A Troubled Environment

The relationship between the UN Peacekeeping mission and NGOs in Haiti

A girl in Gonaives after Hurricane Hanna (Abassi, 2008)

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Abstract

The chaotic and unstable situation in Haiti for decades has stimulated several measures in order to change the situation, ranging from military occupations, trade embargoes to humanitarian assistance. Some of the actors currently active in Haiti include the latest United Nations peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH, deployed in 2004 in order to help stabilise the country and several national and international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Throughout the years a relationship was formed, albeit a complicated and troubled one.

Through literature and interviews conducted in Port au Prince with actors within the UN peacekeeping mission and the NGO community, the different factors that influence their relationship were examined. Concepts such as third generation peacekeeping missions, integrated missions and humanitarian principles were examined thoroughly using literature which made it possible to place comments made by interviewees in a larger context. The study covers the numerous activities in which the actors interact; through more systemic mechanisms such as coordination meetings, but also punctual activities such as disaster relief, Quick Impact Projects, logistical support and security measures, all with changing success. Reasons for interaction vary from funding, visibility to the need to prevent overlap and promote discussion on issues surrounding the protection of humanitarian space. Unfortunately the relationship is plagued by a lot of negative mutual opinions. The violation of humanitarian space, the risk of losing independence and being associated with a mission whose legitimacy is questioned and that is locally considered as being an occupational force tempers the will of NGOs to cooperate with the integrated mission MINUSTAH. In its turn MINUSTAH is concerned about the quality and sincerity of NGOs, particularly the local ones and also the fragmentation and politicisation of NGOs.

A number of changes can be made by both MINUSTAH and NGOs to improve their relationship such as clearer communication towards the local population and organising shared induction trainings to understand the principles and mandate by which both operate. With a high degree of mistrust, staff turnover and a reluctance to truly cooperate, this will still continue to be an extremely delicate endeavour.
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## Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>Community Violence Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FADH</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Haitian National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Force</td>
</tr>
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<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Non Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>LNGOs</td>
<td>Local Non Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>MICIVIH</td>
<td>International Civilian mission Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Mission International Nations Unies de stabilisation de Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>United Nations Civilian Police Mission Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNUD</td>
<td>Program Nations Unies pour le Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNH</td>
<td>Police National Haïtienne</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative to the Secretary General</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>United Nations AIDS</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Multi Interim Force Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission Haiti</td>
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<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Mission Haiti</td>
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I am greatly thankful for the help of Brian, who helped me find accommodation and introduced me to his friends in Haiti. Most importantly of all, he gave me the assurance that it would be fine and safe enough to go to Haiti, a fact many other people before him doubted, or advised against.

Without the help of Mike, Dietmar and Berndt it would have been extremely difficult to go to the interviews. Since public transportation cannot be considered a safe mode of transport, nor can walking be considered as such, they were kind enough to drive me to interviews and pick me up afterwards. Knowing that I could always call them not just for transport but also for security reasons if I felt unsafe, was very reassuring.

Thanks to my parents who have always supported me in whatever endeavour I chose to undertake. Your faith and belief in me have always encouraged me that I can go out on my own to countries like Haiti, and will be alright.

I would also like to thank Brigitte Piquard, my supervisor, for her support and suggestions during the research and writing process.

I would like to end by thanking all of the amazing people I've met and the friends I have made during my brief stay in Haiti. You have all made my experience in Haiti unforgettable.

All errors and shortcomings are mine.
1

Introduction

Haiti started off hopeful, being the second country in the Western hemisphere, after the United States, to become independent\(^1\). Despite this successful start, the country has ever since been characterised by violence, military coups, dictatorship and economic and political instability. These are not the only problems the country is facing. Environmental factors aren’t in favour of the country as the yearly hurricane season affects Haiti greatly, as could be seen only too recently when two hurricanes and two tropical storms devastated the country in the end of August and beginning of September 2008. The Haitian government lacks the capacity to help its own population and so numerous actors have stepped into the gap they have left throughout the years. Embassies, international and local nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), agencies from the United Nations, several peacekeeping missions, including five led by the United Nations (UN), have all tried and are still trying to help the country from sliding even further in despair.

The latest United Nations peacekeeping mission, 'Mission International Nations Unies de Stabilisation de Haiti' (MINUSTAH), was deployed in 2004 in order to help stabilise the country. It arrived in a chaotic and anarchic country, where several other actors, such as NGOs and UN agencies were already present. Throughout the years a relationship was formed, although many NGOs will often question if there is actually a relationship there. 'Relationship between MINUSTAH and the NGOs? There is none, there's your answer'. It is not as clear-cut as that, and this thesis will look at the relationship and explore why the above quote was heard so frequently during the research in Port au Prince in July and August 2008.

1.1 Relevance
We live in an increasingly interconnected world, which is also reflected in the increased interaction between different actors in the field of international intervention, such as UN peacekeeping missions and NGOs. Both actors want to contribute to the improvement of a

\(^1\) Unfortunately the interesting history of Haiti deserves a longer explanation as there is room for here, as it is essential for understanding the current situation in the country. Books such as Girard's Paradise Lost, and Buss's Haiti in the balance are good in describing the situation.
nation’s situation, although they are operating under different structures, values and concepts. It is important to look at these aspects closely, as they impact the inevitable relationship, and perhaps through changing the relationship, the effectiveness of the given assistance can increase, as at the moment the impact of all the efforts is limited.

A lot of authors have been active in writing on UN peacekeeping missions, the humanitarian NGO community and the problems in their interaction. There has been some writing on the opinion of local population of UN missions, but research is still lacking on the impact of those opinions on the cooperation with the mission by NGOs. This is one aspect this thesis is hoping to contribute to. Haiti also appears to be a country that is often forgotten, particularly by European Anglo Saxon scholars. Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries where missions are also present, are the main countries of their focus.

This thesis aims to contribute to the growing research in the interaction between different actors in the field of international intervention, as well as discover the most important factors influencing the relationship between MINUSTAH and the NGO community in Haiti in order to come up with recommendations to improve their interaction.

1.2 Thematic and conceptual framework
This thesis can be placed in the larger debate on international and national intervention in unstable countries. The question of who is active in which area, why, and the effectiveness of their actions has been discussed and researched for numerous years. NGOs and military forces from different peacekeeping missions are increasingly active in the same countries due to the complex nature of crisis and conflicts, resulting in many ethical dilemmas. The coordination of their efforts and the problems they are facing form the background of this research.

The research has been conducted in order to come up with practical suggestions, and is therefore written predominantly with a focus on practitioners active in either the UN or working for different NGOs. It can however also be interesting for scholars and policy makers to see how the specific case of Haiti adds a different view to the debate.
1.3 Structure of the thesis

The thesis will start by explaining the methodology used throughout the research in Chapter 2. In order to understand the context where the research has taken place, chapter 3 will describe the history and socio economic situation of Haiti. Chapter 4 will then continue to look at the nature of peacekeeping missions and more specifically the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH. Chapter 5 will then look at the other actor central to the thesis, the humanitarian community, and it will also look at the principles guiding this divided community. The thesis will continue by examining the activities where MINUSTAH and NGOs, both local and international, interact in Chapter 6. The reasons for cooperating and engaging in different activities will then be explored in Chapter 7. The final empirical chapter will look at the opinions and perceptions both actors have of one another, a very important factor shaping the relationship. The conclusion will then synthesise the findings and readdress the main question of this research, and come up with recommendations to possibly improve the often tense relationship between the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH and the NGO community in Haiti.
2

Methodology

Concerning methodology there are several things that should be mentioned. This report is focused on the question: *What factors define the relationship between the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti and international and local NGOs?*

To answer this question, different methodologies were used to answer different sub-questions. Relevant literature was reviewed in order to gain insight in the different actors and in the Haitian context. The majority of the work was done through field research in Port au Prince, Haiti during July and August 2008, where 32 interviews were conducted with actors within the UN mission and the NGO community. Of these interviews 14 were conducted with MINUSTAH staff, 4 with local NGOs and 16 with international NGOs. In order to protect the identity of the interviewees’ details about their organisations and positions within the mission will not be described in the thesis. In addition to these formal interviews, a lot of information was gathered through informal conversations with people I met during the two months in Port au Prince.

2.1 Data collection, management and analysis
During the preparation phase which took place in the United Kingdom, several people were contacted through email, of which a large number replied. Through initial contact by email and later during interviews, snowball sampling was used. After each interview the interviewee was asked if he or she knew any other people, either within the mission or the NGO community, who would be interesting to talk to. With people’s consent some interviews were recorded, but some people however felt uncomfortable with this, so during these interviews notes were taken. For the analysis of this primary data coding was used, followed by a content analysis where overlapping categories could be connected and compared.

Interviews were conducted with different actors: local NGOs, international NGOs and people working within MINUSTAH. Care was taken to talk to people from different sections within the mission. After the first initial interviews it was clear it would be important to talk to local
NGOs as well, though this proved to be more difficult than other international actors. Members of the local NGOs would not always speak English or French, but Creole, and arranging meetings with them proved to be challenging as they would often postpone, cancel or not reply or respond to phone calls or emails. As a result fewer local NGOs were interviewed than was planned initially. UN agencies were not contacted; the focus of the research was specifically on the relationship between the UN peacekeeping mission and NGOs. Even though this occasionally was difficult, as MINUSTAH is an integrated mission and UN agencies officially work under the same umbrella, it was important to keep this distinction as in the field the agencies do work separately and under a different mandate. It was also important to keep the research focussed and not include too many actors, as the time spent in Haiti was limited to two months.

During interviews it also came forward that there was a considerable difference between the interaction between MINUSTAH and NGOs in the regions as compared to Port au Prince. Several interviews were planned in Cap Haitian, a city in the North with a dynamic NGO presence. Unfortunately this trip was cancelled due to hurricane Gustav.

Another impact of the hurricanes was the cancellation of some interviews. During the last few weeks of August and the beginning of September 2008 Haiti suffered from multiple tropical storms and hurricanes. Numerous efforts were being taken to get relief efforts and supplies to the areas most severely hit, such as Gonaives. All international agencies were involved, and swamped with work as storm upon storm hit the country. As a result some of my interviews with international NGOs were cancelled, as they were putting all their time in effort in reaching the affected population. Some of these NGOs suggested that I conduct interviews with them via email. Although they had suggested this solution themselves, not all NGOs would reply to the email that was send upon returning to the UK.

2.2 Interviews
The interviews took place at the location suggested by the interviewee. Often this was at the office, but occasionally this would also be a restaurant and the interview would be done over lunch or a coffee. This informal setting occasionally helped them speak more freely, although it might also have obstructed them slightly as other people could have listened in on the interview.
At the beginning of the interview the topic and goal of the research would be briefly described. Most interviewees would start talking or giving their opinion straight away. The interview was semi-structured, with different topics needing to be covered, and depending on the answers from the interviewee follow up questions would be asked or the interview would be steered to another topic.

In general open ended questions were used, although at times more closed questions would be asked when the answers to open questions were short. With the answers of those closed questions it would be easier to pose follow up questions, giving the needed information.

2.3 Document review
Relevant literature and documents were reviewed in order to describe the Haitian context and to set the debate on UN missions and the humanitarian community, so the case of Haiti could be placed in that light. Articles, UN reports, press statements and relevant books were used in order to get a balanced view. In order to find the initial reports academic search engines were used. To optimise the used literature, the bibliography of each of the different sources was checked, in order to seek out the most well known sources and get a broader idea of places to look for different articles and books.

2.4 Limitation of data and methodology
As was described earlier, there is a gap in the data from the activities and opinions from NGOs and MINUSTAH staff in the region, due to hurricane Gustav. The number of local NGOs interviewed is also lower than the international NGOs and MINUSTAH staff, therefore not giving a balanced view. The difficulty in contacting some of the NGOs also resulted in the small number of interviews with NGOs who were doing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in cooperation with MINUSTAH; therefore the data on their opinion on the cooperation is largely missing. Although important, it was chosen to not include this information in the end, as using remarks made by other NGOs would not capture the views of the cooperation of those NGOs. The main questions could still be answered without using this information.

Some of the interviews were conducted in French, and because the researchers’ French was not fluent, this probably impacted the understanding of the nuances that were brought forward
during the interview. One interview was conducted in Creole, for which an interpreter came along. She was informed about the aim and goals of the research and as it worked quite well, it was unfortunate that she was unavailable for other interviews, as this could have increased the amount of local NGOs in the data, whom I excluded due to the lack of a common language.

Due to the fact that the research was conducted in the summer months, some members of staff were on their annual leave. Although most people were present for at least one week during July and August, some staff members from either MINUSTAH or international NGOs could not be included in the research.
3

Context of Haiti

When mentioning Haiti, most people cannot place the country exactly\(^2\), although a majority has heard about the hurricanes, the political upheaval, voodoo\(^3\) and perhaps the brutal period of colonisation. It is important to grasp the complex reality of Haiti to fully understand the country and the issues that are facing the international community trying to assist Haiti. This chapter will elaborate on the history of this fascinating country. It will continue to look at the social and economic context and some of the problems the country is struggling to face.

3.1 History
Haiti’s history is often misunderstood, even among international actors active in the country, such as the different UN missions, donors and international NGOs. This affects the effectiveness of their interventions and thereby the opinions of the local population. As these opinions will prove to be important in this research, this section will examine and attempt to clarify Haiti’s turbulent past, where some of the causes of Haiti’s current situation can be found.

In 1804 the whole world looked towards Haiti. Something rare had happened: for the first time a slave rebellion was successful and Haiti became independent from their colonising power. Haiti was France’s richest colony, due to its numerous sugar plantations. These required a lot of manpower, for which slaves were brought in from Africa. In order to control the new Haitian slave population, the colonising period was characterised by high levels of violence, as the French adhered to a strict authoritarian ruling structure. Unfortunately, after 1804, the four founding fathers of Haiti; Toussaint, Dessalines, Christophe and Pétion, kept the population and the sugar plantations under control using militaristic methods and thus keeping the much hated hierarchical structure, which the Haitians fought against during the French colonisation. A class structure was created, partly based on skin colour, which is still

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\(^2\) Most people mistake Haiti for Tahiti. Tahiti is an island in the Pacific, whereas Haiti is in the Caribbean.

\(^3\) Several interesting books have been written on voodoo, for example ‘Voodoo in Haiti’ by Alfred Metraux
very visible today. African slaves intermarried with the French colonists creating a new race, mulattoes, who are currently still high in the class structure. The methods of the founding fathers did not coincide with the dreams of the newly freed Haitians and the plantation system slowly collapsed and subsistence production became the norm.

Since the start of independence Haiti has seen many leaders, most of whom held on to the authoritarian tradition. In the 20th century this once again became very apparent with the election of Francois Duvalier in 1957, more popularly known as Papa Doc. This brutal dictatorship was characterised by a paramilitary organisation, the macoutes, who terrorised the population in order to keep Duvalier in power (Buss, 2004). When he died in 1971 he was succeeded by his son Jean Claude, known as Baby Doc. He continued with his fathers brutal policies, although some improvements were made and some economic development took place. This economic development had eased the way for a civil society to take form, and after massive protests Jean-Claude Duvalier was forced to flee the country in 1986.

The next few years were characterised by multiple military coups, and quick changing governments. During these years the priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide became increasingly popular among the poor Haitians. He was the head of the Lavalas movement, translated as the flood, and he was elected in 1991 by a landslide. His rejection of foreign intervention, the US influence, corruption, and the small and rich political elite were welcomed after years of hardship. Although he was supported by the majority of the Haitians, his proposed changes struck a wrong chord amongst the small political and military elite, and after 7 months he was overthrown in yet another military coup (Shamsie, 2006). He went in to exile in the United States, where he never ceased to lobby for funds for Haiti and trying to create opportunities for him to return (Girard, 2006). The next three years saw yet another period of dictatorship, and economic hardship intensified as the international community imposed several blockades in opposition of the military junta (Shamsie, 2006). Aristide was successful in his lobby, and in 1994 20.000 US troops took over Haiti, authorised by the UN Security Council, the first and only time they authorised the use of force to restore democracy in a member state, and Aristide was able to finish his term as president (Buss, 2008). Aristide knew that the US troops would have to stay in the country in order for him to restore his presidency and as a consequence he collaborated with those whom he used to call the enemy, the United States. His supporters were very disappointed by this betrayal of his former views, which they so
believed in. Aristide disbanded the Armed Forces of Haiti (FADH) in 1995, perhaps out of fear of being overthrown. He also turned to some of the authoritarian methods Haiti was so familiar with, creating a personal army by recruiting chimères, young gang members who intimidated opposition, and used force and torture to suppress the population.

After a period where René Préval, who was prime minister under Aristide, was president of the country, Aristide was re-elected in 2000, although the results of the election were denounced by numerous international organisations. In 2004 massive riots started yet again, as many people felt Aristide had betrayed the values he once preached. This led Aristide to flee the country, although he claimed later that he was kidnapped by the United States. As a result of the riots a US led Multinational Interim Force was established in February 2004, consisting of predominantly French and American troops, and a transition government was put in place. In June 2004 the international force was replaced by MINUSTAH, the first Latin-American lead peacekeeping mission. After several postponed elections, in February 2006 relatively peaceful elections were held and René Préval was elected, a position he currently still holds.

3.2 Socio economic issues
Countries in the Caribbean generally present people with the image of beautiful white beaches, lined with palm trees; gorgeous green mountains and countless opportunities for some amazing travels. Unfortunately Haiti is not among these Caribbean countries. With over 80% of the population living below the poverty line, it is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. It currently ranks 146 out of 177 countries on the HDI index (UNDP, 2007) and, like many other countries, is very much behind reaching the Millennium Development Goals. The economic blockade in the middle of the 90’s had crippling effects to the economy, something the country still has not recovered from. It is also the country with the highest HIV/AIDS rate in the Western Hemisphere. Due to the current effects of both the hurricanes and the world food crises it can be assumed that the amount of people living on

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4 Not a smart move, the future would show as the army leaders would overthrow Aristide years later (Hermann, 2007). The exFADH are still active throughout the country, heavily engaging in drug trafficking.
5 A lot of people doubted his independence and saw him as a puppet of Aristide, who was still very influential in the country (Pouligny, 2006: 50).
6 It combines three factors; life expectancy, education and GDP.
7 The MDGs have been formulated in 2005, and are supposed to be met in 2015.
less than two dollars a day has increased. Unfortunately Haiti's natural resources are very limited, so they have limited means to cope when natural disasters happen.

To further complicate the lives of the population, Haiti is frequently hit by hurricanes having disastrous consequences, only too recently demonstrated by hurricanes Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike, all in a time span of two weeks. (Alertnet, 2008).

The government does not have the capacity to deal with these natural disasters, which, some scientists expect, will only increase under the current circumstances of climate change. Due to the environmental degradation of the country, the effects of hurricanes are far worse than neighbouring countries such as Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Hills are being stripped bare of all trees for charcoal leaving the rainwater to wash away all fertile soil, which highly increases the damages of hurricanes in the form of floods and mudslides (Shamsie, 2006).

The current food crisis is something that all Haitians feel, to a greater extent than some other developing countries, due to the amounts of food that are being imported. Even basic produce such as rice and sweet potatoes are imported, further increasing the dependence of Haiti on others (Shamsie, 2006). To an increasing degree, people living in slums, now eat ‘mud cookies’, consisting of mud, butter and salt, as the main component of their diet.
A woman in a slum in Port au Prince preparing mud cookies

Haiti currently struggles with multiple social and economic crises, a lot of which stem from the corrupt governments, including the long dictatorships, which have ruled Haiti for several decades. It is considered a ‘fragile’ state, a term first given to Haiti in the early 1990’s (Shamsie, 2006). A fragile state can be seen as being plagued by a large degree of violence and a high degree of dysfunction. There is however not yet a complete breakdown of society, and there is hope for the country becoming stable and functioning again, as opposed to a failed state.

Another social issue is discrimination, something that has played a predominant role throughout the history of Haiti, and is still very present today. Racism is prevalent against groups of different colours in society, mulattoes, black or white. Mulattoes, who constitute about 10% of the population, look down on the majority blacks and hate the Haitians who are lighter than they are (Girard, 2006). There is also a high level of stigma against those living in slum areas and people living with HIV/AIDS. All of which enhance poverty affecting the majority of the population.

3.3 Security issues
The poverty facing Haiti is further exacerbated by the security situation of the country. Gang members still control large areas of slums in the capital, Port au Prince. A lot of their activities are financed through extensive drug trafficking, something that is proving very hard to tackle by national and international efforts. The law and order system is also highly dysfunctional, creating a system of impunity. The current UN mission, MINUSTAH, is mandated to intervene and stabilise the country due to the decreased security situation.
During 2005 a record number of kidnappings took place: in the period of 8 months 1,900 people were kidnapped in Port au Prince (Buss, 2008). These kidnappings are usually targeted towards rich Haitians, although sometimes even poor Haitians are targeted and released for a very small sum of money. Children and foreigners have also increasingly become victims. After intervention from both MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police (PNH), the kidnappings decreased for a time. At the moment, due to the rise in food prices kidnappings are on the increase again, as people are becoming desperate for money. The lack of public schools, and therefore expensive public school fees, also contribute to an increase in kidnappings at the start of the school year.

Despite these several security concerns, particularly in urban areas, Haiti is not a typical post-conflict situation (Lopez-Claros, 2007). Haiti does not have two warring parties trying to fight over either power or land and is therefore not a typical post-conflict country. The fact that there is a UN mission present is therefore a contentious issue, something that will be elaborated on in the next chapter.

3.4 International assistance and intervention

International intervention has always had a great influence on Haiti. Internal interests of the US and Canada, for example the fear of the arrival of large numbers of refugees, have influenced their foreign policies regarding Haiti. Trade blockades opposing the military junta in the beginning of the 90’s greatly influenced the economy. The US in particular had a major influence, with already having occupied the country twice in the 20th century, both cases in order to promote democratic governance (Buss, 2008). Their range of intervention is large, from military occupation, to trade blockades, to humanitarian assistance. The fear of boat refugees, the fear of the spread of communism in the 80s from Haiti’s neighbour Cuba, and more recently the drug problem have all contributed to the form of assistance they are providing (Girard, 2006). The country has been colonised by the Spanish, the French, has seen military intervention from the US, and 5 missions from the UN since 1995. The most recent UN intervention is in the form of the stabilisation mission MINUSTAH, which came to Haiti in June 2004.

Haiti also has a long history of international aid and the country relies heavily upon foreign
assistance, either bilaterally, multilaterally or from NGOs. There are also a large number of foreign church agencies present providing aid. Large sums of aid have been pumped into the country, not always having the planned or wished results. The political situation throughout the decades has influenced the amount of aid flowing into the country. ‘During the past three decades, foreign aid from all sources has been suspended, reduced, or redirected, then restored, only to be suspended again (Buss, 2008, p.18).

Keeping the above described context in mind, the thesis will continue to describe the main actors in the research, the peacekeeping mission and the NGOs. It is important to understand the context from which they are operating, before going into detail in the interaction between them. The next chapter will look at peacekeeping missions and the UN mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH.
4

UN peacekeeping missions

Although Haiti has seen both UN and US-led peacekeeping missions, this thesis focuses only on UN missions, as the mission currently in Haiti is operating under a UN mandate. This chapter starts by explaining peacekeeping missions, including the different types of missions and adjustments to missions that have been made throughout the years such as the integrated mission. Since a lot of terms in UN intervention are being used without clearly knowing the distinction, and since this thesis looks at UN intervention, it is important to briefly discuss these. The chapter will then continue to describe the presence of UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti, ending with the stabilisation mission MINUSTAH.

4.1 Peacekeeping and peace enforcement

Peacekeeping is not a new concept, but has been around for numerous decades. As such, many different definitions have been given to peacekeeping, usually using broad characteristics (Bellamy, 2004, p: 12). Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and different generation peacekeeping are most frequently used and will be described below. A limited number of peacekeeping missions were deployed during the Cold War, but it wasn’t until after this period that peacekeeping missions intervened in an increasing manner. During the Cold War intervention was predominantly focussed on monitoring the performance of a truce between two, often intra state parties (Weiss, 2007, p: 323). After the cold war numerous missions have been sent out for various other reasons than merely for monitoring a truce (Bellamy, 2004, p: 48), and as such peacekeeping missions can be seen as having gone through a number of generations.

The first generation is seen as classical or traditional peacekeeping, and emerged in the 1950’s (Weir, 2006). A first generation peacekeeping mission would be lightly armed, and would only be deployed in situations where the hostilities have ceased (Weiss, 2007, p: 324). Merely supervising a truce, and being present with consent of all parties in the country, this type of

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8 See for example Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, or Gordon, Aspects of Peacekeeping, who discuss the different terminology or definitions made throughout the years. Critiques of the different terminologies are given as well, but are not discussed in this thesis, as it is not essential to the understanding of its subject.
mission has been given the term peacekeeping. These missions operate under a Chapter VI UN mandate\(^9\) setting the rules and legislation for the ‘Pacific Settlement of disputes’ (UN charter). These types of missions are unarmed and are not supposed to use force\(^10\).

Second generation missions are more ambitious and include activities that used to be the sole domain of internal politics, such as election monitoring (Weiss, 2007, p: 325). Sometimes this type of peacekeeping is also called ‘wider’ peacekeeping, and can be referred to as Chapter ‘6 \(\frac{1}{2}\) peacekeeping’ (Bellamy, 2004, p: 129).

As the world political structure changed after the end of the Cold War, with more intra state conflicts than interstate conflicts\(^11\), the peacekeeping missions had to evolve. Slowly a shift took place from a traditional peacekeeping mission under a Chapter VI mandate, towards a more robust third generation multidimensional peacekeeping mission operating under a Chapter VII mandate of the UN charter; *Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression* (UN charter). The term peace enforcement is often associated with these types of missions, as they are authorised to act without the consent of all parties and are heavily armed national forces (Doyle, in Weiss, 2007, p: 325).

These missions usually have a greater interaction with humanitarian actors than first generation peacekeeping missions, because they are deployed in the middle of the conflict where NGOs can be trying to alleviate the suffering from the consequences of the conflict (Gordon, 2001). The mandate can include aspects such as capacity expansion and institutional transformation, and different aspects of peace making (Doyle, in Weiss, 2007, p: 327). These missions are often called complex operations, a term also linked to the context in which they operate: complex emergencies (Durch, 2003, p: 4). Missions that have this broader mandate are often described as peace support operations. These are multifunctional operations that involve military forces, diplomatic, and humanitarian actors (Bellamy, 2004, p: 165)\(^12\).

With the authorisation of Chapter VII peace enforcement missions by the Security Council it has become more difficult to deny protections to the innocent civilians who are caught up in

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\(^9\) Chapter VI and VII have been included in the Annexes.

\(^10\) A distinction in the different terminology can be found in a report written by old UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in 1994 looking at the role of the UN in peace and security, *An Agenda for Peace, 1994*

\(^11\) Intrastate conflicts are conflicts within a state. Interstate conflicts are conflicts between two states.

\(^12\) The Brahimi Report further elaborates on peace support operations. MINUSTAH can be seen as a peace support operation as well.
the conflict (Gordon, 2001). This realisation has contributed to the reconceptualisation of the concept of ‘Right to Intervene’ as rather ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), replacing the focus of the people exercising power, but on the victims of conflict (Evans, 2004). The concept was born out of the situation of Rwanda and the Balkans, with the basic idea that a state should protect its citizens from mass atrocities. ‘State sovereignty implies responsibility, not a license to kill’ (Evans, 2008). This basic idea had the consequence that when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, the responsibility becomes that of others --neighbouring countries or the international community, not excluding use of force in extreme cases (Thakur, in Weiss, p: 397). R2P means different things for different organisations. The role of international actors is therefore different within this concept. For international organisations such as the UN, R2P means 'the responsibility to warn, to generate effective prevention strategies, and when necessary to mobilise effective reaction' (ICG, 2008). For organisations such as NGOs and individuals, R2P means 'the responsibility to force the attention of policy-makers on what needs to be done, by whom and when' (ICG, 2008)\textsuperscript{13}. R2P therefore suggests interplay and an attempt to include all actors who are willing and able to prevent a situation such as Rwanda from happening again.

4.2 Integrated missions

A lot of criticism arose after several failures of UN missions, such as in Rwanda and Bosnia\textsuperscript{14}, and as a result a report was prepared in 2000 looking at the future of UN missions, conducted by Lakhdar Brahimi (Brahimi, 2000)\textsuperscript{15}. The report identified shortcomings in the UN’s ability to fulfil its goal to confront ‘the lingering forces of war and violence’, and made recommendations to change the institutional system (Durch, 2003, p.1).

One of the main suggestions made in the Brahimi report concerned the improved coordination in the field, and the creation of an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF). As a result the UN developed an integrated mission approach, to streamline the UN efforts and resources in a country where a peacekeeping mission was present (Paris, in Weiss, p: 420). This would

\textsuperscript{13} A lot of reports have been written on R2P, many written on behalf of the International Crisis Group, www.crisigroup.org

\textsuperscript{14} The UN waited a long time before intervening in the genocide of Rwanda, and when they arrived, they were not very successful. In Bosnia the UN soldiers were not supposed to intervene, even when thousands of Muslim Serbs were slaughtered (Evans, 2004).

\textsuperscript{15} He was also the special representative of the secretary general to UNMIH, one of the first UN missions in Haiti. Furthermore he helped prepare the \textit{No exit without Strategy} report, focusing on achieving sustainable peace.
ensure that all activities and objectives of UN forces and agencies, such as UNICEF and WFP, are working towards a common overarching goal (Weir, 2006, p: 5). UN DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) defines an integrated mission as

‘..one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level. This strategic objective is the result of a deliberate effort by all elements of the UN system to achieve a shared understanding of the mandates and functions of the various pillars of the UN presence at country level, and to use this understanding to maximise UN effectiveness, efficiency, and impact in all aspects of its work at country level’ (UN, 2006).

In an integrated mission all decision making authority goes through one person, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Usually he is followed by a Force Commander, and two Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). One of the DSRSG wears different hats, as he is the humanitarian coordinator, the senior representative of humanitarian activities in the mission, as well as the resident coordinator, the head of the UN country team (Weir, 2006, p: 13). In the field, integration takes place to different degrees, either on strategic, policy or organisational level. This can make a difference in the success of an integrated mission, as the implementation of the integration on merely one of the above levels will lead to a non coherent integration (Hanggi, 2008, p: 9). MINUSTAH, the current mission in Haiti, is an example of this last type of mission, an integrated mission. Its mandate has both Chapter VI and VII elements.

As this approach has been implemented in recent years, several criticisms of integrated missions have come forward. One centres around the increased blurring of development, political and military approaches, as UN humanitarian agencies are being put under political and military branches of the mission\(^{16}\) (Weir, 2006, p: 5). Another critique is that coordination, central in the concept of integrated missions, has become an end in itself, whereas coordination should be seen as a means to improve the effectiveness of intervention (Stobbaerts, 2007, p: 18).

\(^{16}\) The tension between the merging of military, humanitarian and political agendas will be discussed in chapter 6.
4.3 UN military intervention in Haiti

Whether or not to send a peacekeeping mission is decided in the arena of international politics, and in the case of UN missions in the UN Security Council, where the mandate is designed and discussed (Pouligny, 2006, p: 1). The Security Council got involved in Haiti in 1993, after the president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by a military coup. The domestic turmoil was considered a threat to international peace, so a Chapter VII mandate mission, UNMIH, was sent in to restore the democracy (Pugh, in Weiss, 2006, p:376). However, due to uncooperative Haitian military forces, they were unable to deploy completely and fulfil their mandate (UN, 2005).

At this time another mission was present as well, the international civilian mission in Haiti, MICIVIH, meant to assist the professionalization of the police in order to increase their ability and capacity to maintain order. Different missions followed, usually with an emphasis to strengthen the capacity of the police. In 1996 a United Nations Support mission (UNSMIH) was deployed to maintain the law and order and to train police. This was followed by a United Nations Transition Mission (UNTMIH) in 1997, a mission consisting of 300 people contributing to the police training. Finally the United Nations Civilian Police Mission (MIPONUH) arrived in Haiti in 1997, the staff of 500 stayed until 2000 to train specialized police units (Hanggi, 2008). Unfortunately the capacity of the HNP is still greatly lacking and they are currently not able to create a stable society.

4.4 MINUSTAH

In February of 2004, riots started in a city in the North, Gonaïves, and the armed groups slowly made their way down to Port au Prince, resulting in the fleeing of President Aristide. A Multi National Interim Force was deployed, consisting of US, French and Canadian troops, and a few months later the establishment of the UN stabilisation mission, MINUSTAH, was approved in the Security Council having specified its mandate in SC Resolution 1529 (2004).

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17 They took over from the US led Multi National Force (MNF), with Operation Uphold Democracy, who helped bring Aristide back in power (Bellamy, 2004, p: 162).

4.4.1 Decision making process
A UN mission needs the consent of the Security Council in order to be established and members of the UN need to be willing to contribute troops to the mission. In the case of Haiti, the United States, once again, played a large role. Being one of the permanent members of the Security Council, they have a large influence on its decision making process. It is believed that the US used a lot of persuasion to convince countries to contribute troops to MINUSTAH, as they themselves were not willing to do this, partly because their troops were already overstretched with the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Brazil is the main contributing country and some say that they might have volunteered for this in order to please the US, since they refused to send out troops to Afghanistan or Iraq, even though the US wanted them to. Brazil wants to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and therefore needs to keep the US on their good side (Loakimedes, 2004).

Countries contribute forces according to their own internal policies and interests. In the case of the US, it sees Haiti as a threat to the order in the region, and makes efforts to limit the refugees from Haiti going to Florida (Fishel, 2007: 92).  

4.4.2 Mandate
The first mandate only lasted for 6 months, but was renewed in November 2004. A few aspects were added:

‘...an additional formed police unit of 125 officers for an interim period, to be stationed in Port-au-Prince, to provide enhanced operational support to the Haitian National Police and to strengthen security arrangements in the capital; implementing, beyond the Missions’ first year, quick-impact projects of a humanitarian nature; augmenting MINUSTAH’s capacity to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) projects in the community, and strengthening MINUSTAH’s capacity to monitor and evaluate the legal and institutional framework for DDR, including small arms control and other security sector-related legislation; adding one engineering company to the Mission’s military component, with the task of repairing roads and

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19 For more information on the decision making process of other contributing countries, please see Fishel's Capacity for Peacekeeping: The case of Haiti.
bridges used by Mission personnel during implementation of their mandate; and strengthening modestly the humanitarian and development coordination pillars of MINUSTAH, in light of Haiti’s vulnerability to natural disasters’ (UN, 2005)

Due to the institutional rules of the UN, the mandate needs to be renewed every year, and every year slight alterations to the mandate can be made. Resolution 1608 included aspects of a chapter VII mission, and an increase in military forces. The mission is currently working with all the resolution from previous years, in addition to resolution 1780\(^20\). This mandate has been renewed on the 18\(^{th}\) of October 2008, but as the field research was conducted before, this thesis will use the mandate which was active in July and August 2008; resolution 1780.

Relevant aspects in the current mandate for this thesis include the implementation of the quick impact projects of a humanitarian nature, the different development related activities of the military such as building bridges, and the humanitarian and development coordination pillars. In the above activities, there is a more direct involvement with NGOs.

4.4.3 Structure
The structure of MINUSTAH is made up of three different pillars: humanitarian, military and police. Within the pillars there are different sections, such as gender, HIV/AIDS and human rights. They each respond to the DSRSG who is in charge of their pillar.

\(^{20}\) For the full mandate, please see Appendix I
There are currently 9,040 total uniformed personnel, including 7,105 troops and 1,935 police, supported by 474 international civilian personnel, 1,166 local civilian staff and 192 United Nations Volunteers. The SRSG is Hédi Annabi, DSRG are Luiz Carlos da Costa and Joel Boutroue. Joel Boutroue is also the humanitarian coordinator and resident representative for the UNDP. The force commander is Major General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz (UN, 2005b). After decades of change in UN peacekeeping missions, the current mission in Haiti is an integrated mission, so it functions as an umbrella organisation for all UN intervention in Haiti, including UN agencies such as UNICEF, WFP and UNDP, as can be seen in the above diagram.

4.5 Situation of MINUSTAH in Haiti
It is important to emphasize the special context of Haiti and therefore the character of the mission. Haiti has a history of peculiar missions, starting with UNMIL being the first mission.
to restore democracy in order to protect the international order in the region. Ordinarily UN peacekeeping missions, whether operating under a Chapter VI or VII mandate, get deployed in a post conflict or a conflict situation. Haiti cannot really be described as either.

One of the most important distinctions is the fact that Haiti is not a war zone. 'There is no conflict of the independence of regions... What you have here is purely criminal surroundings'. 'There is not an overt conflict' (INGO). As many of the respondents emphasized\(^1\), there is not a situation like in Darfur or in Somalia where there is constant fighting and a lack of a government. There is a government that has some control over the majority of the country. This is not to say that Haiti has a well functioning government, it was without a prime minister for a large majority of 2008, and is known as being one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2008).

Several interviewees also emphasized that the problem in Haiti is poverty and not war. One of the underlying causes of the violence in the country is poverty, although this is the case in a large majority of the conflicts throughout the world. 'The problem in Haiti is poverty, it is not war' (NGO). The manifestations of the violence are mostly kidnappings, targeted to predominantly rich Haitians, but also poorer Haitians or foreigners, drug trafficking and gang violence, all issues that would normally require police intervention, and not military action. Both the president of Haiti and the force commander of MINUSTAH have expressed this view.

This difference with other UN peacekeeping missions results in a change of activities or way of interacting. Some see it as creating more difficulties; others see it as making the situation simpler. The issue of armed protection, usually a major factor in the relationship between a UN peacekeeping mission and NGOs, is less of a problem in Haiti as NGOs can usually go to the communities without a military escort, particularly those NGOs that have been in the country for a long time and know the communities in which they are working. 'You should only have a military convoy if there is a war type conflict and that is not the case here' (INGO). Hence there is a less association with soldiers 'going out and attacking rebels, the association that makes it difficult for organisations to work in the terrain' (MINUSTAH staff). It was mentioned that the practical problems being associated with a UN mission do not apply to Haiti.

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\(^1\) This issue was mostly put forward by respondents from the NGO community.
Not everyone shares this opinion. The absence of an overt conflict leads to an increase of activities by the military for the community. As there is no war situation, and traditional military activities, particularly in the regions, are limited. Soldiers therefore spend a large majority of their time attempting to implement hearts and minds activities. This occasionally further complicates the issues of the invading of humanitarian space. 'I suppose in a place like Haiti, where purely security aspect is more policed than military, they [the military] get drawn into working in humanitarian and development, even more when it's just security and the military sector of their work is clearer' (INGO).

MINUSTAH is not the only actor in Haiti trying to assist the country. There is a large humanitarian community ruled by different principles. This community and their principles will be addressed in the following chapter.
5

The Humanitarian Community

With all the disasters, both natural and manmade, humanitarian action has made it its goal to ‘save lives, alleviate suffering and maintaining human dignity in the face of man-made crises and natural disasters’ (Crisp, in Weiss, 2007: 479). There are several actors who are active in this field, and they all work according to a set of specific principles. There are a lot of debates surrounding these principles and the term ‘humanitarian’, a debate which has increased since the 90’s when humanitarian aid was increasingly being given in highly politicised environments (Özerdem, 2005: 1). The following chapter will look a little closer at the tension within the military and humanitarian community surrounding the term ‘humanitarian’. This chapter will look at the aforementioned principles and differences within the humanitarian community; it will then continue to describe one aspect of the humanitarian community in Haiti, the international and local NGOs.

5.1 Humanitarian community

The most central and important term for this community is the humanitarian imperative. This stresses that humanitarian assistance is an international obligation (Özerdem, 2006: 1). It is elaborated by the fact that the humanitarian space necessary for delivering this aid is inviolable (Weir, 2006: 20). Unfortunately, as will be discussed in chapter 6, this space is often violated in practice. Humanitarian space can be described as a space where humanitarian actors can work and respect their principles of independence and impartiality, where security is guaranteed for humanitarian workers and beneficiaries and where unconditional access to potential beneficiaries is guaranteed (Piquard, 2008). When humanitarian space is compromised, humanitarian actors are limited in the work they can do, and they can actually become endangered. In order to maintain the humanitarian space the humanitarian community is ruled by different principles, which will be described below.

Humanitarianism does not have an objective definition, nor does the idea of a humanitarian actor. It is used in many different ways by a range of actors (Calhoun in Barnett, 2008: 73).

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22 The terms humanitarianism and humanitarian actors are not as clear cut as they are often used. For more information on this please see 'Humanitarianism in Question' by M. Barnett en T. Weiss (2008).
This thesis will look at the term humanitarian action as following the humanitarian imperative. Humanitarian actors are actors for whom humanitarian relief is an end or goal in itself, and not a means to another goal, such as winning hearts and minds, economic or political influence, or religious reasons.

5.1.1 Humanitarian principles

In addition to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster relief, a code that many NGOs have become signatories to, the humanitarian community is guided by four essential principles; humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Although these concepts might appear clear cut and reasonably simple to implement, the reality is rather different. A large amount of discussion and debate have surrounded these principles, particularly because there are differences in the way the concepts are defined and used within this community.

Many NGOs have become signatories to the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster relief’. This code guides the actions of NGOs active in the humanitarian field, as well as describing the context or working environment. The first principle, humanity, is based on international law and means to alleviate suffering, not attained by domination or by military superiority. This is a reasonably uncontroversial principle. The next few however are not.

Neutrality means that one does not support either side of the conflict. It means performing activities without political or other extraneous agenda (Minear, 2007). Remaining neutral is essential to facilitate impartial action devoid of discrimination (Flue, 1999). Although neutrality, as the ICRC interprets it, includes staying neutral in a conflict, most organisations would now agree that an organisation can speak out on the atrocities committed against victims in a conflict.

There are several issues with the concept of neutrality, one of which is stated above, the suggestion that an NGO cannot speak out when violations of international law take place. This is why some organisations prefer the term non-partisan action (Flue, 1999). Many

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23 This code has been derived from the rules the Red Cross follows, they actually have 7 principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality (www.icrc.org). The described four are the ones that are used and referred to most frequently, so these are discussed.
organisations also state that NGOs cannot be neutral, as through their presence in the field they are inevitably and actively involved in conflicts, Rwanda and Bosnia being just two examples (Bushra, in Pirotte, 1999). In both cases NGOs unwillingly became actors in the conflict and aid used and abused by warring parties. It therefore is interpreted differently by different NGOs. The NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was established because of a disagreement with how the ICRC enacted this principle. MSF felt that they would be an accomplice if they did not speak out. Providing advocacy and giving testimony on what is happening is essential in their work (Barnett, 2008: 36). It has been called an undesirable principle, as it is either unprincipled or unachievable because all aid is manipulated (Slim, in Gordon, 2001: 130).

Another issue with the term neutrality concerns the funding from NGOs, as most NGOs are dependent on funding from donor governments. This can also be seen as not being neutral, as governments are politically motivated. While some NGOs such as MSF have the luxury to refuse funding if they have to abide by certain preconditions in order to receive it, not all can.

A less debated principle is impartiality. This is described as assistance according to the severity or proportionality of need (Minear, 2007). It includes impartiality, as ‘Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind’ (Red Cross Code of Conduct, 1994)

However, different actors define impartiality in different ways. The British military, for example, refers to impartiality with respect to their mandate (JWP, 2004). The UN defines impartiality as 'adherence to the principles of the charter' (Brahimi, 2000), giving political connotations to the term. NGOs see impartiality as being impartial to whoever receives aid, as the humanitarian imperative of saving lives is the most important. Making a distinction between persons who are deemed eligible for receiving humanitarian assistance is unacceptable. Individuals should be helped according to their need, nothing else (Flue, 1999).

The final concept, independence, is often seen as the most important of all of the above principles, and the other principles help maintain the independence of an organisation (Weir, 2006) Independence is the obligation to resist interference with key principles (Minear, 2007). Organisations need to be seen as independently functioning, and not be associated with other parties, such as the military, for them to be able to deliver aid. Organisations go to great
lengths to safeguard their own identity (Weir, 2006: 23). Independence also indicates being independent to decide how to implement activities, in such a way that they are not being influenced by donor funding, an issue that also comes up in the discussion about neutrality.

Theoretically these concepts help define and safeguard humanitarian space, but in reality the concepts are less easy to implement. For example, how does an NGO stay neutral when their only donor is placing conditions on their funding? How do you deliver aid and remain independent in such an unstable environment that armed escorts are necessary to deliver the aid? Moral dilemmas such as these will occur when working in the field, either from the point of view of the staff member, for the programme team, the operational policy or the larger international economic order (Bushra, 1999). Depending on the situation several of the principles can be compromised, as Gordon states 'Neutrality and impartiality risk being compromised, but it would be ironic if those principles, invoked in the name of humanitarianism served to prevent humanitarian action altogether (2001, p.12)

5.2 Differences in the humanitarian community
It should be emphasised that within this so-called humanitarian community numerous differences exist. There are the obvious differences, NGOs with different focuses or expertise, such as children, water and sanitation, or food aid. But as was stated briefly above, there are also differences in the interpretations of the humanitarian principles. As Smillie (2004) stated 'The humanitarian enterprise is bewildering in its diversity, all embrace the principles but have different understandings (p.8)'. Another difference concerning humanitarian principles revolves around their willingness to abandon or compromise on those principles in order to perform their activities. NGOs such as MSF are highly principled and will very rarely compromise, and will even risk getting arrested, placed on house arrest, or getting expelled from the country. Others have a more pragmatic approach, compromising principles for the sake of being able to deliver aid.

The friendship or amicable feelings implied with the term community are also often not a reality. There are numerous NGOs active in different fields. They all require funding in order to implement their projects. There is therefore a lot of competition for this funding, sometimes resulting in an unwillingness to cooperate or share information.

24 As was done in Ethiopia for example in 2008
5.3 Humanitarian community in Haiti

Bilateral donors, UN agencies, international and local NGOs are all implementing different projects in both the development and humanitarian sphere in Haiti. Although the first two mentioned actors are important in the delivered assistance in Haiti as they also have large projects and funding possibilities, this thesis will focus on the international and local NGO community.

Due to the political upheaval in the country throughout the decades the NGO community has struggled. The local civil society, including the NGOs, did not get a chance to develop until the presence of Baby Doc and some of his policies. Within the poor community several NGOs were formed, often initially supporting Aristide (Shamsie, 2006: 101). When he began to lose some of his prestige, a lot of NGOs divided themselves in either being pro or anti Aristide, something that is still apparent today. It implies that the local NGO community is relatively politicised.

Numerous international NGOs have intervened in Haiti throughout the years, but with the often insecure circumstances of their work, even losing staff in aid operations, several organisations have curtailed operations at certain time in Haiti’s history (Buss, 2008: 164). As the security situation has calmed down, most NGOs previously active in Haiti have currently returned. The question remains how long the security and political situation will remain stable enough for them to stay.

The next chapter will look into some of the discussions surrounding the interaction between the peacekeeping missions and the humanitarian NGO community. The thesis will then continue with examining the different aspects of the relationship between MINUSTAH and NGOs in Haiti, by looking at the activities they are doing together, the reasons for cooperation and finally it will look closer at other reasons that define the nature of the relationship.

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25 Most of these actors are involved in both humanitarian and development activities. Although often used interchangeably, there is a difference as humanitarian activities are technically in response to a crisis and therefore not long term. Development activities however are aiming towards long-term goals. There is a continuum in between them, and it is always a challenge to decide when the humanitarian activities can or should stop and intervention should be focused on development. For more information on the difference see Development and Humanitarianism by Deborah Eade (2007).

26 Authors give different distinctions for the actors in the humanitarian community, in general most tend to agree though that there is the distinction between UN, local and international NGOs, the ICRC and aid from foreign governments. See Smillie’s Charity of Nations or Weir (2006) for more information.
6

Activities

The context of a humanitarian crisis makes it inevitable that the actors in the previous chapters meet and interact in some way. Haiti is no different than others in this case, both MINUSTAH and the local and international NGO community cross paths during their interactions. This chapter will begin by setting out the debate on the interaction between the military and humanitarian actors since their interaction is not one without dilemmas and problems. It will then continue to elaborate on the different ways the above actors interact or meet each other in the field in Haiti. Coordination meetings, different punctual activities, and activities during disasters will be elaborated on. Aside from the description of these interactions, the paragraphs will also discuss the effectiveness of these different activities and problems that occur, as was put forward by the different interviewees.27

6.1 Military and NGO cooperation
There are different approaches to the cooperation between aid agencies and the military. Although MINUSTAH is not merely a military mission, but has a large non military component, it is important to briefly touch upon some of the issues written in the literature about their reasons for interacting and the problems that are associated with this interaction. There are different approaches to the cooperation; some see it as inevitable and desirable. Others believe that the merging of political, military and humanitarian objectives, as is being done in integrated missions such as MINUSTAH, endangers the upholding of the humanitarian principles and safeguarding of humanitarian space. And finally others take a more pragmatic approach, and go on a case by case basis (Barry, 2002: 1).

The fear of the military invading humanitarian space is a recurring theme in the literature on the military and humanitarians, particularly after 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq, when the

27 The activities focus on Port au Prince, as can be read in Chapter 2. Due to hurricane Gustav, the possibility to go to the region to examine the differences between the capital and the region could not be followed through. Many people however mentioned the difference, as the mission works through a decentralised structure, the situation is also less complicated in the regions as there are less people so there is a more personal linkage between the different actors.
military became increasingly involved in so-called humanitarian activities. Instances such as the US military dropping food packages in similar packaging as bombs outraged the humanitarian community. Even though it is often thought of as such, ‘humanitarian space is not an abstract notion. It is related to concrete assistance and protections efforts. Assistance and protection cannot be provided without a certain amount of humanitarian space, but that space needs to be sustained through the responsible provision of assistance and protection’ (Brabant, in Gordon, 2001: 143). Political involvement in aid raises the possibility that the offered relief gets intertwined with political and military objectives, thereby impacting how needs of the beneficiaries are assessed. Linking the political and military objectives to aid agencies endangers the neutrality of these agencies.

The increase of attacks on aid workers is something that is often brought forward in this discussion. The fact that the military are involved in humanitarian work endangers the aid workers when they are associated with a military force, and therefore not independent or neutral (Hammond, in Barnett, 2008: 174). Using the term ‘humanitarian’ for their actions frustrates the more traditional aid workers, since the military gives aid with a political goal and therefore not necessarily on the basis of the greatest need.

The inherent organisational differences between military forces and NGOs also pose different problems. The flexibility of NGOs is a contradiction to the strict hierarchical structure of the military (Duffield, 2001). Each organisational structure has its advantages and disadvantages, but the differences, particularly in decision-making processes, lead to a lot of frustrations when interaction occurs.

Unfortunately there is no real solution for these problems. Different actors find different answers or acceptable solutions. UN has written ‘Draft guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support the United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies’, also known as the Oslo guidelines (OCHA, 2006). Organisations such as Oxfam have also drafted their own guidelines. These guidelines do help structure the interaction, but the above problems and dilemmas still occur in the field.

The next section will start looking at how the peacekeeping mission in Haiti interacts with the NGO community in Haiti. Coordination meetings are essential in this cooperation.
6.2 Coordination meetings

For a lot of NGOs, coordination meetings are the only occasion when they come into direct contact with MINUSTAH, and it is therefore important to look at this closely and examine the different coordination mechanisms in Haiti and the problems that arise. Coordination in the humanitarian context is seen as essential in order to avoid duplication and overlap. According to Reindorp (2001) coordination is:

‘The systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include strategic planning, gathering data and managing information, mobilising resources and ensuring accountability orchestrating a functional division of labour, negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities and providing leadership’ (p. 5).

Unfortunately, even though everyone seems to agree on the importance of coordination, it is surprisingly difficult in practice.

Haiti is a country with a very weak government, therefore increasing the challenge of coordination. Actors in the humanitarian field often substitute for the government roles (Reindorp, 2001:6). Several interviewees mentioned this issue; that the role of coordination of aid should be left in the hands of the government. Unfortunately the government does not have the capacity to take this on. Even though international actors and the local population realise that the government is not able to coordinate the efforts, criticisms have been made that in its attempts to coordinate and create mechanisms, MINUSTAH is substituting for the government, and more effort should be made to help the government and the Haitian civil society create their own mechanisms. Efforts are being made by MINUSTAH to assist the government in increasing their coordinating capacity, but other actors do not see a lot of changes or improvements with the government taking a lead.

As a consequence several efforts have been made by other actors to coordinate the different efforts. The office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (OCHA)\(^\text{28}\) is a very important actor in the field of humanitarian coordination, gathering different information on the majority

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\(^{28}\) OCHA is one of the UN agencies, who replaced the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in 1997 (Reindorp, 2001).
of humanitarian actors working in a country. In Haiti they chair the *Forum Humanitaire*, a bi-weekly meeting where international NGOs and different people from the integrated mission meet to share information about activities and events. In addition to this meeting, there are meetings focussing on different themes or on different geographical areas. In *Martissant*, one of the slum areas in Port au Prince, a group meets to share information on activities and security information. The child protection unit takes part in a coordination meeting with organisations working with children in conflict with the law and with child trafficking. Another example is the *table participation departmental*. Also referred to as the round tables, they are intended to bring together all the different actors in a certain area or field and information is shared. The appropriate ministries and Haitian government agencies also tend to take part in these meetings. These round table meetings should take place on a monthly basis, although the majority of them are held bi-monthly or every three months. The majority of the interviewees taking part in these meetings mentioned they were relatively satisfied, but there were remarks concerning the quality of information that was being shared and that a lot of information was being retained.

Within the mission the Civil Affairs (CA) Unit is mostly responsible for the coordination role, particularly in the regions, where this is the majority of their task. Not all of the MINUSTAH units are able to be present in the regions, so the CA officer will have that as part of the job package, which often includes coordinating efforts with NGOs in fields such as gender or community violence reduction.

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29 Within the mission, and the NGO community several coordination meetings also take place. The network Clio is one of the larger NGO networks that connects different NGOs, both local and international. There are also meetings with the bilateral donors.
Coordination is always a delicate endeavour and several problems arise in Haiti. One problem limiting the effectiveness of coordination is that not all NGOs or actors within MINUSTAH participate in these meetings. Some NGOs, particularly local NGOs, mentioned not even being aware of the different meetings that are being held. There are also local and international NGOs who choose not to go to the meetings because they do not want to have anything to do with the mission.\(^{30}\) The fear of losing independence, one of the humanitarian principles, and endangering their interventions by associating with MINUSTAH is very apparent here. The fact that a lot of the international NGOs and UN agencies have been in Haiti since before the mission arrived, also contributes to their reluctance of participating in these meetings. Their own knowledge of the local situation is often larger and they have already developed their own way of doing things.

It also appears that, particularly with the UN coordination meetings, it is predominantly the international NGOs who participate. Local NGOs are usually not present or aware of these meetings. This is a critique that occasionally was voiced during interviews, that there is a low involvement of the Haitian civil society. It is a serious issue, as involvement of local civil society is essential for helping develop the country in a sustainable way. The lack of civil society involvement by international missions is not new to MINUSTAH, it has happened during previous missions in Haiti as well. Unfortunately the lack of civil society involvement is something that frequently happens in UN peacekeeping missions (Pouligny, 2006). Not involving civil society also affects the opinion the local communities hold of MINUSTAH, which will be further explained in Chapter 8.

The effectiveness of the coordination always greatly depends on personalities (Reindorp, 2001: 16), something brought forward frequently by respondents. *With coordination you often first have to coordinate personalities, and only after that, activities*. And as was said by another respondent *Personalities can still get in the way*. Meetings are lead by people and their ability to bring people on board and align interests is essential. The change of the deputy DSRSG, who is also the humanitarian coordinator, improved the relationship between the international NGOs in particular, as he was thought to understand the principles guiding

\(^{30}\) The opinion of MINUSTAH and the reasons and consequences for this will be elaborated on further in Chapter 8.
NGOs better. Unfortunately there is a high turnover of staff within both the UN mission and within NGOs, therefore further complicating already challenging coordination efforts.\(^{31}\)

In Haiti coordination is seen as important in order to avoid duplication. Efforts have been made to include different actors and improvements have occurred in the sharing of information and experiences, but there are still problems that seem difficult to overcome. A lot of respondents, both NGOs and MINUSTAH, seem to emphasise the differences in their mandates. Although it is true that MINUSTAH does not have a purely developmental or humanitarian mandate, there are aspects in it. ‘... ‘mandate’ issues are often overemphasized by humanitarian actors. This usually smacks of overt organisational self-interest, with little regard for the interests of the intended beneficiaries’. (Gordon, 2001: 144). True listening, which is essential for effective coordination, seems to be an issue in Haiti as well.\(^{32}\)

6.2 Punctual activities
A majority of coordination doesn’t take place in a structured system, but occur more infrequently or punctual such as the occasional coordination meetings. There are different categories in this regard; there are the activities conducted by the different units, and activities surrounding security and logistic issues.

6.2.1 Different units
As was described in Chapter 3, MINUSTAH has a civilian pillar containing different units, such as child protection, gender and HIV/AIDS. Depending on the mandate of each of the sections, different activities are being done in cooperation with NGOs.\(^{33}\)

According to their mandate and budget, each section has a different relationship with NGOs. One of the sections that engages most frequently with NGOs is the Community Violence Reduction Section (CVR).\(^{34}\) Their unit has a larger budget than some of the other units in the mission.\(^{35}\)

\(^{31}\) Within the mission there seems to be an issue with coordination as well, among the UN agencies and other sections. This will be elaborated on in Chapter 8, talking about the mutual opinions.

\(^{32}\) For more information on coordination, and how to analyse the effectiveness of coordination, please see van Brabants chapter in Gordons Aspects of Peacekeeping.

\(^{33}\) There are other units in the mission, since they did not have contact with NGOs, they will not be mentioned here.

\(^{34}\) The CVR unit used to be the Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) unit, due to unsuccessful results they have changed the approach of this unit, partly due to the lack of adaptation of African DDR programs to the context of Haiti. The change was contested by different NGOs. There is a large problem
civilian pillar and therefore have more freedom to decide on the implementation of projects. Their activities are usually implemented through local NGOs in the field. The CVR unit provides the funding, does the monitoring and provides the NGOs with support during the implementation. The design of the project is in the hands of MINUSTAH, but they consult with the community. Activities include the organisation of events such as the International Day of the Peace, where messages and communication material on peace and non-violence were distributed, free medical consultation was given and football matches were organised.

Another section of the mission working with NGOs is the Child Protection Unit. The office of this unit is located in the UNICEF office, and is therefore the only unit that is not located at the MINUSTAH headquarters or the UNDP compound beside the headquarters, suggesting a greater distance with other sections of the mission. As an integrated mission, it makes sense to have these two groups working together closely. The unit has different projects focusing on children's rights, reporting on child violations such as kidnappings, and the rehabilitation of children affected by violence. Some of these activities, such as the gathering of information on the situation of children in Haiti, are conducted in cooperation with, predominantly local, NGOs. One example is the NGO COVAVIVA, active in Martissant in the area of sexual abuse. They also work together with a local NGO working in a prison, and they give schooling, vocational training and psychological assistance to girls in prison. The unit feels that they have a good relationship with NGOs, they put efforts in building trust with the community in order to be able to work with them as they realise that the relationship between peacekeepers and NGOs is tenacious.

The mandate of the HIV/AIDS unit and the gender unit focus predominantly on activities within the mission on raising awareness on HIV/AIDS or gender, but they also occasionally work with NGOs. Both units provide training in their area of expertise for different NGOs. For some training the human capacity will be provided by the NGO, and the logistical support; such as the room and the production of materials will be provided by MINUSTAH. The rooms and equipment will often be in one of the multi media centres provided by MINUSTAH. These centres have computers and a conference room that can be used by different actors in the region. Even though both units have a limited or no budget, they still receive a lot of requests from local NGOs.

with arms and weapons in Haiti, and to create a more stable society with less violence, disarmament and demobilization is essential.
In Haiti there are a number of NGOs that concentrate on human rights, and the Human Rights section of MINUSTAH works together with some of these. The units’ work focuses predominantly on strengthening the capacity of these, often smaller, NGOs. As is the issue with many of the sections, they have very limited budget to support NGOs in an extensive way. In most cases the unit merely finances different activities, for example they support NGOs who are holding discussions on human rights with school children. The unit provided them with materials and promoting the visibility of these NGOs by paying compensation for journalists to go out and visit the schools.

Another unit is the correction unit, who works in prisons and predominantly works to strengthen the institutions who are involved in one way or another with the correctional facilities in Haiti. With their limited budget they cooperate with a few NGOs, usually to improve the water and sanitation in prisons, or to provide medical treatment for prisoners.

Civil Affairs is one of the largest units within the civilian pillar of MINUSTAH and therefore has representatives present in all ten departments of Haiti. In the event that another unit is not represented, as in the child protection unit, the civil affairs officer will take over their role as well. Therefore they have a large interaction with NGOs in the field, and this is predominantly focused on coordination of efforts. They are also in charge of the Quick Impact Projects, which will be elaborated on below.

Besides these activities occasional cooperation takes place, usually during special events such as the world Aids day, it might be that different NGOs are requested to participate. One example is a vaccination campaign, conducted in coordination with UNICEF. MINUSTAH provided the logistical support in transporting the vaccines to all the regions. NGOs would help with the organisation of the population and the giving of the vaccinations in the regions in which they were active. This was a successful campaign, and was mentioned frequently within the mission as an example of successful cooperation.

At times the different sections cooperate with each other when designing activities, the impression was made however that this cooperation is not very regular and there seems to be a lack of knowledge within the mission on the activities that are being done and with which NGOs. Although they all knew other people within different units who would be interesting
to talk to, this often seemed to be the extent of their knowledge. The areas in which some of the units work do overlap, however, and their activities could be more effective if the coordination within the mission was more comprehensive.

A lot of the sections see themselves as being part of MINUSTAH, but being different as well as they are more NGO oriented and more in contact with the local population. They therefore believe that the local population has fewer issues working with them, being the gender unit, or the child protection unit. This lack of identification with their role within the mission as a whole, even though as an integrated mission it is supposed to be, seems an underlying issue and an aspect that complicates interaction as it fuzzes the identity of both MINUSTAH and the role of the units in it.

6.2.2 Logistics
MINUSTAH has a large logistic capacity, as the majority of the mission’s budget focuses on the military apparatus. As a result some NGOs call on the mission for logistic support. This is also not without problems however. Most local and international NGOs do not want to be seen with MINUSTAH, as their beneficiaries -the population- sees them as an occupational force. NGOs also want to keep their independence and neutrality, two of the principles necessary to safeguard humanitarian space. In order to avoid this direct contact, a lot of NGOs go through OCHA when they need equipment that the mission might be able to provide. OCHA then functions as an intermediary, and liaises between the NGOs and MINUSTAH organising the arrangement so that direct contact with the mission can be avoided. In most cases when logistic support is requested it is given by MINUSTAH: ‘we never say no’ (MINUSTAH staff)\(^{35}\).

6.2.3 QIP
Quick Impact Projects are ‘small scale, rapidly implementable projects, of benefit to the population. These projects are used by UN peacekeeping operations to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation’ (DPKO QIPs Policy Directive). The latest mandate of MINUSTAH (1780) specifically mentions that QIPs ‘\textit{the need for the}

\(^{35}\) Although most NGOs would agree with this, one NGO contested it as she requested perfusion for babies from the hospital run by MINUSTAH; they did not however want to comply.
quick implementation of highly effective and visible labour intensive projects that help create jobs and deliver basic social services’. In MINUSTAH they focus on different areas of intervention; livelihood/employment generation, public infrastructure, training/capacity building, and social mobilisation (MINUSTAH, 2008). The projects have a maximum budget of $25,000 and have to be implemented within six months. The total budget for QIPs is two million dollars a year.

Different actors can apply for the funds available for QIPs; sections within the mission, the military, the government and actors within the community. After evaluating the projects last year, the Civil Affairs Unit, which is in charge of the QIPs, realised that the projects implemented by the government did not have the desired results, so in the coming fiscal year there will be less partnership with the government and an increase in partnering with NGOs. Although the need to see results is understandable, the fact that they are not working with the government in this area partly de-legitimises the mission, as it is part of their mandate to support the national institutions. It goes against the concept of empowering the government.

The CIMIC (civil military coordination) unit coordinates the requests for QIPs coming from the military battalions. Battalions are usually only in Haiti for six months, however, which complicates their implementation of QIPs.

The NGOs applying for these funds are predominantly local. NGOs that are granted the funding usually already work with MINUSTAH in one way or another, for example in a coordination meeting. They tend to know how to write a proposal that will receive approval. A lot of NGOs however either do not know about the existence of QIPs or they disagree with the motive behind the QIPs, which is seen by some as being predominantly political and a way to legitimise the mission's presence. Furthermore, NGOs want to focus on longer term projects, not just ones that create impact in the short term; 'a quick impact project is not what the country needs'.

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36. The majority of the QIPs happen in the regions and not in Port au Prince, unfortunately there wasn't enough time during the research period to go to the regions.
37. The implications of not working with the Haitian government will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 8.
38. The NGOs I met with have never participated in a Quick Impact Project, and it is therefore difficult to judge the relationship during the implementation of such projects.
6.2.4 Security

Often where there is a peacekeeping mission, interaction happens in this tricky area of security. There are several ‘red zones’ in Port au Prince, with high levels of violence and gang activity.\(^{39}\) UN agencies are obliged to have a military escort present when they are going into these red zones. NGOs can request a security escort as well, although they often choose not to as this will associate them with the UN mission, thereby jeopardising their independence or neutrality. Since the situation of MINUSTAH in Haiti is quite unique, the need for security escorts is not as high as in other countries where a UN mission is deployed.

International NGOs will often have their own security officer; in one case a number of international NGOs all contribute funds for a shared security officer. Information on security issues is shared between the UN mission and the NGOs.

6.2.5 Activities from separate military battalions

In Haiti several countries contribute military personnel, who do not only engage in military activities, but also perform activities called ‘hearts and minds’. These activities are part of military doctrine aimed towards gaining the confidence of the local population to increase the effectiveness of their military operations.\(^{40}\) Every battalion has their own budget and with this budget they can choose what activities they want to implement. This can range from cleaning up a field for the local youth to play football, building a school, or digging water wells. This is usually done in cooperation with the local organisations present in the area.

There is a lot of criticism relating to the hearts and minds activities; including the lack of civil society participation, calling some of the activities humanitarian, or the impact of the activities.\(^{41}\) Even within the mission there is disagreement. One example given was a battalion said that they were giving out food aid, but this consisted of giving out sweets, something that cannot be considered food aid. Critique has been given that the military should consult more

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\(^{39}\) These zones are usually the large slum areas throughout Port au Prince; Cité Soleil is one of the famous ones, although it is reasonably stable at the moment. Martissant, Bel Air and Cité Militaire were other red zones during the time the field research was conducted. For an idea of the situation in Cité Soleil, watch the movie ‘Ghosts of Cité Soleil’.

\(^{40}\) Hearts and Minds activities are not the same as QIPs, although both activities can be implemented by the military. QIPs are however financed by the funds from the mission, and hearts and minds activities from the individual battalions.

\(^{41}\) The importance of the lack of civil society participation will be elaborated on in chapter 8.
with UN agencies when trying to decide which activities to implement in order to avoid activities such as the one described above.

Although the humanitarian community in Haiti shares the critique about the effectiveness, it is predominantly concerned with the use of the word humanitarian. If hearts and minds activities are labelled ‘humanitarian’, and these activities include giving sweets, it tarnishes the work the humanitarian community does according to the humanitarian principles.

6.3 Disasters
Another occasion where interaction takes place is when a natural disaster happens. Natural disasters happen frequently in Haiti and present different possibilities for interaction due to the need to act quickly. As was said by one respondent 'unless there is a huge major emergency, I really don't see why we would work together or coordinate our efforts' (INGO). Most NGO respondents tended to agree that having MINUSTAH present in these circumstances was beneficial. Having a direct cooperation with the mission is usually seen as an absolute last resort due to the need to stay independent and dealing with the consequences of a hurricane qualifies as such an emergency.

Haiti is hit yearly by tropical storms and hurricanes during the hurricane season, which starts half August and lasts approximately until the beginning of November. The impact of these storms in Haiti is huge. During the tropical storm Hanna in 2008, most of the infrastructure was destroyed, leaving several cities in the North of the country unreachable by road for the delivery of aid42 (Reliefweb, 2008)

MINUSTAH has a very large capacity, particularly in the area of logistics. They are present throughout the country, and battalions have helicopters and other transport possibilities to help with the first response. These are usually concentrated around a base area, and therefore easily deployed. The hierarchical military structure is also beneficial for having a quick first response in case of an emergency. The different battalions also use their own resources to facilitate the response and create shelters, and provide food.

42 For more information on the impact of the storms in August and September, please see the reports on alertweb.org or reliefweb.int
Whether the mission or OCHA coordinates the intervention during an emergency was debated for a time. It is now clear however that OCHA coordinates the response, something appreciated by the NGO community. There are also different meetings surrounding contingency planning that are chaired by the UN agency.
7

Reasons for interaction

There are several reasons why cooperation takes place in the different forms as described above. These reasons can be explained on two different levels, the first being reasons for cooperation or the benefits of a certain type of relationship, and the second being the opinions and perceptions that are underlying to help shape and form the more subjective interactions. Chapter 8 will look at the latter level, whereas this chapter will look into the first level; the different reasons for cooperating. The first section will look at why MINUSTAH chooses to work with NGOs; the second section will look at why NGOs choose to interact with MINUSTAH.

7.1 MINUSTAHs reasons for interaction

From the perspective of the mission there are a number of reasons for cooperating or building a good relationship with the NGO community. This section will discuss the gaining of confidence of the local population, issues of visibility, implementation of activities, and the prevention of overlap.

As is the case for all military operations, it is important that the local community in which operations are being carried out is not hostile to the armed forces. In Haiti this seems even more important as there already was a hostility or general distrust towards the military, resulting from their long history of military coups, which eventually even lead to the disabling of their army. MINUSTAH and their military in particular, therefore need to ensure that they gain confidence of the local population. In order to accomplish this they work together with local NGOs on activities ranging from QIPs and hearts and minds to disaster relief efforts and activities carried out by the different units. These activities are aimed to improve the living circumstances of the local communities, therefore gaining good will.

The concept of visibility is greatly associated with the above reasoning. In order for the local population to accept the military mission, their non-military activities or the funding they give to benefit the community need to be visible. By working with NGOs the mission is spreading the word that they are not merely 'the bad guys' carrying out military operations, but that they
are there to help improve the lives of Haitians. To increase this visibility the mission often provides the NGOs with funding on the condition that the MINUSTAH logo is shown upon finalising the project.

Another reason for the mission to cooperate with NGOs relates to its mandate. As was described before, MINUSTAH is not merely a military mission. Of the three pillars of the mission only one is military, there are two other pillars that interact with the population: the humanitarian pillar and one under which the police and justice units fall. However, the majority of the staff in the mission is in the military, and only a relatively small section deals with the civilian aspects of the mandate. They therefore do not have the manpower or the human resources to implement their own activities. The different units would be very limited in their effectiveness if they had to carry out all of their work without external partners. Hence there is the need to engage with NGOs.

The cooperation with INGOs is less focused on visibility, winning the local population or on the need within the mission to fulfil its mandate. Coordination of efforts and international intervention is the central focus on the interaction with INGOs. As was written in the previous chapter, the realisation of the importance of coordination in order to increase the effectiveness of international intervention is well spread\(^43\). The willingness to decrease the overlap or duplication of activities is very present in the mission. Coordination meetings with the NGO community are therefore a logical result. It seems that a more direct cooperation with INGOs, in for example implementation of activities, is limited because the need to work with the international NGOs has fewer benefits. It was also suggested that it was easier to work with local NGOs as they did not voice their criticisms of the mission while working together with them.

### 7.2 NGOs reasons for interaction

There are also several reasons for NGOs to interact with the mission, or to create a more direct relationship. The following section will discuss issues of visibility and funding, the efforts to reduce duplication, the need to discuss the invasion of humanitarian space by MINUSTAH, and the security and logistical support the mission can give.

\(^{43}\) In the development and humanitarian field several countries committed to aligning their aid in order to increase coordination and prevent overlap. This so-called Paris Declaration was signed in 2005 and included several international donors and NGOs (OECD, 2005).
For Haitian NGOs the issue of visibility and funding can be very important. Local NGOs often struggle getting funding in order to implement their own activities. Particularly for smaller NGOs, MINUSTAH provides them with funding opportunities. Often they cannot afford to be too particular in who they receive funding from. Since Haiti has seen a long succession of missions a section of the population has learned how to work the system to get money. As a consequence there are a number of organisations or individuals who call themselves NGOs, but in reality have only been established in order to receive money from the UN mission. This will be elaborated on further in the next chapter. Increasing visibility is another effective way to receive more funding from other donors or sections within the mission. Once an NGO has managed to successfully apply for funding within the mission, they can add this activity to their CV, increasing their credibility.

Although some international NGOs have worked with MINUSTAH and INGOs at times also struggle with receiving funding, they tend to have a wider range of funding opportunities. Hence they can afford to be more critical in choosing who they receive funding from. Therefore the main reason for their cooperation with the mission tends to be centred on coordination issues. It is in the NGOs interest as well to get an indication of what activities are being done by different actors in the field in order to prevent overlap.

There is an added rationality for wanting to interact with MINUSTAH. In some of their activities they are considered to be invading the humanitarian space, or the space in which humanitarian actors can intervene according to the humanitarian principles. Several discussions have taken place between the mission and NGOs to address the importance of this space and to discover ways to safeguard it. Certain issues have been resolved, but unfortunately this continues to be an issue for NGOs, a fact not always understood by all staff within the mission. It will therefore continue to be a reason for meeting with the mission.

There are two other reasons driving NGOs to work together with MINUSTAH. One focuses on the security situation in Haiti. Although Haiti is not a typical country where a peacekeeping mission is present, as was discussed earlier, there are issues surrounding security and protection. A military escort can be requested in order to protect staff that is trying to reach beneficiaries in red zones. There is a great reluctance however by most NGOs in requesting this, because of issues of independence, as stated before.
Another important reason for interacting with the mission is their logistic capacity. MINUSTAH has a large general budget with a large military component. This results in them having a large logistic apparatus. When transport is needed for materials, occasionally MINUSTAH will be contacted to provide this. During disasters a similar situation will occur, the logistical capacity will be looked upon in order to help the NGOs deliver their assistance. This is still done with a certain hesitation however, and the request will often go through OCHA rather than direct to MINUSTAH.

Only a small number of NGOs work directly with MINUSTAH based on their need of assistance or funding and their own capacity present. There is a great reluctance to cooperate with them as NGOs fear jeopardising the humanitarian principles so important in their work. A lot of NGOs would say 'we don't need MINUSTAH and they don't need us'. As shown above, there are several reasons for the interaction between MINUSTAH and NGOs. The most important impact influencing the relationship between these two actors is however the mutual opinion and perception they have of one another. The specific nature of MINUSTAH and their actions also influences the opinion of the local population and NGOs. The next chapter will look at these different aspects more closely.
8

Opinions and their Effect

As was described in the previous chapters, different activities are done in cooperation, shaping the relationship between MINUSTAH and the NGO community. There are also several rational decisions for embarking on a relationship with each other, either direct or indirect, as was described in chapter 7. One important aspect has not been covered, however, and this revolves around the opinion and perceptions both actors have about the other. The following chapter will analyse these opinions and look at how this influences the nature of the relationship.

8.1 Opinion of MINUSTAH

Carnival is a big event in Haiti and usually lasts for several days. It is a time for dancing and partying, and also an opportunity for the population to speak their mind and bring forward sentiments. For the past few years carnival songs have been written with MINUSTAH as a central theme. Songs with comments and insinuations such as them stealing goats of the local population, or merely saying that they should leave as they are not doing anything, have been extremely popular.

Whether it is negative or positive, everyone in Haiti seems to have a clear opinion of MINUSTAH, the latter unfortunately being the dominant opinion. This section will look at the expectations of the mission, the perceived impact of their activities, incidents that have brought the mission into a negative light and the lack of knowledge among the population on the activities of MINUSTAH, possibly resulting from poor communication. The latter being an issue many missions often struggle with, as they tend instead to focus on informing only international media (Pouligny, 2006: 147).44

44 For more information on the opinions of the population of previous missions, please see the book Peace Operations seen from below by Beatrice Pouligny.
8.1.1 Expectations

‘As a peacekeeper, taking the people you deal with seriously – whether it be a commander, militiaman, political leader, simple peasant or shantytown dweller- requires understanding how these individuals actually regard you. There are expectations – positive and negative- present before the mission’s arrival and they change during its presence in the country (Pouligny, 2006, p: 96). This was certainly the case in Haiti. By the time MINUSTAH was deployed in 2004 the Haitians had seen a total of 5 UN missions since 1994, all with different mandates and different degrees of success in enacting this mandate. Haitians have had a long negative history with their own military and militaristic methods as well, also influencing their expectations. The previous involvement of the international community, in the form of occupation by the US in the beginning of the 20th century, and the crippling embargoes in the 90's have also led to a negative opinion of foreign involvement in their country. The long history of aid assistance to Haiti also needs to be taken into consideration, as this has created the assumption that everyone who comes from outside brings aid. So Haitians might expect material gains from the UN mission (Pouligny, 2006: 160).

Several interviewees stressed the high levels of expectations that people have of this mission. The high degree of visibility of the white UN cars, and also the knowledge of its budget leads people to believe that great results should follow. ‘My opinion is MINUSTAH; they spend 33 million dollars per month, more than a million a day, what is the result. I do not say the result is zero, but I do not see or feel, we don't see the work of MINUSTAH. And they spend a lot of money, but we don't see' (local NGO).

There are also large expectations by local NGOs (LNGOs) to receive money. The LNGOs are aware of MINUSTAH's large budget so that they expect to get funding. However, as was described earlier, the majority of the budget goes towards military spending and staff spending, not towards projects that NGOs might implement. There is only a very limited budget available to support NGOs and to implement projects. 'The population is expecting more, they see all the cars and they know how much they are being paid, what the salaries are, and they don't see anything happening’ (local NGO).

There is also the expectation that MINUSTAH will provide protection for civilians. In a number of cases this expectation has not been lived up to. There have been incidents where MINUSTAH failed to intervene to protect the civilian population (Gauthier, 2008). In August
2005 numerous people died at a football match in Martissant, where several people armed with machetes entered the stadium. MINUSTAH did not intervene to prevent the situation (IJDH, 2005). It seems that while the mission is operating under a Chapter VII mandate, the chief contributing countries are working more along the lines of a traditional peacekeeping mission, and therefore not initiating more robust actions\textsuperscript{45}.

The policing aspect of the mission, carried out by UNPOL, is also merely to 'assist the PNH'. They have no executive authority, something that the population does expect of them (Morneau, in Shamsie, 2006: 72). This expectation closely links to the problems with communicating with the population on the activities of the mission, something that will be discussed in a later paragraph.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{mural.jpg}
\end{center}

\textit{A picture of a mural of demonstrating Haitians, with one sign saying 'Haiti for the Haitians'}

\subsection*{8.1.2 Incidents}

During the years MINUSTAH was present in Haiti a number of incidents have happened that did not benefit the perception of the mission within the NGO community or by the population. One of these incidents happened in the slum area Martissant, an area where there is a great animosity towards the mission. In November 2007, 108 Sri Lankan soldiers who were part of the mission were repatriated to their country. They were charged with sexual exploitation, and the paying of prostitutes who might be under age (International Herald Tribune, 2007). This has had a major impact on the reputation of the mission, and was still mentioned frequently as an example for why there is a lot of hostility towards the mission.

\textsuperscript{45} For other cases of the lack of civilian protection, please see Cavallaro (2005), Keeping the peace in Haiti?
Other incidents that influence the opinion of the mission concern the military operations. In the period when there was greater insecurity in Port au Prince, the military conducted different operations in the slum areas in order to arrest gang members and drug lords. During these operations 'collateral damage' was not uncommon. The slum areas are heavily populated and during gunfire, innocent civilians were often shot or killed. This resulted in a greater distrust of the mission, and also increased the reluctance of NGOs to engage directly with the mission.

8.1.3 Impact and effectiveness

Besides the discussion on the impact of the activities on the humanitarian space, there is also a debate on the actual impact of the QIPs or hearts and minds activities. In many cases the success and efficiency of NGOs in programming is higher than that of the military, due to a better local knowledge (Flint, in Gordon, 2001: 235). In Haiti this is also the case. For example, in some areas military are building schools. A local engineer or mechanic, however, would cost a less than a soldier. It would also have the added benefit of employing someone of the community who can then feed his family, something this quote illustrates. 'You know, paying a soldier 2000 dollars a month to repair a school, when you can find someone for less money, less than 2000 gourdes to do the same job and that can help the family to get a meal' (INGO).

There are different reasons why the impact of the activities might be limited; one of them is time constraints. Among the majority of the mission staff there is a high turnover, frustrating the NGO workers who are in the country for a longer period of time. The yearly renewal of the mandate, and therefore also the budget, also limits the effectiveness of activities as there is limited time for implementation or to thoroughly think about the design of a project. One example was given concerning road construction 'there were a lot of problems, the roads weren't build well, so whenever it rained there was no draining system, so the water would get into the houses. People would stay on the streets because it was better there than in the houses' (INGO).

There are several issues concerning the projects. The lack of follow up is an issue as this reduces the impact of an activity. It also gives the population the impression that the efforts

\[46\] There were approximately 40 gourdes to an American dollar in the beginning of September 2008.
being made are not sincere, as the mission never comes back to check the project. The selection of respondents and the fact that the mission does not know the people in the community is also found troubling by the population and NGOs. If there is no local knowledge, how can the projects be given on the basis of the greatest need? This links to the lack of civil society involvement, a serious concern when looking at the sustainability of the projects. Even though there is no exit strategy as of yet, the mission will eventually leave the country. It would be a shame if all small projects implemented by MINUSTAH cease to exist because the local population does not want to or know how to carry them on. It is also thought that certain interventions that are being performed by MINUSTAH should not be conducted by them, but are part of the mandate of an NGO, who have more experience in implementing these types of projects.

'If the international community's response is to send a peace mission to end the 'conflict', and MINUSTAH does not tackle the causes of violence, it will be difficult to consolidate long-term peace' (Gauthier, 2008). As this quote illustrates, another issue affecting the opinion of the mission is the lack of their tackling structural factors of insecurity, such as poverty, the free circulation of arms, impunity, and corruption (Varma, 2004: 9). With the amount of weapons circulating in Haiti it is extremely important to have a disarmament program, something that NGOs are not qualified to do alone. There was a DDR program at earlier stages of the mission. It was changed however to the CVR unit after the DDR had little success. One of the reasons for the failure of the DDR program was the hypothesis that Haiti was a classical conflict and therefore that programs which worked in other African contexts would work there as well. The lack of government capacity to help implement the programme has also compromised its success. The fact that MINUSTAH is working according to short-term goals is problematic when trying to solve the structural issues the country is facing. The high level of staff turnover is not beneficial either, as it erodes the knowledge that could be present in the mission.

Furthermore, there is a lack of confidence in the quality of the military that are contributing to the mission. It is usually not the best soldiers who get sent to peacekeeping missions, and the countries contributing troops are not all known for their outstanding reputation, particularly in the area of human rights (Gauthier, 2008). The soldiers usually don't speak the local languages either, French or Creole.
8.1.4 Attitude of the mission

Communication is essential in all relationships, and MINUSTAH seems to struggle with this occasionally. NGOs feel that they are not taken seriously, that they are not being listened to, for example in arguments concerning the invasion of humanitarian space or advice on implementation. In one example, concerning the placement of a temporary base in a school, a large international NGO told MINUSTAH that they should not occupy a school, even though it was the summer and the children were not at school. A school is a symbol. The mission disregarded the advice however, and used the school, outraging the population. It has also proven to be difficult to explain why there is reluctance by NGOs to accept a military convoy, for example, despite all of the discussions on humanitarian principles.

A lot of NGOs also feel that MINUSTAH is not open to working with Haitian actors. They say they will work with the national institutions, but will still want to be in control of those interactions. Their willingness to cooperate with Haitian NGOs is even more limited. The lack of civil society involvement is something that greatly disturbs Haitians; it increases their feeling that they are being occupied.

There is also the suspicion that the communication within the mission is faulty, both between the sections and with the UN agencies and the rest of the mission. The different units and aspects of the mission do not always seem aware of each other's activities. There is a lack of information sharing with the population as well. The population does not know what the mission is doing, or why they are even in Haiti. Even though there is a public information unit, and only recently even a MINUSTAH radio station, this information does not seem to reach many. Communities, local and international NGOs struggle to give answers as to what activities MINUSTAH is implementing.

8.1.5 Duplication and parallel structures

Even though one of the reasons to cooperate with one another is to avoid duplication, due to the lack of communication and the unwillingness to listen this is often not very successful, or not perceived as being successful. Linked to this is the creation of a parallel system. The general opinion is that the mission is creating a parallel structure with all the programs they are putting into place. They are not fully supporting the Haitian authorities. MINUSTAH can't be seen as a part of Haiti, programs are creating a process that will create even more
frustrations (INGO). The problem with creating parallel structures is that people start becoming increasingly dependent on the mission to remain in Haiti, for work or financial opportunities. MINUSTAH's mission is predominantly to support national institutions. By taking away support, as they are doing with the QIPs, they are undermining these efforts. They are not empowering the government or giving Haiti a sense of ownership in their own development.

8.1.6 Positive comments
Not all comments are negative regarding the mission. There are certain areas where their work and activities are appreciated. Providing security is an aspect that is considered quite beneficial. A majority of the people agree that if the mission would leave promptly, there would be huge security issues again as the Haitian National Police (HNP) do not have the capacity to respond. Furthermore some of the activities, particularly regarding infrastructure projects, are usually appreciated by NGOs, as these projects can simplify their access to their own beneficiaries as well.

Despite a few positive notes, the majority of the above factors contribute to a great level of distrust towards the mission, greatly complicating an effective and healthy relationship. To reemphasize; the lack of cooperation with Haitian civil society leads to the perception of the mission being an occupational force. The limited visibility of results or impact of activities also leads to them being called 'turista' by the local population; 'they are not doing anything, they are just sitting in the tank, they go to the beach and they are doing nothing' (LNGO.) There is also the feeling that the UN staff members are merely in Haiti for the money and not to bring sustainable change. As a peacekeeping mission, Haiti is a relatively good place to be, the violence is not really targeted towards foreigners, there is no war, and they are in the Caribbean so quick visits to lovely neighbouring islands can be made. Despite all this, there is less hostility towards the mission due to changes in staff and improvements that have been made. As the populations' opinion tends to be quite unstable however, this could change again quite quickly.

Some NGOs feel sorry for the military in the mission. They have been placed in Haiti, a context that does not require military action. The military are stuck in a catch-22, they can't do any more military activities, yet they are there and are visible, so they do some other
activities, but they get criticized for that as well, they can't do anything' (INGO). As was stated earlier, there is a tendency for the population and the Haitian government to blame international intervention, and due to its high visibility MINUSTAH is very effective scapegoat 'for everything that is going wrong in the country and for the effectiveness and the inability of the government to provide' (INGO). This view is shared by some of the authors who have extensively researched Haiti, such as Girard and Buss.

8.2 Opinion of the NGO community

As pointed out earlier, it is important to keep in mind the great differences within the NGO community in Haiti - one might not even call it a community as such. There are very principled NGOs who will not cooperate with MINUSTAH, and there are those that are more practical. There are certainly positive comments concerning NGOs, about the activities that they are doing. There were however still comments of a more negative nature that were made criticising the NGO community generally, focusing on their fragmentation, quality and their attitude towards the mission or sincerity in their motives.

8.2.1 Fragmentation and politicisation

‘Everyone has an NGO here; it is an individual enterprise very often. That is a big problem here' (MINUSTAH staff). There are an incredible amount of NGOs present in Haiti. Most respondents suggested there are hundreds, if not thousands, with a large diversity in effectiveness and sincerity in motives. The large fragmentation of the NGOs makes it difficult and complicated to find the NGOs that are suitable to start a partnership with. The lack of structure in the civil society due to the large number of NGOs further complicates their already tricky relationship. '... for the UN it is this myriad of [NGOs], it's very tough for them to have any structured dialogue with this atomised reality of NGOs' (INGO). On a more positive note, it also makes it possible to always find NGOs who are willing to work with the mission, who do need the funding and visibility that MINUSTAH can bring.

The large amount of NGOs is partly due to the weakness of the government in service delivery. NGOs have jumped into this gap in order to have at least some services delivered. There are therefore NGOs that have a lot of different specialities. Another reason for the

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47 Civil Society signifies a large amount of groups and people, not just NGOs. Community based organisations, social movements and other interest groups are also part of civil society (LSE, 2004).
numerous NGOs is the lack of employment opportunities. Haitians who have had some education often choose to start an NGO as that might present them with the opportunity to receive some money. *They can create their own business, but they should not be creating an NGO* (MINUSTAH staff). Another result of the lack of capacity of the government is that NGOs are also creating parallel structures, *... in general there is the problem with aid that they are creating parallel structures and letting the government just take their hands off and not take responsibility. The government is just sitting back* (International expert).

Theoretically NGOs should not be linked to a political party, as their name suggests they are nongovernmental. Haitian NGOs do tend to be politicised however. Ever since civil society came up, a majority of the NGOs were formed as a resistance to the government, at the time the Duvalier dictatorship. A lot of those NGOs then started to support Aristide. As the opinion of Aristide changed, so did the attitude of a number of the NGOs. One can currently divide a lot of NGOs in either pro- or anti- Aristide. For the political section of the mission this is extremely interesting, as they can see NGOs as players in the complicated political field of Haiti. Other people within the mission see the politicisation of NGOs as the reason why MINUSTAH is criticised, suggesting that the criticisms are politically motivated.

### 8.2.2 Quality

A lot of respondents have emphasised the difficulties of finding good NGOs to work with due to the quality of the staff. Due to the lack of socio-economical opportunities there is only a small percentage in the country that can read and write. However, a major issue is the ‘brain drain’. According to a study of the World Bank, 81% of the qualified population leaves the country as there are hardly any opportunities in Haiti, (World Bank, 2005). The majority of the population who would therefore be capable of running a successful NGO, or to aid the development of the country has left.

The capacity of local NGOs is often another problem. Often they do not know how to write project proposals good enough to receive funding from a donor. They frequently lack the administrative capability to implement projects, particularly the financial administration, less so with international NGOs than with local ones. Financial administration is essential for donors who want the spending of their funding well documented. Project design is also seen as a skill that local NGOs struggle with. Consequently only a few NGOs constantly receive...
the funding for projects. Once they have worked with the UN, a UN agency or an international NGO their chance for receiving funding again increases drastically.

It is not just MINUSTAH that struggles with a turnover of staff, this is also an issue within the international NGO community. In some NGOs expatriate staff will only stay six months. This is not enough time to grasp the complex context of Haiti, and it results in a lack of continuity in the assistance that is given. 'Every time there is someone else coming they have to start from scratch again' (MINUSTAH staff). Furthermore, it is not just the mission that focuses on short-term goals, NGOs are also occasionally guilty of this, and sometimes this lack of a long term vision deepens the problems instead of easing or solving them.

8.2.3 Attitude of NGOs

Several comments were made on the attitude of NGOs when cooperating with the mission. People within the mission feel that NGOs only see them as the bad guys. Particularly among international NGOs comments were more challenging as they criticise the mission to a greater extent, making it easier for the mission to work with local NGOs.

The reluctance of NGOs to work with the mission, often due to humanitarian principles, also seems to be another important factor in the opinion of the mission of NGOs. 'The majority of NGOs are not open minded to have a close relationship with MINUSTAH (MINUSTAH staff). Even though some staff within the mission seems to understand the reservations NGOs have, there are still those that seem to feel that the NGOs are creating a problem that is not really there.

Another voiced opinion is that Haitian NGOs are not sincere in their motives for operating and are merely after the money. Haiti has seen a large amount of foreign intervention in different quantities throughout the years, so some Haitians know the system rather well and take advantage of this. They set up their own NGOs, often only consisting of only themselves. Since they know that the mission has a budget, they will try and apply for this money. 'There are a lot of NGOs here only to make money, and the sad thing is, is that they are taking this money from the Haitian people' (international expert).

There are also other NGOs that adjust to whatever area MINUSTAH is focussing on. When
they realise that they need human rights specialists, they will be a human rights specialist. Even if they do not know a lot about the subject: '...the way they are created is often based on a question of opportunity. There are a lot of organisations that are in it for profit and not professional and have no means to develop. This is most of them' (MINUSTAH staff).

8.3 Effects on the activities
The opinions and expectations all influence the relationship between MINUSTAH and NGOs. International NGOs often partner with local organisations in order to create sustainable projects and give the community a sense of ownership. The opinion of the population of MINUSTAH is therefore extremely important. Since it is negative and hostile, INGOs will refrain from cooperating with the mission, as this will distance them from their own partners and beneficiaries.

8.3.1 The integrated mission MINUSTAH
MINUSTAH is an integrated mission and this has implications for its interaction with NGOs. 'There is an integrated mission here; all the UN agencies are included. People see it as such on the field as well, MINUSTAH is all the agencies, the UN is MINUSTAH. There is no distinction there' (INGO). The lack of distinction complicates the interaction between MINUSTAH and NGOs. If all UN organisations, the peacekeeping mission and all the agencies within the UN country team are supposed to be seen as operating under one umbrella, then how can an NGO work with them, since they will automatically be associated with the most visible part of the mission: the military (Pouligny, 2006: 30). The military drive around in large open vehicles, wear uniforms, guns and a blue beret or helmet. 'That's where you see this whole integrated mission thing, it makes boundaries very difficult to see, it fuzzes stuff' (INGO).

It makes it more complicated to work with the civilian aspects of the mission, or even with the UN agencies. They are also perceived as being part of the military and political nature of MINUSTAH. Even within the mission, there seem to be issues with how the civilian actors and the UN agencies work with the military, and how they can prevent the negative perception, which mostly focuses on the most visible part, the military, from affecting their work. For NGOs the confusion between the UN agencies and MINUSTAH also creates scepticism in both their work. This confusion is partly caused by the fact that the UN agencies
were often working in the country before this mission came into the country, and therefore they used to be separate from a UN mission, whereas now they have to report to the deputy DSRSG of the mission. The question was raised in how far the UN agencies can keep their own space for operation, or are they completely being taken over by the mission structure that was imposed on them in 2004.

How the concept of an integrated mission is implemented in Haiti by MINUSTAH is an area in which there does not appear to be a lot of clarity. During interviews it was suggested that the integration was failing, as even within the mission they are unclear of the practical implications of the integrated mission. UN agencies see themselves as non-MINUSTAH, and so do some of the units within the DPKO part of the mission. If it is not clear or implemented throughout all the different aspects of the mission, then how can it be expected that the NGO community grasps the concept of how it is being implemented in Haiti. The structure of the integrated mission is so complicated that everyone seems to have a different idea of what constitutes the mission.

8.3.2 Humanitarian principles

Issues of humanitarian principles and humanitarian space are essential in this discussion in the interaction between MINUSTAH and NGOs. Of all the humanitarian principles independence seems to be particularly important when defining the relationship. Since the mission struggles with the opinions and perceptions of the local population it is very important for NGOs to remain independent from the UN mission. They cannot risk the chance of being associated with the mission and thereby jeopardising their own activities, or even compromising their own safety, as there have been specific attacks aimed at MINUSTAH, such as during the riots in April 2008. '... so it proved again to us NGOs, that it's so important to keep our name and our operations separate, in the perception of the population. Because the day we are being perceived as being all and the same, we're in big trouble' (INGO).

As explained in Chapter 5, closely linked to this is the principle of neutrality. When NGOs are associated with the mission, which is there due to a political mandate, they risk losing their neutrality, since they will be linked to the political motives of the mission. 'With MINUSTAH even the civilians are considered military, the activities they are doing are military' (LNGO).
8.4 Opinion of international actors of local actors
Haiti has received billions of dollars of aid for many years and the country is still struggling and still considered a failed state. There are numerous reasons for this, but one aspect that seemed to come forward quite frequently in both literature and some of the international actors who took part in interviews was the corruption and unwillingness of the Haitian government to really assist their country frustrates the international community. For years they have been able to play out the international community to assist them, and as one of the respondents said, they are the only country that calculates foreign aid in their national budget.

The international community has always been a scapegoat for the failures of Haiti; the French colonisers are still being blamed by the Haitian government, with Aristide asking for a reimbursement in 2003 from France of 21 billion US dollars as just one recent example (Girard, 2005: 191). MINUSTAH is now functioning as 'the bad guy', making it possible for the government to distract and manipulate the population (Buss, Girard and others).

There is a lot of frustration among international donors on the unwillingness of the Haitian government to take any responsibility, and although the foreign actors might have assisted this mentality by their lenience to accept a lot from the government out of guilt perhaps, it is time for them now to accept that they are a key factor for the failure of the state. Haiti likes to see itself as a sovereign country, but they are definitely not acting as such. Acts such as service delivery in the sectors of health, education and water, are almost completely in the hands of local and international development or humanitarian agencies, for this reason Haiti has even been called the 'Republic of NGOs' (Hermann, 2007: 82). 'Ultimately, Haitians of all stripes, resident in the country and in Haiti’s impressive diaspora, must assume responsibility for their country's future rather than hoping that the UN can solve the country's multiple and complex problems for them' (Einsiedel, 2006: 170).
Conclusion

This thesis set out to find out how different factors in Haiti influenced the relationship between the UN integrated mission MINUSTAH and NGOs. Several issues came forward, one being the complex context of the country. Haiti's long history of military involvement, including a multitude of military coups, military occupations by the US, and 5 UN peacekeeping missions, have all helped form the opinion of the population on military forces. These often negative experiences complicate the functioning of MINUSTAH, and therefore their cooperation with local NGOs and international NGOs who work with these local NGOs. The reason for a peacekeeping force in Haiti is also questioned at this time. While there are security issues such as kidnappings and urban violence, there is no war in the country. The security problems, which are greatly linked to the poverty and lack of opportunities for the population, should not be targeted with a military force, the majority of the mission.

MINUSTAH and the NGO community interact in different ways resulting in different types of activities. Coordination meetings are one essential form of interaction, as these are often the only time when INGOs and MINUSTAH come into direct contact. The effectiveness of these meetings is questioned however, as communication and information sharing seems to be limited. The different units in the mission, that are responsible for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the mandate, work with mostly local NGOs to implement small projects. The control and power is still predominantly with the mission by often controlling the budget, the project design and the monitoring and evaluation. Quick Impact Projects and hearts and minds activities can be done in cooperation with NGOs. The effectiveness of these activities is often challenged however, due to the rush in which the activities need to be implemented; they are often not thought through. Finally, during disasters, which in Haiti are predominantly hurricanes and tropical storms resulting in severe flooding and mudslides, NGOs and MINUSTAH work together. This seems to be the most positive interaction due to MINUSTAHs large logistical capacities; this is one time where both actors truly need each other to save lives.

The reasons for choosing cooperating in specific types of activities are another factor
influencing the relationship. For NGOs the reasons range from direct motivations such as receiving funding, improving their visibility and logistical support, to more indirect cooperation with coordination to avoid duplication and overlap and keeping the discussion going on the importance of humanitarian space and humanitarian principles, something that the mission infringes on at times. For MINUSTAH, implementing the civilian aspects of their mandate is an important reason to engage in cooperation with NGOs, as their budget and human resources in the civilian pillars is rather limited. Improving their reputation, gaining the hearts and minds of local communities, and showing that the mission does not merely consist of the 'bad guys' is also extremely important.

The factors that most greatly influence the relationship between MINUSTAH and the different NGOs working in Haiti relate to the opinions and perceptions they have of one another. The legitimacy of MINUSTAH is heavily under fire. The success of their implementation of the mandate is very limited, national institutions such as the police are still extremely weak, whereas strengthening these institutions is a main aspect of their mandate. The impact of other activities the mission is implementing is also rather limited. The government is corrupt and their capacity is weak to the degree that even MINUSTAH has planned to give them less QIPs and in doing so MINUSTAH de-legitimises their presence even further as they are mandated to strengthen the government. Although the local population see some improvements in the security situation, in general they do not acknowledge the mission as a useful actor, and instead see them as either 'turista' or as an occupational force. The incidents such as the abuse by the Sri Lankan soldiers, or the 'collateral damage' during military operations further exacerbate this opinion. The image of them being tourists is also reinforced by the continuing security problems and the lack of impact of the mission's activities and yet high visibility of their presence. The lack of civil society interaction also frustrates NGOs and increases the perception of being occupied by a foreign force. On the subject of cooperation, why would an NGO, local or international, want a more direct cooperation or relationship with a partner who does not enjoy internal or national legitimacy?

NGOs also do not enjoy a very positive image with people from within the mission. The attitude of the NGOs is problematic; they only see the mission as 'bad guys'. The lack of willingness to engage with the mission frustrates them. The lack of capacity, the fragmentation and the politicisation are often heard criticisms from within the mission, and
are also voiced within the NGO community. The sincerity of a large number of local NGOs is also questioned; they are portrayed as only being interested in the money that MINUSTAH can bring, and not in actually wanting to improve the situation of the community.

Another issue that is very important relates to principles guiding the humanitarian community. International NGOs struggle with the narrowing of humanitarian space by MINUSTAH and the lack of real understanding or respect of the importance of the humanitarian principles. It is important for NGOs to remain independent in order to successfully implement activities, as the mission has a negative reputation with the population this importance increases. During the riots in April 2008 MINUSTAH was deliberately targeted, illustrating the hostility of the population towards them and thereby the importance for the NGO community to not be associated with them. MINUSTAH calling some of their activities humanitarian while not using the principles of impartiality or neutrality in their implementation, as the activities are by definition politically motivated, are also issues of concern. In general, NGOs should not be associated with the military in order to maintain independence, and as the most visible part of the mission are the military, this is an important factor for NGOs not to be seen with MINUSTAH.

MINUSTAH being an integrated mission further complicates the situation, as it 'fuzzes' the lines between the military aspects and the civilian aspects of the mission, as well as with the UN agencies. As an integrated mission, all aspects of the UN are working under one umbrella, within the mission itself however they do not necessarily see themselves as such. They want to maintain their own independence, particularly UN agencies, and they will continue to implement their own programmes, which they have been doing before this peacekeeping mission arrived in 2004. The conflict of agendas; political, military and humanitarian are therefore problematic, as even the civilian aspects of the mission are politically motivated and associated with the military, even engaging with the civilians within the mission compromises the humanitarian principles for NGOs.

These negative opinions and expectations that are not being lived up to lead to a low level of trust in the relationship, and a lot of underlying hostility. It seems that all the above factors have created a relationship that is so wrought with problems that it is impossible to improve the situation. It is a relationship so troubled that a lot of people would give me the answer to the research straight away upon meeting them, 'there is no relationship'. With that in mind,
the question how the relationship can be improved seems even more relevant, as such a strong reaction indicates some sort of relationship, albeit a negative one. The lack of trust and more importantly the lack of willingness of both actors to engage in more activities make it seem nearly impossible to engage in a more direct cooperation. The need or wish to do this is not there either. A relationship is not merely direct cooperation however, and can also be formed through indirect interaction. Improvement of that can definitely be beneficial and less contentious. MINUSTAH should improve their communication with the population about the activities that they are doing and possibly also on how the budget is divided, as there are a lot of expectations and issues surrounding the financing of the mission. The UN should also learn from previous missions and mistakes, issues with internal legitimacy and negative perceptions by the local population are not new to MINUSTAH but have plagued most UN missions in Haiti. This can improve the reputation of the mission, making it easier to cooperate with NGOs. Better induction for the military concerning humanitarian principles and designing projects with a quick impact upon coming to Haiti could also bring an important change, as it could also improve the perception of the population. Closely associated with this is using the knowledge from UN agencies and NGOs in the design of such projects. NGOs also have something to contribute; they can be extremely useful in the aforementioned induction, by for example explaining their interactions and the importance of the humanitarian principles using practical examples of Haiti. They should however be willing to contribute to such an activity and realise that it can improve the way the military choose their activities or act around NGOs. The induction can take place on a high level, so the direct cooperation is not obvious, therefore not compromising the independence of the NGOs. The success of these suggestions is all dependent on the leadership and personalities of the staff of both the NGOs and MINUSTAH, and with the high turnover of all their international staff it will be extremely challenging.

It has to be mentioned that it appears that the mandate and perhaps even the presence of MINUSTAH in its current form is not the right answer for Haiti. The context does not require a peacekeeping mission to be there that consists of predominantly military forces. Therefore their actions, even though they have improved the security situation, and their presence cannot be seen as legitimate. Another option could be a stronger UNPOL presence within the mission, as they will then have a greater capacity to train and strengthen the HNP. Until the mandate changes, and the international community, with the US first, realises that Haiti needs a different approach in order to help stabilise the country, it will be very difficult to really
improve the relationship between the UN mission and NGOs.

The troubled environment in which actors have to work in Haiti, a hostility from the local population towards MINUSTAH and international interference, negative opinions between MINUSTAH and NGOs, as well as a more general troubled environment with security problems, corrupt authorities and yearly reoccurring natural disasters, makes all intervention complicated and complex.

It appears that many people, both Haitians and international staff working in Haiti, have lost hope that any improvements will happen in the next ten years. Haiti still desperately needs assistance and it is up to the willingness of all actors involved to create their own context within the Haitian context in which they can all implement their different mandates without overlap, duplication or hostility. A healthy relationship, with either direct or indirect interaction, between all actors working in that context is essential to improve Haiti and to create an environment in which all actors, predominantly the Haitians themselves, can prosper.
Appendix I

Resolution 1780 (2007)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5758th meeting on 15 October 2007

The Security Council,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti,
Welcoming recent steps towards achieving lasting stability and democracy in Haiti,
Welcoming the continuing achievements in Haiti’s political process, including through the peaceful holding on 29 April 2007 of the final round of local and municipal elections, and noting with satisfaction the number of women and youth engaged in this process,
Reaffirming the inter-connected nature of the challenges in Haiti, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, rule of law and institutional reform, national reconciliation, and development are mutually reinforcing, and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Government of Haiti and the international community to address these challenges,
Recognizing that respect for human rights, due process and addressing the issue of criminality and putting an end to impunity are essential to ensuring the rule of law and security in Haiti,
Acknowledging significant improvements in the security situation in recent months but noting that the security situation remains fragile,
Emphasizing the importance of cooperation between Haiti and neighboring and regional states in effectively managing and securing Haiti’s borders, and in line with the shared interest to secure these borders,
Underscoring that international illicit trafficking of drugs and arms continues to affect the stability of Haiti,
Commending the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), for continuing to assist the Government of Haiti to ensure a secure and stable environment,
Emphasizing the role of regional organizations in the ongoing process of stabilization and reconstruction of Haiti and calling on MINUSTAH to continue to work closely with the Organization of the American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),
Stressing the importance of establishing credible, competent and transparent governance, and encouraging the Government of Haiti to further strengthen state institutions,
Welcoming the initial steps towards establishing a legislative framework for judicial reform through collaboration between the legislative and executive branches,
Commending the establishment of the Consultative Commission on Prolonged Pretrial Detention, and expressing its strong support for further efforts on this issue as well as in addressing prison overcrowding,
Calling on the Haitian government, in coordination with the international community, to advance security sector reform, in particular by continuing the implementation of the Haitian National Police (HNP) Reform Plan, as well as efforts to reform the critical judiciary and correctional systems,
Welcoming the support of OAS to update the Haitian voter registry and calling on the Haitian authorities, with the continued support of donors and regional organizations as well as MINUSTAH and the UN system, to establish permanent and effective electoral institutions, and to hold elections consistent with Haiti’s constitutional requirements,
Underlining the need for the quick implementation of highly effective and visible labor intensive projects that help create jobs and deliver basic social services,
Acknowledging the laudable work done by Haitian authorities and MINUSTAH to respond to the needs of disaster-affected people, and welcoming future coordinated actions in this regard,
Expressing gratitude to the troops and police personnel of MINUSTAH and to their countries and paying tribute to those injured or killed in the line of duty,
Welcoming the Secretary-General’s report S/2007/503 of 22 August 2007,
Determining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, despite the progress achieved thus far,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as described in section 1 of operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1542 (2004),
1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINUSTAH as contained in its resolutions 1542 (2004), 1608 (2005), 1702 (2006) and 1743 (2007) until 15 October 2008, with the intention of further renewal;
2. Endorses the Secretary General’s recommendation for reconfiguring the Mission in line with the concepts outlined in paragraphs 28 and 29 of his report S/2007/503, taking into account the need to adjust MINUSTAH’s...
composition and realign its activities to reflect the changing circumstances and priorities on the ground and

decides that MINUSTAH will consist of a military component of up to 7,060 troops of all ranks and of a police

compartment of a total of 2,091 police;

3. Expresses its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary General, notably in his efforts to

improve the security situation in close cooperation with the Government of Haiti, and reaffirms his authority in

the coordination and conduct of all activities of United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes in Haiti;

4. Recognizes the ownership and primary responsibility of the Government and the people of Haiti over all aspects of the country’s stabilization, recognizes the role of MINUSTAH in supporting the Government’s efforts in this regard, and encourages the Government of Haiti to continue to take full advantage of international support to enhance its capacity, which is indispensable for the sustainable success of MINUSTAH;

5. Reaffirms its call upon MINUSTAH to support the constitutional and political process under way in Haiti, including through its good offices and, in cooperation with the Government of Haiti, to promote all-inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation, and to provide logistical and security assistance for the upcoming electoral process;

6. Welcomes the continuing contribution of MINUSTAH to the Government of Haiti’s efforts to build institutional capacity at all levels and calls upon MINUSTAH, consistent with its mandate, to expand such support to strengthen selfsustainable state institutions, especially outside Port-au-Prince, including through the provision of specialized expertise to key ministries and institutions, taking into account the ongoing efforts by the Haitian authorities to fight all forms of crime;

7. Requests that MINUSTAH continue its support of the HNP as deemed necessary to ensure security in Haiti, and encourages MINUSTAH and the Government of Haiti to continue to undertake coordinated deterrent actions to decrease the level of violence;

8. Welcomes progress in the implementation of the HNP Reform Plan and requests MINUSTAH to remain engaged in assisting the Government of Haiti to reform and restructure the HNP, consistent with its mandate, notably by supporting the monitoring, mentoring, training, vetting of police personnel and strengthening of institutional capacities, while working to recruit sufficient individual police officers to serve as instructors and mentors of the HNP, consistent with its overall strategy to progressively transfer geographic and functional responsibilities to its Haitian counterparts to facilitate HNP engagement in conventional law and order duties, in accordance with the HNP Reform Plan;

9. Invites member states, including neighboring and regional states, in coordination with MINUSTAH, to engage with the Government to address crossborder illicit trafficking of drugs, arms and other illegal activities, and to contribute to strengthening HNP capacity in these areas;

10. Requests MINUSTAH to provide technical expertise in support of the efforts of the Government to pursue a comprehensive border management approach, with emphasis on state capacity building, and underlines the need for coordinated international support for Government efforts in this area;

11. Recognizes the need for MINUSTAH to establish patrols along maritime and land border areas in support of border security activities by the HNP, and encourages MINUSTAH to continue discussions with the government of Haiti and member states to assess the threats along Haiti’s land and maritime borders,

12. Requests the UN country team, and calls upon all relevant humanitarian and development actors, to complement security operations undertaken by the Government of Haiti with the support of MINUSTAH with activities aimed at effectively improving the living conditions of the concerned populations and requests MINUSTAH to continue to implement quick impact projects;

13. Condemns any attack against personnel from MINUSTAH and demands that no acts of intimidation or violence be directed against United Nations and associated personnel or other international and humanitarian organizations engaged in humanitarian, development or peacekeeping work;

14. Welcomes the steps taken towards the reform of rule of law institutions, requests MINUSTAH to continue to provide necessary support in this regard, and encourages the Haitian authorities to take full advantage of that support, notably in such areas as restructuring the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, certifying magistrates, providing legal aid to the most vulnerable, and modernizing key legislation;

15. Requests MINUSTAH to continue to pursue its community violence reduction approach, including through support to the National Commission on Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration and concentrating its efforts on labor intensive projects, the development of a weapons registry, the revision of current laws on importation and possession of arms, and reform of the weapons permit system;

16. Reaffirms MINUSTAH’s human rights mandate and calls on the Haitian authorities to continue their efforts to promote and protect human rights, and calls on MINUSTAH to continue to provide human rights training to the Haitian National Police and other relevant institutions, including the correctional services;

17. Strongly condemns the grave violations against children affected by armed violence, as well as widespread rape and other sexual abuse of girls, and requests MINUSTAH to continue to promote and protect the rights of women and children as set out in Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1612 (2005);

18. Encourages MINUSTAH and the UN Country Team to enhance their coordination as well as with the various development actors in Haiti in order to ensure greater efficiency in development efforts and to address

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urgent development problems;
19. Calls on the UN system and the international community, in particular donor countries and institutions, in cooperation with the Haitian authorities, to devise and support a renewed aid coordination system, based on mutual responsibility, which would focus on immediate needs as well as on long-term reconstruction and poverty reduction, and encourages donors to accelerate the disbursement of their pledges as a contribution to development and stability in Haiti;
20. Welcomes progress made by MINUSTAH in communications and public outreach strategy and requests it to continue these activities;
21. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance of all MINUSTAH personnel with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to ensure that acts involving their personnel are properly investigated and punished;
22. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of MINUSTAH’s mandate semi-annually and not later than 45 days prior to its expiration, taking into account a review of the activities and composition of MINUSTAH, its coordination with the UN country team and other development actors, a comprehensive assessment of threats to security in Haiti, and the development during this mandate period of a consolidation plan with appropriate benchmarks to measure and track progress, in consultation with the Haitian government;

23. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Appendix II

Chapter VI: Pacific settlement of disputes

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle
their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance
of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the
nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the
General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the
Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it
accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific
settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention
under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article
33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of
adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement
of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take
into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties
to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of
the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by
the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

**Article 38**

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes.

**Article 44**

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

**Article 45**

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

**Article 46**

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

**Article 47**

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

**Article 48**

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

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Images

Picture main page: Logan Abassi, www.minustah.org


Map Haiti in world from: http://www.answers.com/topic/haiti

Map Port-au-Prince: http://maps.google.com

Picture Hurricane Hanna: Logan Abassi, www.minustah.org