were eating less than 20 per cent of the food they needed a day (Berkeley and Schrage, 1986, p.137). As starvation became imminent, the Fifth Brigade taunted those dying with such statements as, “First you will eat your chickens, then your goats, then your cattle, then your donkeys. Then you will eat your children and finally you will eat the dissidents” (Meredith, 2007, p.70). All the while, the government was holding undistributed aid stocks in its Matabeleland South silos.

As well as forced starvation, inhabitants were continuously subjected to the use of mass detention centres, created and controlled by the Fifth Brigade. Thousands of innocent civilians were rounded up and detained in appalling conditions whilst being tortured for the whereabouts of dissident members. One notorious camp was Bhalagwe Camp in Matobo, which reportedly housed around 2000 men and women at one time and where roughly 8,000 civilians were detained during the few months of operation (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.57). Although the death toll is unknown, Bhalagwe Camp was situated adjacent to Antelope Mine where in 1992 hundreds of human remains were discovered, leading to the belief that victims were disposed of in mine shafts throughout Matabeleland South (Nehanda Radio).

In April 1984 the atrocities diminished due to pressure both domestically and internationally led by the Catholic Bishops of Zimbabwe. As a result, Fifth Brigade was withdrawn from active service and once again underwent intensive retraining before re-entering service for a brief period in 1985 and then finally being disbanded in 1986 (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.57).
2.5 1984 – 1987

Although violence lessened in the months following April 1984, it once more escalated in the election year of 1985. However this time it cannot be distinguished by a particular region as it occurred throughout Matabeleland. In urban areas, ZANU-PF Youth Brigades were used to intimidate and pressure civilians into voting against ZAPU and they were responsible for a variety of crimes including destruction of property, assault and murder (Eppel, 2004, p.45). In comparison, the rural areas of Matabeleland and the Midlands experienced the continued sinister phenomenon of disappearances as hundreds of ZAPU and community leaders were murdered at the hands of Fifth Brigade, the CIO and PISI (Eppel, 2004, p.45). However in spite of all this brutality Matabeleland remained a ZAPU stronghold with the party winning all the seats in Matabeleland in the 1985 election. Therefore the government had an apparent change in strategy whereby integrating ZAPU into ZANU-PF remained the only available option. This finally occurred after a slow process of negotiation in December 1987 with the signing of the Unity Accord between Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. This peace treaty formally ended the 1980s atrocities leaving in its wake a legacy of pain and suffering amongst the people of Matabeleland and the Midlands that is still felt to this day. However it is important to note that six months after the Unity Accord, Mugabe announced an amnesty for all those involved in the conflict. Portrayed as benefiting the dissidents, this amnesty essentially pardoned an estimated 3,500 members of Fifth Brigade for the murders of around 20,000 civilians, entrenching the futile hope amongst the victims for justice (Eppel, 2004, p.46).

2.6 Summary

In summary, the intensity of the disturbances in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands throughout the 1980s was catastrophic. Specifically designed for this purpose, the Fifth Brigade conducted two noticeable operations that varied in strategy. In 1983 Matabeleland North, public executions were the method of terror, whilst in Matabeleland South a year later widespread detention and torture was more common. Although the death toll for these two campaigns is difficult to confirm, a survey in 1999 found that one in four people in Matabeleland had seen a family member disappeared (Eppel, 2014, p.407). The government’s defence that dissidents were
responsible for the majority of these deaths was negated when another survey placed the responsibility of 90% of the atrocities on government forces (Eppel, 2004, p.44). Therefore the Unity Accord of 1987 and more specifically the amnesties that followed in 1988 aggrieved the affected regions as perpetrators escaped the justice they deserved. For the victims of the violence and their families the atrocities continue to haunt them to this day, as they remain bitter at the ill treatment they suffered as well as suspicious and distrusting of the government that inflicted the punishment upon them.
3. Methodology

3.1 Data Collection

This study uses a combination of primary and secondary sources to create and sustain its argument.

Eight semi-structured interviews with twelve people were conducted in person in Zimbabwe for this investigation. Ideally more interviews would have been conducted but due to the dangers involved researching this topic, and more importantly the ethical considerations that those interviewed would be put at significant risk, it was decided that the cohort of interviewees would be limited to those deemed safe to talk to (c.f. discussion in the limitations section page).

Semi-structured interviews were chosen as they are open-ended and allow for a detailed discussion of the topic under study. They also facilitate a development in the discussion, permitting the interviewee to direct the conversation and steer it without being constrained by the interviewer. However, most importantly, semi-structured interviews create a calming ambience that allows sensitive information to be attained, as Krueger and Casey elaborate (cited in Longhurst, 2010, p.103):

It is about talking but it is also about listening… It is about being open to hear what people have to say. It is about being non-judgemental. It is about creating a comfortable environment for people to share. It is about being careful and systematic with the things people tell you.

The sensitivity of the topic investigated meant that a good rapport with the interviewees was essential before valuable information could be collected. This sensitivity also disrupted the sampling method forcing the researcher to rely on snowball sampling because of its effectiveness at reaching hidden populations and its safety for both the researcher and interviewee. Snowball sampling involves identifying a subgroup of members called ‘seeds’, who in turn help identify other members to be included in the sample (Magnani, 2005, p.69). This method is most
commonly used when a degree of trust is needed to initiate contact, as was the case in this investigation (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). The model below demonstrates the snowball process used in this study:

However, snowball sampling has one notable weakness, its sample bias. Johnston and Sabin have identified this in their article (2010, p.38), where they explain that the seed members provide the researcher with other respondents who are more likely to share their characteristics and ideals. The result is a final sample that over-represents one group and does not reflect the views of the larger population. However, this study investigates the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on the Matabeleland people. Therefore, all of the interviewees (with the exception of A2) share the common identity of being from Matabeleland. Thus, it is felt that their views are justifiably representative of the wider majority living in the affected regions. It was the researcher’s original aim to sample interviewees from other regions and opposing parties (the ZANU-PF government), but given the sensitivity of the topic this was not possible to pursue (as further discussed in the limitations section).

3.2 Data Analysis

The data analysis of this study followed the guidance of Ryan and Bernard’s *Techniques to Identify Themes*. In their article, the authors highlight a number of steps
that need to be taken in the analysis process: discovering themes and subthemes, winnowing themes to a select few, establishing hierarchies, and cutting and sorting the data for the discussion (Ryan and Bernard, 2003, p.85).

The initial process of discovering themes was completed prior to the interview, and is what Gibbs and Taylor (2005) define as “a priori codes”. These are themes identified from pre-existing theories or research that mould the shape of the interview. In the case of this study several themes were investigated: the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland; thoughts on the future; and bottom-up versus top-down transitional justice. An example of how the interviews were structured by a priori themes can be seen in Appendix 1.

Once the interviews had been conducted they were transcribed and coded in accordance with the a priori themes. However, given the magnitude of these, sub-themes were created to separate the data into more manageable sizes. See Appendix 2 for the codes given to the sub-themes. A procedure of “constant comparison” was then used when coding the transcriptions (Gibbs and Taylor, 2005). This ensured that the coding was consistent and forced the researcher to constantly analyse the data to make sure the information was appropriately placed.

Once all the transcriptions had been coded, the researcher winnowed out the sub-themes that either lacked sufficient evidence or were no longer relevant to the discussion. See Appendix 3 for the finalised themes and sub-themes used for this study.

The final process, once the coding had been completed, was to cut and sort the information. This meant identifying suitable quotes, connecting them to examples, and then analysing the subtheme in accordance with the investigation. Appendix 4 shows the finished product for one sub-theme. Once this had been completed, secondary sources were then applied to accentuate the relevance of the primary sources, as well as to provide further context to give weight to the argument.
3.3 Literature Review

Although the Gukurahundi occurred in the 1980s, it was not until the publication of *Breaking the Silence: Building True Peace* by the CCJPZ and the LRF in 1997 that the topic fully emerged into the public domain. Prior to this only two books had been published which addressed the atrocities: Berkeley and Schrage (1986), and Werbner (1991). However, both of these had noticeable weaknesses. Berkeley and Schrage’s book was written two years before the 1988 Amnesty thus giving an incomplete picture of the disturbances. Similarly, the Gukurahundi only made up a small part of Werbner’s anthropological work as the majority of his interviews were conducted in the years preceding the massacres. Therefore, *Breaking the Silence* can be defined as an epoch-making report that lays the foundation for any investigation analysing the Gukurahundi. Another work of mention that was published around the same time is that by Alexander, McGregor and Ranger (2000). Although invaluable, this study gives a historical account of the Matabeleland region over the period of a century, and so the events of the 1980s only make up a small section of the study.

*Breaking the Silence* thus paved the way for further research into a topic previously unknown to anyone outside the areas affected, and since then, numerous reports and journals have been published on a variety of topics to do with the events of the 1980s. One such theme that has been amply covered is that of the exhumation process. Eppel, the Executive Director of Amani Trust (before the government closed it down), has completed a comprehensive investigation into the exhumation process as a form of transitional justice (Eppel, 2002; Eppel, 2006; Eppel, 2014). Originally, this study intended to add to this discourse by aiding Eppel’s investigations. However, it soon became clear that the ethics imposed by this study made it impossible to pursue (as further discussed in the limitations section). However, having travelled to Zimbabwe and interviewed Eppel in person, it transpired that one area requiring further research was the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on today’s society.

In response to this, the researcher identified three main themes on which this investigation aims to provide deeper understanding: tribalism; the lack of acknowledgment and development; and recommendations for recovery.
A) Tribalism

One theme that stands out in the Zimbabwean discourse is that of tribalism, as academics fiercely contest its role in the Gukurahundi context. Some, such as Mabhena (2014) argue that the Gukurahundi was a tribal move to dominate the Ndebele people as an act of revenge for the Ndebele raids in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, this line of reasoning is for the most part refuted. The general consensus amongst academics is that the Gukurahundi was a political manoeuvre intended to subdue the ZAPU party not eliminate the Ndebele people. The only reason tribalism has entered this discourse is because the majority of ZAPU’s supporters were Ndebele, as Werbner elaborates (1991, p.159):

The recruiting of the armies on a regional basis was itself a process that polarised people who came to be identified as Shona or Ndebele. The nationalist struggle thus fed and in turn was fed by its antithesis, the polarisation of two quasi-nations or super-tribes, the Shona against the Ndebele.

It is therefore widely agreed that the Gukurahundi was a plan hatched by Mugabe to create “one state with one society, one nation, one party, one leader” (Msindo, 2012, p.218). Whilst this study does not dispute this argument, tribalism creeps back into the Gukurahundi discourse as a lasting impact of the massacres, and it is this theory that calls for further investigation. However, it is important to mention that this form of tribalism differs from that in the above paragraph. Whereas the argument that Shona tribalism was the cause of the Gukurahundi has been disproved, the tribalism that evolved out of the massacres is that of Ndebele nationalism. Most vehemently supported by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, the argument that tribalism evolved out of the massacres is proposed in his article (2011) where he states, “Ndebele particularism emerged out of this violence highly politicized and wounded posing a danger to the pretences of a unitary nation-state of Zimbabwe.” Although Ndlovu-Gatsheni draws a connection between the contemporary pressure groups existing in Matabeleland and the atrocities of the 1980s, he fails to explain sufficiently why this is the case. This provides a gap in the literature for this study to further explore: an explanation as to why Ndebele pressure groups are using the Gukurahundi as a tribalist argument.
B) Lack of acknowledgment and development

Another theme amply explored by academics is that of government denial and a lack of acknowledgement of past atrocities. Mashingaidze (2010) correlates the lack of national reconciliation with government denial by highlighting the culture of impunity that is prevalent in contemporary Zimbabwe. Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru adds to this argument (2013, p.92), where he states that reconciliation without justice is bound to fail as “silence and amnesia are the enemies of justice”. However, whilst these two authors investigate the issue of government denial from a top-down political perspective, a bottom-up, local outlook is missing. Ndlovu addresses the physical and psychological effects of the lack of acknowledgement on victims of the Gukurahundi (2015). However, his investigation occurs in South Africa, thus excluding the effects on those still residing in Matabeleland. This presents an opportunity for further investigation that this study seeks to explore.

Furthermore, the issue of development neglect in Matabeleland is one that has been repeatedly mentioned but never sufficiently investigated. For the most part, academics mention the development neglect of the 1980s due to the conflict and conclude that because of this Matabeleland remains underdeveloped today. However, rarely do they go into further detail and explain why this is the case. The one exception to this is Musemwa (2006), where he identifies water as a weapon of control used by the government on the people of Matabeleland to gain votes, and suggests that the water shortages in the region have resulted in companies moving to Harare. However aside from this, the substantial gap available on the topic of development neglect is one that this study seeks to explore but is unable to fully cover. This presents a gap for further research that would add to the Gukurahundi discourse.

C) Recommendations for Recovery

First proposed by Breaking the Silence, the possibilities for recovery have since been investigated by two academics: Murambadoro (2015) and Vambe (2012). Whilst they explore different mechanisms for recovery (Murambadoro highlights the importance of government acknowledgement and Vambe the significance of communal
reparations), these two academics conclude that without positive change national reconciliation will remain unrealised. This issue is analysed in greater depth in Chapter 5: Recommendations for Recovery. It is important to note that whilst Vambe and Murambadoro propose two logical recommendations they fail to properly justify their need. Neither academic explains how their recommendation will address the contemporary problems that the Gukurahundi is having on today’s society, a task this study aims to fulfil.

D) Conclusion

Since the publication of Breaking the Silence in 1997, the Gukurahundi has been investigated from a number of angles. However, research into the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland has so far been neglected. Whilst academics have highlighted a number of issues that encompass this research topic, they have yet to sufficiently connect the issues together. This can be seen with Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s argument where he associates the contemporary pressure groups existing in Matabeleland with the issue of the Gukurahundi. However, he fails to examine this premise in sufficient depth, merely concluding that it was “the climax of regional politics of frustration and resentment of domination” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). Similarly, this is the case with the recommendations for recovery. Whilst Murambadoro and Vambe have highlighted the mechanisms needed for national reconciliation, they fail to justify its need. Therefore, this connection between the atrocities of the 1980s and the contemporary problems existing in Matabeleland today has never properly been explored. By doing so, this study will demonstrate how the events of the past are still affecting the people of the present.

3.4 Limitations and Ethical Considerations

This study originally intended to investigate the exhumation process conducted by the EAAF and the Amani Trust on victims of the Gukurahundi, and investigate whether or not it could be considered a form of bottom-up transitional justice. To do this, the researcher planned to interview a number of victims’ families. However, the majority of the potential interviewees live in rural Matabeleland in the areas worst affected by the atrocities. Given the sensitivity of the topic, it was felt that it would be too
conspicuous and therefore dangerous to both researcher and interviewee alike, for a
foreigner to go to these isolated areas to conduct research. This danger was
emphasised by a contact in Bulawayo who, when asked about the Gukurahundi,
responded with:

Gukurahundi = totally no go area, especially at this time once again. It is a
simple fact so don’t expect anything in public. Even in the archives of the
Jesuits these files are embargoed and they were the ones who did much to
expose it. Few will openly talk of it, particularly at this time as the old regime
crumbles and those with reasons to avoid discussion fight back. One citizen
journalist has disappeared while there are laws that have been used to shut
down discussion – even an art exhibition in Bulawayo… Sorry to be blunt but
this topic may cause you and others a lot of trouble. I am very concerned that
this might backfire on you. (Anonymous, 2015)

The citizen journalist that the contact refers to is Itai Dzamara who was abducted in
March 2015 and has not been seen since (Phiri, 2015). Although Dzamara was not
protesting against the Gukurahundi per se, he was demanding the resignation of
Mugabe for his human rights record and failure to run the country correctly.
Dzamara’s disappearance demonstrates the risks related to these sensitive topics. With
regard to this study, it was important to reduce this risk by changing the investigation
to something that could be conducted in a safer manner. Therefore, it was decided
instead to investigate the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland. This
change meant that the research required could be conducted in Bulawayo and would
therefore be more discreet. However, although less conspicuous, the sensitivity of the
topic still meant that arranging and conducting interviews was a delicate matter, and
under the time constraints of the research trip meant that only seven interviews were
conducted (with the eighth taking place in London). As well as this, all interviewees
were given an assurance of anonymity (even those who did not request one). Thus
they appear in this study under the letter and number of their Dictaphone position;
beginning with A1 and ending with E2.

Another limitation that is important to mention is the location of the study. The
Gukurahundi atrocities occurred in three provinces: Matabeleland North,
Matabeleland South and the Midlands. However, this investigation only analyses the lasting impacts on two of the three provinces, excluding the latter. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, the atrocities only affected a small part of the Midlands, thus any results obtained in this study would not reflect the view of the majority living in that region. Secondly, and more practically, all of the fieldwork conducted for this investigation (with the exception of the London-based interview) was in Matabeleland. No research was conducted in the Midlands thus explaining its exclusion from the study.

3.5 Chapter Outline

There are two substantive chapters to this dissertation.

Chapter 4 consists of the main body of this study and addresses the first two research questions. Split into four sections, the first two examine the long-term impacts of the Gukurahundi on today’s society. Section 1 identifies the lack of acknowledgement on behalf of the government, whilst section 2 investigates the issue of development neglect. Subsequently, section 3 analyses the prevalent emotions existing in Matabeleland as a result of these long-term impacts. This leads us to the final section that connects the contemporary pressure groups to the unresolved issue of the Gukurahundi. The model below sets out the flow of this Chapter:
Chapter 5 concludes by looking to the future and proposes three recommendations for recovery: national acknowledgement, national apology and communal reparations. It introduces each recommendation with a literature review to highlight their significance, before connecting these ‘solutions’ to the issues identified in Chapter 4, Sections 1 & 2. Subsequently, it addresses the likelihood of the government adhering to these recommendations.
4. Lasting Impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland

The short-term impacts of the Gukurahundi were devastating to the Matabeleland population, with an estimated 20,000 people murdered and thousands more suffering psychological and physical wounds from their experience at the hands of the Fifth Brigade. However what few have looked at, and none in particular depth, is the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland’s society today. Although the Mugabe regime considers the issue closed and refuses to permit any open discussion of the massacres on the basis that it would be “opening old wounds”, it is evident that these wounds are far from healed, and resentment and anguish still reside in Matabeleland today (Rwafa, 2012, p.315). These emotions can be seen to have evolved from two themes of which this study will now explore: a lack of acknowledgement, and a lack of development.

4.1 Lack of Acknowledgement

A) Government Denial

The lack of acknowledgement stems from the issue of government denial. The Zimbabwean Government has repeatedly suppressed information regarding the 1980s massacres, denied its role or responsibility for the crimes, and even in May 2015 labelled the Gukurahundi a “Western conspiracy” (Maponga, 2015). The closest Mugabe has come to acknowledging the massacres was at the funeral of Joshua Nkomo in 1999 where he labelled the events “a moment of madness” (Murambadoro, 2015, p.50-51). However as Rwafa (2012, p.319) rightly points out, “From its lack of clarity, the statement becomes a form of denialism.” Therefore this lack of acknowledgment has meant that for the victims of the Gukurahundi their wounds have never properly been addressed. By censoring its information and preventing the topic from being openly discussed the government has inflicted what Eastmond and Selimovic (2012, p.503) describe as a “second wound of silence”.

ZANU-PF’s denial of the Gukurahundi dates as far back as the Chihambakwe Commission of 1984. Created to hear testimonies of victims from the Matabeleland North violence a year before, the Commission collected ample evidence of the Fifth
Brigade’s atrocities, as hundreds of people turned up to have their stories told. However once all the information had been collected, Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa announced in 1985 that the Commission of Inquiry Report would not be made public, refusing to give any reason or explanation as to why this was the case (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.61). To those who had risked their safety in giving evidence and to many more this censorship was another injury sustained as the perpetrators of the 1983 crimes evaded justice.

The Chihambakwe Commission was not the only mechanism established by the government to ‘heal old wounds’. In 2009, the Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) was created to curb state sanctioned violence and impunity in the aftermath of the 2008 electoral violence. With a mandate to instil discipline amongst political parties and to hold them accountable for politically motivated crimes, the ONHRI intended to reach into the past and create a national framework for reconciliation for all political crimes since the Gukurahundi (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru, 2013, p.96). However it encountered numerous problems from its inception, as it had no means of enforcing its code of conduct, and the political parties involved were unwilling to compromise (Murambadoro, 2015, p.39). This has led to Mashingaidze’s (2010, p.25) description of the Organ as a “political gimmick to hoodwink a traumatised people.” In 2013 the ONHRI was dissolved and replaced with the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), which intended to address past human rights abuses. However once more politics has prevented the Commission from fulfilling its mandate causing the process to be “merely cosmetic gestures” designed to protect ZANU-PF’s political dominance (Murambadoro, 2015, p.49).

Therefore the creation and failure of these three mechanisms ostensibly designed to reconcile a country divided by civil war and political ideologies demonstrates the futility of the situation for those victimised in the Gukurahundi. Combined with the amnesties of 1988 in which the perpetrators of the 1980s crimes were granted clemency, this has led to what many define as a ‘culture of impunity’ in Zimbabwe. Originally developed by the Rhodesians in the Bush War, the idea of granting amnesty to the state’s armed forces was justified on the basis of national security; the ‘culture of impunity’ can thus be described as cheap justice. For those victimised in
the Gukurahundi this culture has meant that many are unwilling to seek justice as they are afraid of its repercussions given that the perpetrators remain in powerful positions, such as Perence Shiri the commander of Fifth Brigade who is now head of Zimbabwe’s Air Force. Therefore, this not only inflicts further pain on the Gukurahundi victims but for government soldiers it installs a sense of immunity, a sense that they are above the law and that “extreme violence is never punished” (Mashingaidze, 2010, p.21).

**B) Gukurahundi as a ‘taboo’ subject**

The government’s denial of the Gukurahundi combined with this ‘culture of impunity’ has made recovery for the victims virtually impossible. With the topic of the massacres left unresolved by the government, the people affected are left in a state of limbo (Ndlovu, 2015, p.62). Their inability to achieve reconciliation directly correlates to it being a taboo subject. People in Zimbabwe are extremely reluctant to talk about the massacres as one interviewee explained, “It’s a bit of an offence to talk about that… It’s still seen as sensitive and subversive” (D.1, 2015). Therefore if one cannot freely discuss an event such as the Gukurahundi, it is hardly surprising that they cannot find closure on the topic. For those who have been brave enough to attempt to publicise the massacres, the government has been quick to shut them down. This is best demonstrated by Owen Maseko, a Bulawayo artist whose paintings of the Gukurahundi atrocities led to his arrest in 2010 under charges of “insulting or undermining the authority of the President” and “the publication of false statements prejudicial to the state” (Rwafa, 2012, p.324).
“They made us sing their songs while they tortured and killed our brothers and sisters”

What Maseko’s example also demonstrates is that even those who were not directly affected by the atrocities, the younger generation born afterwards, are seeking justice and closure as well. The indirect victims of the Gukurahundi have joined the struggle for freedom of speech and information as they have a personal connection to the topic either through family members who were victimised or via their ethnic affiliation. This is best demonstrated by the pressure group *Ibhetshu Likazulu* (‘The Lion Skin of the Ndebele Nation’), which is currently taking the State to court over the freedom to commemorate the Gukurahundi, an event that none of the members were actually a part of. These examples demonstrate the lasting impact of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland today. The inability to freely discuss the events of the past due to government suppression and its ‘culture of impunity’ has meant that closure has yet to occur, and for those living in Matabeleland today the wounds sustained in the 1980s are still raw.
C) Lack of New Leadership

The issue of leadership is also a direct consequence of the Gukurahundi. Fifth Brigade’s specific targeting of ZAPU members from all levels has entrenched the fear that the new generation have of becoming a leader or pursuing a career in politics in Matabeleland today, as one interviewee explained:

People are afraid to be a leader… Because unless you’re a leader that supports the state you will be the first casualty in a state backlash, you know you will be tortured first or disappeared, that’s the lesson of the 1980s. So people don’t want to assume leadership positions. (B.1, 2015)

For those who experienced the atrocities first hand, memories of horrific violence based on political affiliation have resulted in a withdrawal from the political scene. This has resulted in today’s political vacuum, whereby the leaders who are expected to drive the Matabeleland region are not there. This has had a direct impact on today’s youth because this leadership gap has meant they have nothing to learn from their elders. Without having experienced the terror of the 1980s, today’s youth are frustrated with the political distance of the older generation and therefore stay away from traditional parties such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and in turn create their own radical institutions (C.1, 2015). This leadership crisis has meant that Matabeleland has continuously suffered political confusion as the region’s leading party always descends into chaos. This is seen in the 2014 split of MDC where one faction was accused of ZANU-PF loyalties, whilst the other was accused of a “failure of leadership” (Harding, 2014).

D) Lack of documentation

Another slightly more practical impact that the Gukurahundi is having on today’s society is the issue of documentation. For the families of those murdered in the massacres it is incredibly difficult to obtain a death certificate due to the Gukurahundi remaining unacknowledged and censored by the government. The lack of a death certificate has further repercussions for the family of the deceased because the children cannot be granted a birth certificate if both parents are not present (or a death
certificate is not presented). Without a birth certificate children cannot go to school and are considered ‘stateless’. This has therefore created a “whole legacy of people without identities” (A.1, 2015). It goes without saying how damaging this can be for a society, as it will not only affected today’s generation but will continue to affect future generations until the issue is resolved. Until then thousands of innocent civilians are denied existence as one interviewee explains:

… You can’t get a death certificate if the person’s in a mass grave and everyone’s pretending he wasn’t killed. So if you’re pretending someone wasn’t killed, you are pretending they never lived… So it’s this complete denial of those who were murdered. (B.1, 2015)

The lack of a death certificate, as well as creating problems for the children, creates difficulties for the partners of those murdered as they are unable to access savings or pensions of the deceased (Ndlovu, 2015, p.62). This affects them financially further adding to their pain.

The lack of documentation as a lasting impact of the Gukurahundi is one of the most frustrating and damaging consequences of the 1980s massacres. It demonstrates that the Gukurahundi was not an isolated act of violence but an event that is continuing to detrimentally affect those victimised, and will continue to affect future generations until the government acknowledges its crimes.
4.2 Lack of Development

A) Development Neglect – An Overview

“During the 80s and during the 90s, in this part of the country, nothing was happening.” (C.1, 2015)

A side effect of the Gukurahundi that is having a lasting impact on today’s society is the issue of development neglect. At the turn of the decade with civil strife over and the country newly independent, donations and investments poured into Zimbabwe. However, the disturbances that plagued Matabeleland throughout the 1980s suspended the development activities in these regions because they were considered ‘in conflict’ (Hill and Katere, 2002). Therefore as thousands of its inhabitants were being murdered, Matabeleland saw the lion’s share of development go to the other Zimbabwean regions. This is demonstrated with three fifths of communal area loans going to Mashonaland whilst only 4% was directed to Matabeleland in the 1980s (Bond, 1998, p.319). The impact of this is still being felt today and has resulted in Matabeleland lagging far behind the other Zimbabwean provinces, as President Mugabe himself has admitted:

While there was little or no development in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands, development went ahead in the provinces of Mashonaland, Manicaland and most parts of Masvingo and the Midlands. The country was thus divided into two parts of unequal development. (Musemwa, 2006, p.248)

Although the majority of development was suspended in the Matabeleland region due to the Gukurahundi atrocities, some trickled through. However once more this development was soon caught up in the politics of the conflict as ZANU-PF tried to assert its authority. With the District Councils dominated by ZAPU members, ZANU-PF introduced ex-ZANLA guerrillas as Local Government Promotion Officers (LGPOs) in an attempt to promote the establishment of Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOs). However the ex-ZANLA LGPOs were received with hostility by the Matabeleland population due to its government connection and as a result “development planning moved at a
snail’s pace” (Mabhena, 2014, p.145). Therefore, the lack of investment in Matabeleland throughout the 1980s handicapped the region in the succeeding decades resulting in what Vambe (2012, p.286) described as a “silent genocide still taking place”, as best demonstrated by the examples below.

**Zimbabwe’s Economic Crisis 1997 – Present**

In order to understand why the Zimbabwean government has continued to neglect the development of Matabeleland, it is important to briefly analyse the economic meltdown of 1997. The financial crisis has meant that very little development has occurred in Zimbabwe since the late 1990s. Combined with the Gukurahundi atrocities of the 1980s, this has meant Matabeleland has failed to witness any major development since pre-independence. Whilst the rest of Zimbabwe has also been greatly affected by the economic crisis, the development they experienced in the 1980s has meant that they have managed far better than the Matabeleland regions.

Coltart (2008, p.13), explains that three events occurred in 1997 that initiated the economic meltdown: Mugabe deployed Zimbabwean troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo to protect mining investments of the ruling elite; Mugabe agreed to pay huge pensions and other benefits to war veterans loyal to ZANU-PF; the government commenced with the threats to acquire land held by white commercial farmers. The latter event was particularly disastrous to the economy as agricultural production accounted for 40 percent of the economy prior to the crisis and plummeted with the new beneficiaries due to their lack of expertise and farming equipment (Mail & Guardian, 2009). This is best demonstrated with the fall in annual wheat production from over 300,000 tons in 1990 to less than 50,000 in 2007 (Coltart, 2008, p.2). The result of these three events was a cumulative inflation of nearly 3.8 billion percent between 1997 and 2007 and unemployment of 94 percent of the Zimbabwean population in 2009 (Hanke, 2008, p.1; Mail & Guardian, 2009). This is also seen in the graph below.

Although the Zimbabwean economy picked up from 2009 to 2013 with the dollarization, it has since dropped due to “adverse weather conditions, weak demand for key exports, and election-year uncertainty” (Ndela, 2015). This has led to George Ward’s prediction of a further economic crisis (Manayiti, 2015).

Therefore in relation to this study, the economic crisis helps explain the feelings of resentment in Matabeleland today. The combination of the Gukurahundi atrocities and the economic meltdown in 1997 has meant that Matabeleland has seen little to no development since pre-1980. This has meant that those living in Matabeleland are always below par in comparison to the rest of the country.
B) Water Shortages and the Zambezi Water Project (ZWP)

One such example of this lack of development can be seen with the ZWP. Originally planned by the Rhodesians, the ZWP intended to end water shortages in Matabeleland North by channelling water down from the Zambezi River to the Gwayi-Shangani Dam, which would then hold water in a reservoir for the region. However, this project remained a “pipe dream” for the Bulawayo inhabitants due to the “failure of central government to commit itself towards the finalisation” (Mhlanga, 2013, p.286). This created feelings of indignation amongst the Matabeleland citizens due to the fact other Zimbabwean regions have constructed dams in the meantime, for example the Tokwe Mukorsi Dam in Masvingo Province, which was built between 1998-2015, and the Osborne Dam in Manicaland, which was constructed between 1991-1994 (Mazingi and Kamidza, 2011, p.361). The consistent water shortages that continue to affect Bulawayo as a result of not having a working dam has meant that many heavy industry businesses have relocated to Harare thus depriving the region of investment, finance, and employment for its people.

As well as the frustration surrounding the project’s lack of progress, the government’s use of the ZWP as a political card has increasingly angered the Matabeleland North population. Musemwa highlights that the government’s manipulation of the project as a political weapon in the hope of enticing votes from the Bulawayo residents, has created feelings of anger and dismay at the government’s constant empty promises (Musemwa, 2006, p.247). This issue is still affecting Bulawayo today as seen by a newspaper article published in June 2015 that states:

The Zambezi Water Project is a gimmick that is repeatedly being used by ZANU-PF to try and win the Matabeleland vote. As far as we are concerned this issue died a natural death and chances of it being revived are nil. We are sick and tired of this political gimmick. (New Zimbabwe, 2015)

The frustration is clear. For Matabeleland citizens the construction of dams around the country, at what they consider their expense, has fuelled feelings of marginalisation and neglect. These emotions were created in the Gukurahundi and are still impacting
today’s society as one interviewee noted, “You can’t talk of the marginalisation and underdevelopment of Matabeleland in isolation with Gukurahundi” (E.1, 2015).

C) Road conditions

“The major economic issue that we are talking about is the roads. If an area cannot be accessible then there can be no governance.” (E.2, 2015)

As well as the accessibility to water, both interviewees and academics highlight road neglect as an issue of paramount concern to the people of Matabeleland. This dates back to the 1980s when the Gukurahundi prevented road development from occurring at a time when other regions in the country had their road networks constructed. One interviewee further elaborates this:

If you drive around the rural areas of the rest of Zimbabwe, you’ll find that there are magnificent new roads that were constructed since 1980… in the 1980s in particular and to a less extent in the 1990s a vast amount of money was pumped into building new roads throughout Mashonaland that didn’t happen in Matabeleland, North and South. I think I’m correct in saying that there is only one new, major rural road constructed since 1980 in Matabeleland North and South whilst most of the arterial roads were constructed 50, 60 years ago. (C.2, 2015)

The neglect of Matabeleland’s roads is a central example of the neglect of the region in general, as poor road conditions have prevented teachers from reaching their schools, which in turn deteriorates the quality of education (Ncube, 2015). This is also seen with development projects where the road conditions have prevented donors from accessing some areas, thus excluding the isolated residents from the programmes intended to benefit them (Mtetwa, Dziro and Takaza, 2013, p.31). Mtetwa et al. have identified rural roads as those of most concern and this is supported by one interviewee who explains that whilst the main highways are in poor condition the government is forced to address them. In comparison, the roads in rural Matabeleland “haven’t changed in 50 years” thus making their accessibility virtually impossible (C.2, 2015). Murambadoro experienced this during her research for her
article (2015), where she states that the road conditions were so bad she had to travel a 15km stretch on a donkey drawn cart to access one village (Murambadoro, 2015, p.41). Once more it becomes evident why feelings of marginalisation exist in Matabeleland today as rural people are forced to live in harsh conditions, cut off from nearby towns and villages, all because of a lack of development in the 1980s that the government has failed to rectify.

D) Education

Education in Matabeleland has been one of the most significant sectors of government neglect, as seen with only six schools making it into Zimbabwe’s top one hundred in 2014 (Makwati, 2015). Again, the causes of this date back to the Gukurahundi where Fifth Brigade specifically targeted teachers in an effort to kill off the “cornerstone of society” (E.1, 2015). This victimisation meant that those teachers left alive fled their posts and failed to return. Therefore the impact of this on Matabeleland’s educational sector was disastrous, as schools did not have enough teachers to run effectively combined with the deterioration of infrastructure due to government neglect.

The poor quality of education as a result has severely impacted the performance of students in the Matabeleland regions. This is best demonstrated by the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) in Bulawayo that recruits virtually all of its students from other regions in Zimbabwe despite being Matabeleland’s home university (Murambadoro, 2015, p.46). This has resulted in what Mhlanga (2013, p.287) describes as “a lost development project, which was created through an act of Parliament to hoodwink the people of Matabeleland into believing that they own something.” However the inequality of these regions does not just affect NUST but the educational sector as a whole, as one interviewee elaborates:

If you come to education now… in terms of ratios of population, it’s pathetic… They are saying the people from Matabeleland make up 20% of the population but we expect that to be reflected in the universities but it is not there. It’s as low as 2% in terms of intakes. You go to some facilities; you find it is totally zero. (C.1, 2015)
The lack of Matabeleland students in Zimbabwean universities is correlated to its quality of teaching in primary and secondary schools. Therefore it is hardly surprising that institutions like NUST have an unequal representation of home students. NUST requires science A-levels as a prerequisite for entry, however 60% of Zimbabwe’s science teacher vacancies occur in the Matabeleland region, combined with only two schools in Bulawayo that have science laboratories and Matabeleland North having no qualified Chemistry or Physics teachers (Muchetu and Dube, 2015). This has resulted in one MDC legislator demanding the introduction of a quota system that ensures tertiary institutions give first preference to students from their home region:

What is happening is that when you look at the state of institutions of higher learning in the Matabeleland region, very few students come from Matabeleland. And unless you address that particular issue, fair representation and distribution of resources will always be a problem. (Langa, 2015)

It thus becomes a cycle of stagnation whereby students cannot move on to higher education as they do not possess the standards required, which in turn decreases the turnout of Matabeleland university students who come back to work in the region. The result is a province that has never recovered from the events of the 1980s.

The lack of Ndebele teachers has meant that others from different regions in Zimbabwe come and work in Matabeleland in their place. This has created a language problem as those from the other regions rarely speak the Ndebele language. This has created resentment amongst the Matabeleland inhabitants as classes are taught in Shona, which they believe “serves as a constant reminder to the community of their suffering during the Gukurahundi” (Murambadoro, 2015, p.46). The idea of Shona replacing Ndebele as the language taught in schools instills a sense of oppression in the region as one interviewee elaborates, “Why are they learning Shona in schools? Because you want them to be what you are, which will never work” (A.2, 2015).

Government neglect in relation to infrastructure is also plaguing the Matabeleland schools, which is having a detrimental affect on the education of school children. A lack of basic amenities has meant that standard teaching becomes impossible, as age groups are thrown together to fit into cramped locations, and in some instances
children have even been forced to learn outside under trees (Makwati, 2015). These issues are being continuously publicised demonstrating the extent of the damage, as seen in one newspaper article published on August 12, 2015, that compares Matabeleland South schools to ‘grass hut homesteads’ and states, “Due to a lack of resources and shortage of qualified teachers, the pass rate for most of the schools is always at 0%” (Nyoni, 2015). This is a repeated concern for the Matabeleland educational sector as seen with another newspaper report below:

It is clear that the impact of Gukurahundi on the educational sector is disastrous. Fifth Brigade’s specific targeting of Matabeleland teachers has inflicted a wound on the region that has yet to heal. Schools in Matabeleland are in disrepair, understaffed and lack the basic amenities required to teach the standard of education expected of them. This has resulted in the region underachieving at all levels, best demonstrated by the unequal number of students graduating from universities. This once more highlights
the significant damage done by the Gukurahundi on the region that is still having an impact to this day, and will continue to have an impact on future generations unless it is resolved.

4.3 Resentment and Marginalisation

Although briefly mentioned above, it is important to expand upon the prevalent emotions existing in the Matabeleland regions today. One of the most concerning is the fractured relationship between the state and the Matabeleland inhabitants. This occurred with the Gukurahundi atrocities where the trust between the state and those victimised was broken, and has resulted in a sense of mistrust, suspicion and unease against the ZANU-PF government ever since. One interviewee uses a powerful analogy to explain this:

If you want to talk about the impact of violence on functioning, one of the ways to think about it is, what happens to the way you see the world if you’re a three year old and your father rapes you. You know your father is supposed to protect you, he is this all-powerful person in your life, and if he rapes you what do you do? Who do you turn to? What does this do to your worldview when the very structure in your life that is supposed to protect you violates you? How does that change the way you see the world forever and your functioning as a human being and your functioning as a family?... And you know this is what I see, this is what happens when a state tortures and kills its own citizens. The reason states are there is to protect its own citizens, that is what states are supposed to do. And when a state starts to kill and torture the very people they are suppose to protect, what are the survivors suppose to make of this? It is very fracturing and it is incredibly damaging. And you know, how do people ever deal with that government after that, I mean if you can’t even go to the state and say please don’t kill me, how can you go to the state and say please fix the road or please build me a school or clinic. What expectations can you have of a state that won’t even respect your life and your right not to be tortured? So that is the situation in this country and especially in Matabeleland, which has never known anything different. (B.1, 2015)
It is important to note that these feelings of suspicion have only intensified in the years succeeding the atrocities. This is due to the issues previously discussed, such as the government’s lack of acknowledgement and the culture of impunity. However, as well as feelings of mistrust, the Matabeleland populations are also angry, frustrated and resentful. These emotions are due to years of government neglect and denial that has resulted in the region feeling marginalised and abandoned. However, what is interesting to see is that these emotions are generally found in the indirect victims of the Gukurahundi. Whereas those directly affected still retain their sense of fear towards the government, the younger generations who were not directly victimised by the violence are instead angry. Matabeleland has therefore witnessed an emotional transition, as one interviewee explains, “The generation right now are more angry. They’re not afraid because they were not physically victimised themselves” (E.2, 2015). Innocent to some extent of the government’s brutality, this ‘angry, young generation’ desperately needs to be reconciled by the government before more chaos ensues. One interviewee stresses this, “I’m worried about this angry generation… You know, if you want to prevent this angry generation escalating and becoming a negative force to be reckoned with in the future you need state intervention” (B.1, 2015). Thus, we are left with a generation of ‘angry, young men’, brought up in a region that has been marginalised by their government, who have resorted to radical institutions and tribalism to counter this neglect, as this study will now show.

**4.4 Pressure Groups and the Call for Tribalism**

Out of the anger and mistrust have grown a multitude of radicalised pressure groups, generally consisting of young men, educated in South Africa, who are advocating for the expression of their Ndebele heritage and condemning the government for its crimes. Such groups as: *Vukani Mahlabezulu* (Wake Up), *Imbovane Yamahlabezulu* (a Zulu battalion), *ZAPU 2000*, *Mthwakazi Action Group* (MAG), *Mthwakazi People’s Congress* (MPC), *Matabeleland Liberation Front* (MLF), and *Ibhetshu Likazulu* (The Lion Skin of the Ndebele Nation) have been created since the Unity Accord in 1987 to express their resentment at the lack of justice served in the wake of the Gukurahundi, as well as their aggravation at the lack of economic development in Matabeleland (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009a, p.189). Varying to different degrees of extremism, these groups have witnessed the failure of politics to bring about change
in their region and have thus adopted a more radical stance. Others have gone as far as calling for complete secession of Matabeleland into its own separate state called the Mthwakazi Free State, as seen below (MFS)(Mthwakazi being the traditional kingdom of the Ndebele people). This is being promoted by a pressure group in the United Kingdom called the United Mthwakazi Republic (UMR), which has declared:

For our part, for our present generation, this Zimbabwe, and any attempts to maintain it in any guise in future as a state that includes Mthwakazi, is as false as it is silly. It is only part of the grand illusion of the whole Zimbabwe project created in the 1980s… What we have is their Zimbabwe, of Shonas, and a fledging state for Mthwakazi, which we have called UMR. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008, p.191)

The UMR refers here to the concept of ‘Shonalisation’, the idea that the Shona tribe are infiltrating all sectors of governance to control Zimbabwe and the Ndebele people. A malicious term that should be treated with the utmost caution, it encourages tribalism and the disunity of Zimbabwe. However, a number of these pressure groups used it to promote their message, as demonstrated by the Mbokodo group that published a paper entitled, To All The People Of Matabeleland, that read:
This paper is to warn you the people of Matabeleland, the Nguni, Kalanga, Sotho, Venda, Tonga, Nambya, and Shangaan of what is happening in our land.

A: There is a conspiracy by the Shona to force everybody to become Shona by speaking Shona and abandoning our cultures.

B: There is a deliberate plan by the Shona to flood our areas. By doing so they will force us to abandon our ways and follow their ways. This is contained in a secret book they wrote in the 1970s and distributed amongst themselves. This is part of what they wrote.

a. They have removed everybody from Matabeleland from top posts and replaced them with Shonas, e.g. a, Most Headmasters are Shona.

b. In our colleges, nursing schools and other higher education places, only Shonas are admitted so that only Shona learn valuable skills to make them masters and keep us their servants.

c. All jobs in the formal sector are given to the Shonas deliberately. Even the tea boys, sweepers and messengers come from Mashonaland. As for us we are forced to sell vegetables in our land or jump the border.

d. All bus drivers and security guards are Shona and they force you to speak Shona.

e. All policemen are Shona and they harass our people for nothing.

f. All taxi drivers are Shona except emergency taxi drivers.

g. All postmen are Shona.

h. The army is all Shona.

We now appeal to all you people of Matabeleland to,

1. Refuse to speak or to be spoken to in Shona, everywhere, at your work places, in the bear halls, in church, in buses, and everywhere else. The Shona must learn to speak our languages otherwise they have no reason for being here.

It is evident from the contents of this document that the message is both dangerous and angry. It is also clear that the origins of their argument exist in the Gukurahundi. Both groups mention indirectly the atrocities of the 1980s demonstrating the lasting impact it is still having on today’s society. Thus, a ramification of the Gukurahundi is this militant form of tribalism that the Matabeleland pressure groups are advocating,
as stated by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009b, p.184), “Gukurahundi violence provoked radical Ndebele cultural nationalism as well as radical Ndebele politics, that sometimes contested the whole idea of a unitary Zimbabwe state.” As previously discussed, the Gukurahundi was not a tribal attack but a political manoeuvre. However a consequence of it was that it hardened ethnic differences. This has led to what Breaking the Silence labelled as one of the “most tragic impacts of Fifth Brigade”, the feeling amongst Ndebeles that they were victims of an “ethnic and political war” (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.59). Therefore, although it is untrue to state that the reason Gukurahundi occurred was tribal, it is fair to state that tribalism has evolved out of it. The people of Matabeleland today feel discriminated against due to their ethnic background and when asked about the events of the 1980s will often define the Gukurahundi as ‘genocide’, as one interviewee elaborates:

They still feel repressed, they still feel somehow colonised by the Shonas, by the Shona dominant government, and for me that’s a real tragedy because I don’t think the Gukurahundi massacres were about ethnicity. It was about ZAPU, it was about a political entity not a tribal entity. But it became conflated and people see themselves as having been crushed because they were Ndebele not because they were ZAPU supporters. (B.1, 2015)

Therefore, contemporary Zimbabwe is faced with a number of radicalised pressure groups, consisting of discontented young men angry at their ill treatment. Using the Gukurahundi as the foundations for their argument, these groups correlate the contemporary problems facing Matabeleland with the 1980s atrocities. The lack of a government response or even acknowledgement has fuelled their anger and resentment and has created concerns amongst bystanders of further violence, as one interviewee demonstrates, “If the government doesn’t accept responsibility then justice is not done. With the generation as it is as an angry generation, a frustrated generation, it is a recipe for another war of revenge. A senseless war” (E.2, 2015).
5. Recommendations for Recovery

The picture of Matabeleland today is bleak. Youths are disillusioned and angry whilst the elder generations are scarred by a traumatic history. With these contemporary problems originating with the Gukurahundi, it is evident that to solve this current crisis one must address the past. If the government continues to dismiss these grievances it is feared that the indignation prevailing in the Matabeleland regions today will spill over into all out conflict.

Therefore, the field research conducted for this investigation highlights three recommendations that will stand as prerequisites to national reconciliation:

1. National Acknowledgement
2. National Apology
3. Communal Reparations

These three recommendations combine moral and material compensation in an effort to bring about restorative justice. Unlike retributive justice that may entrench the deep-seated anger already existing in the affected regions, restorative justice aims to “help victims move beyond anger and a sense of powerlessness” by repairing social connections and bringing about peace (Minow, 1998, p.92). Therefore, it is believed that if these three recommendations are adhered to, tensions between the two parties will ease and recovery can begin. However, it is important to note that whilst these three recommendations put into place mechanisms for the country to move forward, reconciliation is not guaranteed. For many victims the past is too painful and forgiveness an alien concept, as Horacio Verbitsky, an Argentinean journalist, explains when talking about reconciliation in Argentina after the Military Junta:

Reconciliation by whom? After someone takes away your daughter, tortures her, disappears her, and then denies having ever done it – would you ever want to ‘reconcile’ with those responsible? That word makes no sense here. The political discourse on reconciliation is immoral, because it denies the reality of what people experienced. It is not reasonable to expect people to reconcile after what happened here. (Sooka, 2006, p.322)
5.1 National Acknowledgement

“We believe you can’t pretend as if we are a country that healed without talking about it openly.” (E.1, 2015)

Quinn (2003, p.3) states that for a society to rebuild after violent conflict it must first engage in the process of acknowledgement “before any of the other steps can take place.” Her choice of acknowledgement as the initial step in the path to reconstruction is logical, and is thus replicated in this study. However, it is important to first define acknowledgement and explain its significance before applying it to the Zimbabwean case study.

Quinn (2003, p.3) goes on to define national acknowledgement as “publicly admitting to and accepting a knowledge of the events that have taken place.” The key word here is ‘publicly’ and is reiterated by Weschler (cited in Govier, 2003, p.70), where he states, “It’s what happens and can only happen to knowledge when it becomes officially sanctioned, when it is made part of the public cognitive scene.” Therefore, it would appear that to acknowledge something would be to openly admit to it, to spell it out by stating the facts and thus allow it to be freely discussed. The issue however arises when the event that needs to be acknowledged is unpleasant and the person who is doing the acknowledging does not wish to do so. In this case, one of denial, those victimised feel a sense of humiliation and anger. In contrast, an acknowledgement has the power to restore dignity and pave the way for reconstruction. This is demonstrated in Ariel Dorfman’s play Death and the Maiden, where a torture victim captures her torturer and is about to enact revenge when he admits that what he did was wrong and his admission restores her dignity (Govier, 2003, p.66).

In the case of the Gukurahundi, academics and human rights activists have continuously encouraged national acknowledgement of the atrocities. This is first seen in 1997 with the Breaking the Silence report (1997, p.5), which states, “Only when those who inflicted untold hardship are prepared to acknowledge that they did so, can a lasting reconciliation take place between all who live in Zimbabwe”. This highlights
the correlation between government denial and a lack of recovery in Matabeleland. This is reiterated by Murambadoro (2015, p.35) in her investigation of reconciliation options for Matabeleland today, where she concludes that only when “the government acknowledges the past and puts in place effective measures to address the injustices incurred” can reconciliation truly begin. However, what Murambadoro fails to do is to connect the solution to the contemporary problems. National acknowledgement of the massacres would solve a number of the lasting impacts that the Gukurahundi is having on today’s society. An acknowledgement would break the censorship of the atrocities and allow the topic to be freely discussed. This would progress the act of recovery, as victims would be able to seek help without fear of harassment. It would also put into place measures to create a ‘Commemoration Day’ for the atrocities that pressure groups are desperately fighting to achieve. Lastly, it would narrow the range of permissible lies and therefore challenge the still prevalent official account that the Gukurahundi was part of the struggle to defend Zimbabwe from armed dissidents (Ignatieff, 1996). This would prevent the need for Matabeleland pressure groups to ‘write their own history’ and as Sooka (2006, p.319) states, is “crucial for a country to start rebuilding a new social solidarity”.

It is recommended that the Zimbabwean government acknowledge the atrocities of the 1980s because by doing so they would initiate the process of reconciliation. Contemporary Matabeleland exists in the shadows of the past and it is only through creating what one interviewee describes as an “enabling environment” that measures can be put into place to help the victims recover (D.1, 2015). However it is important to reiterate the words of Van Zyl (1999, p.16), “While truth may lead to reconciliation, it is a myth to presume it automatically does so.”

5.2 National Apology

“It is only a matter of him, the President, coming forward and issuing a public apology, which he has never done. To come public and say, “I’m really sorry for what happened but we are going to make it up, and sort out the problem.”” (A.2, 2015).
It is common for an apology to accompany an acknowledgement. For if you acknowledge that you did something bad, it is customary to express regret for your actions. Bashir (2008, p.57) has identified this connection where he states, “The demand of acknowledgement is intimately linked to the third principle of reconciliation, that is, taking responsibility and offering an apology.” The power of an apology has long been debated in the transitional justice discourse, with critics going so far as to describe it as “lip service and empty rhetoric… a cheap and easy way for perpetrators and their descendants to assuage their guilt” (Barkan and Karn, 2006, p.6). However, although with its critics, it is obvious that an apology is a necessity in the process of reconciliation after violent conflict. Barkan and Karn (2006, p.7) highlight this in their book, where they state, “A sincere expression of contrition, offered at the right pitch and tenor, can pave the way for atonement and reconciliation.” Therefore, with its importance demonstrated, we are left asking what does an apology contain? Barkan and Karn have identified sincerity as one of the essential characteristics. This is supported by Tavuchis where he states (1991, p.3) that an apology is “the expression of genuine regret and remorse for the harm done.” However, Tavuchis (1991, p.8) goes on to explain that an apology should also be a “form of self-punishment that cuts deeply because we are obliged to retell, relive, and seek forgiveness for sorrowful events that have rendered our claims to membership in a moral community suspect or defeasible.” Therefore, we are left with a humble statement of remorse that borders self-humiliation. In the absence of these characteristics, the apology can cause more harm than good as demonstrated with Kang Kek Iew, a war criminal and former leader in the Khmer Rouge movement in Cambodia, where witnesses criticized his apology as being “not sincere, meaningful or effective” (Ryono, 2012, p.123).

In the Zimbabwean context, a national apology would accompany the acknowledgement in initiating the process of reconciliation. What is interesting to note is that for the majority of Matabeleland citizens they do not want retributive justice in the sense of prosecution and imprisonment, but instead would prefer an apology as it is seen as “moral gesture of goodwill” (Vambe, 2012, p.292). One interviewee reiterates this:
What interested me about the reactions of victims was that very few called for The Hague to be involved and prosecutions and the like, they wanted three things. They wanted firstly an acknowledgement that what had happened had happened, secondly an apology, and thirdly communal reparations. (C.2, 2015)

A national apology on behalf of the government and those involved in the atrocities would mend the fractured relationship between the two parties and appease the growing number of pressure groups. This would calm the rising anger felt in Matabeleland today and prevent an escalation of conflict.

5.3 Communal Reparations

“What makes the problem fester is the sense that ongoing generations, the current generations are disadvantaged, and the best way of addressing that is by ensuring that there is this investment to bring these areas up to par with the rest of the country.” (C.2, 2015)

The final prerequisite to reconciliation recommended by this study is that of communal reparations. Communal reparations complete the picture of restorative justice by providing the material compensation that accompanies the moral compensation of an acknowledgement and an apology. This study has opted for communal reparations under the guidance of Breaking the Silence, which dismissed the option for individual compensation due to the complexities of identifying victims over two decades later (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.212). However, communal reparations have its weaknesses, as demonstrated by The International Centre for Transitional Justice (2015, p.6): reparations can inadvertently benefit perpetrators if they live within the community; communal reparations are not personal enough for individuals affected by the violence; and lastly, the process may become confused with the development activities that the community is entitled to anyway. This last point is worthy of attention and it is often difficult to distinguish the two. Walker highlights this (2013, p.221), where she states, “Attempts to get value twice-over from using investment and development in communities as a kind of collective reparation can mute or cancel the fittingness of what is offered.” However,
nonetheless it is important for affected communities to be brought “up to par with the rest of the country”, and so communal reparations have become a preferred strategy in the process of reconciliation after violent conflict, as seen in the cases of South Africa and Timor-Leste (C.2, 2015). Although with its weaknesses, communal reparations can be used effectively in certain settings, as Stevens elaborates (2013, p.565), “When victims share a common identity (e.g., indigenous Mayans of Guatemala), collective reparations provide unmistakable acknowledgement of wrongdoing, provide a form of restorative justice, and move people toward a more inclusive society.” Therefore, in the case of Zimbabwe, the common identity shared by the Matabeleland inhabitants would imply that communal reparations would be effective in restoring the community and initiating the process of reconciliation.

Once more, it was Breaking the Silence that first proposed the idea of communal reparations in the context of the Gukurahundi. The report suggested that financial assistance in the form of improved infrastructure would greatly aid the recovery of the communities affected (CCJPZ & LRF, 1997, p.213). Vambe reiterates this fifteen years later, where she interviews over 300 people from five affected areas and concludes that, “Closure to the issue of genocide in Zimbabwe will be guaranteed when government authorities deliberately develop Matabeleland and the Midlands” (Vambe, 2012, p.296). Although she specifically identifies the younger generation as being the most vocal, her research reveals that the demand for economic prosperity is not age dependent: “The old and young, men and women all seem to agree that the content of reconciliation should be tangible” (Vambe, 2012, p.296). However, similarly to Murambadoro, Vambe fails to justify the need for communal reparations. In light of the previous chapter that calls attention to the lack of development facing Matabeleland today, it is evident that communal reparations are what it will take to appease the indignation felt in the affected regions:

In the 1980s, there was a vast amount of donor money flooded in and it was spent elsewhere. It wasn’t spent in Matabeleland and that needs to be rectified. That likewise will cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and coming back to your question, it needs government involvement. And so, it’s those kinds of communal reparations that we need, and from our interviews it’s very clear that that is what it will take to bring about reconciliation. (C.2, 2015)
One major problem highlighted by this interviewee is the expense of developing a region neglected for over three decades. With Zimbabwe’s economy looking worse than ever how can the government compensate the Matabeleland regions? Another interviewee proposes an answer, “If you are saying the national budget of the country is so much, we will deliberately put a certain percentage to Matabeleland because it was affected by the genocide” (E.1, 2015). Under the current financial circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect the complete development of Matabeleland in the near future. However the answer proposed reveals a level of symbolism attached to the process, as if the action is one of repentance. Alternatively, looking at it from a practical point of view, it makes sense to allocate a greater portion of the country’s financial budget to the affected regions, as this is what it would take to equalise the country in the long-term. One final possibility proposed by Mani that would in essence bypass the economic woes of Zimbabwe is to allocate Matabeleland development packages from overseas donors (Mani, 2008, p.256). This would be a slow process but the action would demonstrate the remorse of the government for its past deeds and serve as a prerequisite to national reconciliation.

It is clear from the previous chapter that the lack of development of Matabeleland is having a lasting impact on today’s society. Communal reparations in the form of improving infrastructure and developing the region would solve these issues. As a result it is hoped the tensions of the past will ease and the journey to reconciliation can finally begin.

5.4 Reality v. Fantasy: Likelihood of government adhering to recommendations?

Although it is well and good to propose recommendations for the reconciliation of Zimbabwe, it is also important to question the likelihood of their coming to fruition. Regrettably, it seems highly unlikely that the ZANU-PF government will adhere to any of these proposals. Mugabe’s party considers the issue of the Gukurahundi to be closed as of the Unity Accord in 1987, and anyone further investigating the massacres is accused of “opening old wounds” (Rwafa, 2012, p.315). Paradoxically, a number of ZANU-PF party members have even voiced their support of the Gukurahundi massacres in recent years, further escalating tensions on the topic. This is demonstrated by Nathan Shamuyarira, the spokesperson to ZANU-PF, who stated in
2006 that the actions of Fifth Brigade were “not regrettable” as they were “doing [their] job to protect the people” (Ellis, 2006, p.40). However, it is in fact Vice President Mphoko who best represents the government’s current stance on the Gukurahundi. His statement earlier this year declaring the massacres a “Western conspiracy” epitomises the likelihood of reconciliation occurring in Zimbabwe in the near future (Maponga, 2015).

With the rising tensions in the region, we are left asking what needs to change in order to prevent further uprising and bloodshed. The unanimous verdict amongst interviewees and scholars alike is a change in government. As one interviewee highlights, three of the most powerful men in Zimbabwe are directly implicated to the 1980s atrocities: Robert Mugabe (President of Zimbabwe); Perence Shiri (Head of Zimbabwe’s Air Force); and Emmerson Mnangagwa (Vice President of Zimbabwe); and therefore it seems highly unlikely that they “are going to want to process their own criminal record any time soon” (B.1, 2015). Thus, it comes down to three options: the 2018 elections; a coup; or finally the change in power due to the death of the President. In all three circumstances, if anyone seizes power who has something to hide from the Gukurahundi then the issue will remain suppressed. Alternatively, if the person who succeeds the President had no involvement in the 1980s massacres, then it is much more likely the issue will be resolved. Either way, it appears that the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland are unlikely to be resolved any time soon, and this poses a grave threat to the security of the region and a bleak future for the youth of today.
6. Conclusion

The aim of this investigation was to explore the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi on Matabeleland in an effort to understand the pressure groups’ existence in the affected regions. This study demonstrates that the Gukurahundi is continuing to have a lasting impact on Matabeleland through two noticeable themes: a lack of acknowledgement, and a lack of development.

A lack of acknowledgement by the government for its atrocities has prevented the regions from moving forward emotionally. The government’s denial of its role combined with the mechanisms put in place to protect its soldiers has created a culture of impunity in Zimbabwe that has instilled fear in those wishing to seek justice. This has left the victims of the Gukurahundi in a state of suspension where they are prohibited from mourning their dead and thus have never been able to fully recover.

Similarly, a lack of development is continuing to affect today’s society. Excluded from the decade of investment in the 1980s due to the disturbances, Matabeleland has since remained dramatically behind the rest of the country. Through the use of three examples (ZWP, roads and education), this study demonstrates that not only did the Gukurahundi prevent any development from reaching the affected regions, but also in the succeeding years the government has failed to rectify this inequality. This has not only impacted the current Matabeleland population but will continue to detrimentally affect future generations as well.

The combination of these two themes has resulted in Matabeleland harbouring a deep-seated resentment. This resentment exists predominantly in the younger generations born post-Gukurahundi. Brought up in a region marginalised by the government, with a chapter of their history suppressed from public discussion, these indirect victims are angry at their ill treatment. This has culminated in the creation of pressure groups throughout Matabeleland advocating their Ndebele heritage and condemning the government for its crimes. Varying in degrees of extremism, some have adopted a more militant stance using a ‘guilty by association’ concept that targets the Shona tribe for the Gukurahundi atrocities. These groups pose a grave threat to the security
of the region, either through their own civil unrest or through the fear that the government will unleash a ‘Second Gukurahundi’ in response. Thus, they need to be reconciled immediately to prevent any further bloodshed from coming to Matabeleland.

This study proposes three recommendations that stand as prerequisites to national reconciliation: national acknowledgement, national apology, and communal reparations. It is widely believed that if the government adheres to these proposals then the tensions of the past will ease and the process of recovery can finally begin. However, it appears unlikely that this will be the case. The government’s stance on the Gukurahundi remains one of denial. ZANU-PF’s refusal to accept responsibility for the atrocities has led to a change in government being the only available option left for national reconciliation. However, this appears unrealistic at present and therefore the lasting impacts of the Gukurahundi will continue to haunt Matabeleland’s society. With Stuart Doran’s upcoming book alleged to directly implicate the government in the Gukurahundi massacres, combined with the unresolved grievances previously discussed, it is widely feared that violence will erupt once more in Matabeleland, as one interviewee has stated: “If the government doesn’t accept responsibility then justice is not done. With the generation as it is as an angry generation, a frustrated generation, it is a recipe for another war of revenge” (E.2, 2015).

Word Count: 14,663
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Anonymous. 2015. E-mail.


Images


8. Appendices

Appendix 1: A priori codes demonstrated in interview with E2.
Appendix 2: Codes used to separate a priori themes in transcriptions.

Analysis of Interview Data

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<td>TD1</td>
<td>Top-down 1: Reparations – communal and individual</td>
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<td>TD2</td>
<td>Top-down 2: Acknowledgement – Openly talk about issue &amp; no need to rewrite history/ Truth telling/ Commemoration</td>
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<td>TD3</td>
<td>Top-down 3: Apology/ Responsibility</td>
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<td>Top-down 4: Change in government – TRC</td>
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<td>Top-down 5: National reconciliation between tribes</td>
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<td>BU1</td>
<td>Bottom-up 1: Memory Transfer</td>
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<td>BU2</td>
<td>Bottom-up 2: Commemoration/ Memorialisation at a local level</td>
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<td>BU3</td>
<td>Bottom-up 3: Government non-involvement</td>
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<td>BU4</td>
<td>Bottom-up 5: Exhumations and reburials</td>
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<tr>
<td>R1</td>
<td>Ramifications 1: Development neglect and inequality due to Gukurahundi</td>
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<td>R2</td>
<td>Ramifications 2: Roads</td>
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<td>R3</td>
<td>Ramifications 3: Schools &amp; Education</td>
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<td>R4</td>
<td>Ramifications 4: Clinics</td>
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<td>R5</td>
<td>Ramifications 5: Loss of property</td>
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<td>R6</td>
<td>Ramifications 6: Lack of birth/ death certificates/ documentation - statelessness</td>
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<td>R7</td>
<td>Ramifications 7: Lack of leaders</td>
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<td>R8</td>
<td>Ramifications 8: Fractured relationship between state and community</td>
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<td>R9</td>
<td>Ramifications 9: Emotional transition from fear to anger</td>
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<td>R10</td>
<td>Ramifications 10: Problem generation / Angry young men</td>
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<td>R11</td>
<td>Ramifications 11: Identity issue – victimhood v. perpetrator</td>
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<td>R12</td>
<td>Ramifications 12: Tribalism v. Politics</td>
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<td>R13</td>
<td>Ramifications 13: History written wrongly</td>
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<tr>
<td>R14</td>
<td>Ramifications 14: Still not talked about/ Government denial/ Media Progression</td>
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<td>R15</td>
<td>Ramifications 15: Lack of job opportunities</td>
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**Appendix 3:** Themes and sub-themes left after winnowing process.

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Appendix 4: Cutting and sorting data example.

**Ramifications 3: Education**

**Quotes**
- C2: “Secondly if you look at schools, the number of schools that go to A-level outside of Matabeleland is way more than in Matabeleland, especially schools that do A-level maths and the sciences, and once again in the 1980s, there was a vast amount of donor money that flooded in and it was spent elsewhere, it wasn’t spent in Matabeleland and that needs to be rectified.”
- C1: “They overlook these infrastructure of schools which in Matabeleland they were not done, and when were schools built in this country, especially between 1981 and 1989 and this is the time when this side has the problem and these are the issues that are beginning to haunt the youths of today when they start to ask, why don’t we have a secondary school close to us? When in other parts of the country they do have?”
- C1: “If you come to education now, we have got about 9 state universities and 5 private which gives you a total of 14 universities in this country. But if you go there, in terms of ratios of population, it’s pathetic. From this part of the country it does not matter which university, even those that are located here our students are not there… If you use the population percentage ratio which is being targeted, I don’t know what criteria they are using, they are saying the people from Matabeleland makes up 20% of the population but we expect that to be reflected in universities but it is not there. It’s as low as 2% in terms of intakes. You got to some facilities, you find it is totally zero, you get what I am saying. This is because of the distances to the schools. Our focus has been at universities, higher education, because they have done groundwork in terms of primary and secondary education, during the 80s and during the 90s, in that part of the country. In this part of the country nothing has happened, so when universities have been built now the gap becomes clearer because you have schools that are not performing. And there are many factors that make that school not perform: infrastructure, it’s dilapidated, they are far apart, and all those things, they can’t attract good teachers, they don’t have water supply system, there are a lot of complicated things we could spend the whole month talking about. As a result, the youth of today from Matabeleland does not find it possible to perform in the same way as the youth of that side.”
- E1: “If you make a start, you realise that most of the people were killed were teachers, so if you kill the very teachers, literally, you are killing that society, because it is not easy to replace human resource in such a short period of time… During that time you have got schools that were destroyed, curfews, so it affected the performance of those people, a certain generation was affected. So it is impacting the current generation. So those are some of the things that are affecting even the present, because if you eliminated those people, now you have got Shona speaking teachers in Matabeleland teaching at a primary level, because the teachers from Matabeleland were killed during the Gukurahundi.”
- A2: “Of course, you might say that education is there, like any country, but believe me, in other provinces, Mashonaland etc. we have never learnt Ndebele in our schools. But in Bulawayo, they are forced to learn Shona. Why is it? There is already a division. These are the things we don’t see but affect the whole country. Why are they learning Shona in schools? Because you want them to be what you are which will never work.”

**Themes and examples**

**Gukurahundi violence on teachers**
- Information supported by Alexander, McGregor and Ranger

**Ratio inequality**
- National University of Science and Technology – look at Murambadoro & Mhlanga article
- Connects to poor quality of teaching in primary and secondary schools that results in fewer Matabeleland students entering university
- Sunday News article- 60% of science teacher vacancies in Matabeleland; no qualified Chemistry or Physic teachers in Matabeleland North

**Language barrier**
- 2014 Deputy Minister of Primary and Secondary Education statement on language problem in Matabeleland – serves as a “constant reminder to the community of their suffering during the Gukurahundi” – Murambadoro article

**Poor infrastructure**
- Newspaper articles; SouthernEye & the Zimbabwean – both recent

**Analysis**
- Connects back to the Gukurahundi. The targeting of teachers and the lack of development in the 1980s is continuing to have a detrimental effect on today’s society- there is a lack of teachers and infrastructure of schools is poor
- This has resulted in inadequate teaching of students (combined with the language problem of speaking Shona) which has resulted in an unequal ratio of those studying further education from Matabeleland in comparison to the rest of the country
- Solution: Reparations in development of educational sector in Matabeleland
Appendix 5: Ethics Review Form

Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment

Ethics Review Form E1

This form should be completed by the Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Student undertaking a research project which involves human participants. The form will identify whether a more detailed E2 form needs to be submitted to the Faculty Research Ethics Officer.

Before completing this form, please refer to the University Code of Practice for the Ethical Standards for Research Involving Human Participants, available at http://www.brookes.ac.uk/Research/Research-ethical/, and to any guidelines provided by relevant academic or professional associations.

It is the Principal Investigator / Supervisor who is responsible for exercising appropriate professional judgement in this review. Note that all necessary forms should be fully completed and signed before fieldwork commences.

Project Title:  Truth without Reconciliation: The Exhumation Process in Zimbabwe

Principal Investigator / Supervisor:  Richard Carver

Student Investigator:  Ben Teuten

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<th>Yes</th>
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<td>1. Does the study involve participants who are unable to give informed consent? (e.g. children, people with learning disabilities, unconscious patients)</td>
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<td>2. If the study will involve participants who are unable to give informed consent (e.g. children under the age of 16, people with learning disabilities), will you be unable to obtain permission from their parents or guardians (as appropriate)?</td>
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<td>3. Will the study require the cooperation of a gatekeeper for initial access to groups or individuals to be recruited? (e.g. students, members of a self-help group, employees of a company, residents of a nursing home)</td>
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<td>4. Are there any problems with the participants' right to remain anonymous, or to have the information they give not identifiable as theirs?</td>
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<td>5. Will it be necessary for the participants to take part in the study without their knowledge/consent at the time? (e.g. covert observation of people in non-public places?)</td>
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<td>6. Will the study involve discussion of or responses to questions the participants might find sensitive? (e.g. own drug use, own traumatic experiences)</td>
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If you have answered 'no' to all the above questions, send the completed form to your Module Leader and keep the original in case you need to submit it with your work.

If you have answered 'yes' to any of the above questions, you should complete the Form E2 available at http://www.brookes.ac.uk/research/research-ethics/Ethical-review-form/E2/ and, together with this E1 Form, email it to the Faculty Research Ethics Officer, whose name can be found at http://www.brookes.ac.uk/research/research-ethics/research-ethics-officers/

If you answered 'yes' to any of questions 1-13 and 'yes' to question 14, an application must be submitted to the appropriate NHS research ethics committee.

Signed: [Signature]
Principal Investigator
/Supervisor

Signed: Ben Teuten
Student Investigator

Date: 14/05/2015